

Migration, integration of immigrants and integration statistics in Central Europe: possibilities and restraints.¹

Attila Meleg
Demographic Research Institute,

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Integration and migration policies are in a very difficult position as there are no clear ideas of trends and basic structures governing migration processes. This is mainly due to the enormous complexity of the phenomenon itself which is determined by multiple socio-economic factors, international links, historical ties, cultural cognitive patterns (Sassen 1996, 1998, 1999, 2001; Sik 2001; Portes 1995; Böröcz 2002; Castles 2000, 2003; Massey 1998; Favell 1998). There are widely different migratory groups and migratory intentions, which makes the task of analysts and policy makers almost impossible. One clear way out of being lost among these myriads of factors is to look for macro structures, migratory and integration cultures and cultural, cognitive, discursive patterns governing migration, circular migration and also settlement.

This is especially important in our region of Central (Central and Eastern Europe) where individual countries present rather different migratory and integration profile as this region includes countries of immigration like Austria, countries of emigration like Romania and countries which show a rather low profile both in terms of immigration and emigration like Hungary or Slovakia. In addition these countries, having not only different migratory profiles, also show somewhat different migratory and integration policies and statistical systems regardless of the efforts to unify these systems on the EU level. Thus it seems to be very difficult to formulate a coherent picture.

On this basis this paper intends to formulate some ideas concerning the macro structures guiding migration processes in the concerned region and ways how the

¹ Some parts of this analysis is absed ont he a project funded by European Integration Fund in Hungary, 2009
EIA/2007/3.2.3.1

different states try to handle the management of migration and statistical systems related to that. This paper provides some ideas concerning these complex issues, which nonetheless requires the simultaneous handling of these problems.

In concrete the paper will argue that there is a need to relocate the different countries into a large scale systems and historical approach in order to see how and why these countries have different migratory profiles and to see how the different states handle migration and integration and statistics and what conclusions we can draw from this analysis and with view of this how the measurement of integration on a national and cross national level can be solved with respect to data sources. The paper provides some preliminary ideas in this respect for the sake of starting a discussion ²

The paper will then contain the following parts:

- The concept of integration
- Integration, integration indicators and migration policies in Europe
- Migration processes in Central and Eastern Europe and the issue of migratory spaces
- Attitudes toward foreigners and countries of Eastern and Central European countries
- The analysis of some countries in the region concerning integration and migration policy and possibilities of measuring integration.

Integration: conceptual frameworks

We first have to note that integration is a fluid and complex concept which has made its fame during the last 30 years mainly as opposed to concepts like assimilation and acculturation. The sociological use of the term originating from the Chicago School would be rather clear, but its actual use in research and institutional, national programs is much more floated even we can say it some ways reverses the original meaning of the term.

In a neutral sense integration and social integration should be the description of how the society is structurally organized in terms of institutions and reproduction as

² It is important to note that this paper is NOT arguing against most other micro, mezzo and macro level approaches (network theory, social capital theory, individual calculation, historical links, enclave economies), rather beside using some of the insights, especially when integration is analyzed, it promotes a complementary approach.

thoroughly theorized by such diverging classics of sociology and thinkers like Parsons, Durkheim or very importantly Karl Polányi developing different types of social and economic integration. This approach applied to migrants and asking the question what structures are available for them to set their personal and social spaces after crossing in some forms national boundaries is completely missing from present discussions. This approach would neatly avoid the loaded question underlying integration research and policy: “...*who or what is integrating whom and with what?*” (Favell, 2000) Nonetheless, we have to note that this question remains the question even today. The best way to avoid this “activist” type of concept would be to focus on the complex interaction (spaces) of migrants, migrant groups, host groups and institutions, and sending groups and sending societies which interaction is shaped by various social conditions, public discourses (Melegh 2010, Melegh-Kovács-Gödri, 2010, chapter 1). This can be regarded as a demanding concept which can and which is hardly covered by research or more importantly by institutional management of these processes. There are several reasons for this:

Such a complex research would be always very costly and requiring several scholarly disciplines which approaches are interested in maintaining scholarly walls instead of cooperation. The “container” approach, that is to say societies, nations as well-defined containers into which we have to “integrate” migrants as people coming from outside is an overall scholarly and political bias which can be hardly avoided (Favell, 2000). The above container approach is also supported by certain logics of capitalism which would look for the management, exploitation and disciplining of available labor and human stocks for advancing the competitive capacity of individual states and blocks of states like the European Union.

Also there are different complex philosophies of integration which have an enormous impact how the complexity of integration is understood, analyzed, institutionalized (and measured): (Geddes 2003; Bosswick – Heckmann 2006; Carrera 2005; Niessen 2000; Kovács – Vidra 2004; Zolberg 1999; Kovács 2004a; Joppke 1999; Cole 2000; Favell 1998). The first one we can be multiculturalism (Canada, Sweden as relevant examples), the second assimilation (like in France), the third selective exclusion (Switzerland) and the fourth transnationalism promoted by international, supranational organizations including the EU itself. (see Melegh 2010). These philosophies are all relevant and not a single state can be characterized by one approach only. Nonetheless we have to note that the region we analyzed can be

primarily described by selective exclusion which means that migrants are severely selected on grounds how citizenship can be provided for them and how citizenship is actively or indirectly denied of many migrant groups (Iglucka-Okólski, 2005). This is a region of ethnic privileges and rather clear discrimination against some other groups. But this is one of the actual problems we analyze and first we should look at European development concerning a more unified approach to integration and measuring integration. Let us review this process also in order to understand why the complex understanding of integration is almost unattainable. .

Migration policy, integration indicators and European developments

Böröcz in a recent book of his rather powerfully argues that the EU as non state is constantly maneuvering in the competition for global control in order to overcome the lack of weight of concerned European states (this is why they actually create the Union), to maintain its competitiveness in term of rates of wealth and economic development and to play a double game of playing unity in certain aspects and to behave as separate nation states when that serves better certain interests (Böröcz 2010). The case of migration policy and the management of migration can be an excellent example of his argument. EU policy on the management of migration can be characterized by looking for extra labor to increase weight in terms of labor resources and to do it in a way that it maintains high rates of wealth and high quality social services for the local populations partially closed toward non-European immigrant groups. This complex maneuvering can be described by the following concerns in migration policies.

After giving up zero growth policy European states and most importantly the Commission are looking for managed migratory inflows in order to secure inflows of adequate labor force from outside the EU, while maintaining and securing internal free flows of people even concerning new member states. This is seen as a very important condition for securing better conditions and thus a proactive migration policy is envisaged especially after the Amsterdam Treaty. (Shierup et al 48-80). This can be a weight and additional supply factor counterbalancing changes in the labor market and demographic structures. It is important to note that this “additional” supply is supposed to be provided through various temporary and seasonal permits, cross-

border, partnership agreements to secure the chances of expulsion, control and to push the issue of labor migration down to local and regional levels (Schierup *ibid*).

There is a very clear attempt to unify and strengthen the border control outside the EU via securing strict Schengen rules and to keep away those who in the eyes of concerned bureaucrat put burden on the Schengen zone countries. In addition it establishes a system which hierarchically sets countries from the point of view of migratory and security concerns (Melegh-Illés 2010).

In terms of integration the most important factor is that European Union citizens enjoy almost citizenship rights within the EU while third country nationals are subjected to different controls over entry into and residence in the European Union and it is a rather definite aim to maintain some exclusion from citizenship and citizenship rights (In some ways this is why there is a talk about integration). This is paralleled with formal “equal” non-discriminatory treatment in welfare services and very importantly in the labor market, and there is a definite attempt to better integrate them into the labor force (into the so called workfare regime) without providing large scale welfare services. (Tóth 2009, integration principles set in 2003 Thessaloniki) Thus it clearly serves the increase of global competitiveness and further capital accumulation (Schierup et al, 2006, 48-80)

In this management and control of migration there is a stress on the willingness of the migrant to get integrated and more and more there is the idea of conditionality of providing legal residence for those not willing to get integrated or those not taking over “central”, “European” values. The best example is Germany where not attending integration courses after 2005 could be a basis for losing residence rights, but we can refer to the Vichy Declaration of 2008 on the integration of immigrants, which set cultural adaptation as a requirement for the migrants. We may talk about a “conservative” turn in this respect, more and more turning toward the defense of European values and setting integration obligations for the migrants. (Gárdos et al 2010)

The idea of a unified integration statistics and measurements is also related to the above described management problems and this conservative turn. From 2008 there is a definite attempt to set common measurement (set of indicators) of the integration level of immigrants without analyzing the interaction between immigrants and non-migrants or the host society. (Gárdos et al 2010). If we look at the list of core indicators we can actually very clearly see how the complexity of integration is

pushed aside and how migrants themselves become the main actors of a “film” directed by many other actors and processes.

Policy area	Indicators
Employment	Core indicators: employment rate ⁶ unemployment rate ⁷ activity rates
Education	Core indicators: highest educational attainment (share population with tertiary, secondary and primary or less than primary education) ⁹ share of low-achieving 15-year-olds in reading, mathematics and science ¹⁰ share of 30–34-year-olds with tertiary educational attainment ¹¹ share of early leavers from education and training ¹²
Social inclusion	Core indicators: median net income – the median net income of the immigrant population as a proportion of the median net income of the total population ¹³ at risk of poverty rate – share of population with net disposable income of less than 60 per cent of national median ¹⁴ the share of population perceiving the health status as good or poor ¹⁵ ratio of property owners to non-property owners among immigrants and the total population ¹⁶
Active citizenship ¹⁷	Core indicators: the share of immigrants that have acquired citizenship the share of immigrants holding permanent or long-term residence permits the share of immigrants among elected representatives

The above mentioned set of integration indicators finalized under the Swedish presidency clearly reflect some of the points made above. First, while acknowledging there is an underlying logic of looking for comparable dataset, it is not accidental that that the labor market is the first sphere in which indicators are set. This shows how important it is that immigrants should be first and foremost integrated into the labor

market partially to solve integration problems in this way and partially extending manageable workforce. This fits into the trend that there is also a move from welfare system to “workfare systems” in which process the welfare rights and citizenship rights are made conditional for securing a greater push on individuals to make bigger efforts to get integrated into the labor market (Schierup 2006, 48-80) No inclusion to welfare systems are included among the core indicators. Social inclusion is understood as having property and not being poor which is a rather limited view of social cohesion and social integration. Surprisingly there is no measurement of discrimination (e.g. in labor markets, or public spheres) and inclusion to welfare systems which have been corner stones of integration policy toward migrants in the European Union since the Amsterdam Treaty (Tóth 2010). Overall what is seen as measurable are employment, citizenship and poverty rates among non migrant and (vaguely defined) migrant groups in terms of employment, education and other characteristics related to civic citizenship. (Gárdos et al 2010, Tóth 2010) This set in social perspective indirectly puts the “burden” on the immigrants and it fails to present a clear picture on the actual complex interaction between migrants, migrant groups, the host society, its institutions, discourses and the sending society, which approach is suggested by a wide range of sociological literature (Melegh 2010; Geddes 2003; Bosswick – Heckmann 2006; Carrera 2005; Niessen 2000; Kovács – Vidra 2004; Zolberg 1999; Kovács 2004a; Joppke 1999; Cole 2000; Favell 1998). These “relational” measures could include the following areas:

- Opinion polls measuring attitudes toward immigrants
- Some kind of a measure for provided linguistic and other integration services
- Average length of citizenship processes.
- Use of public money (contribution and use of health funds) etc:

These measure if not having statistical background then they should be promoted in order to measure the interaction and the relationship otherwise we may formulate badly misleading picture on integration and surely the migrants or certain groups of migrants (ethnically or racially defined) will be blamed for the lack of “their” integration. Before turning to our region let us review the migration situation in the region.

Macro structures and migration processes in Central and Eastern Europe: some challenges for integration

Looking at the migratory processes in Europe in the last one hundred year we may observe a very clear gradual process in which previous countries of emigration become countries of immigration. More precisely we can see that countries being somewhat less industrialized or in other words maintaining substantial rural economies and societies provided a huge number of emigrants to industrial centers demanding large numbers of industrial workers and service people. The impetus for this internal and international migration was the crisis of rural societies and economies and the thus appearing low wage local economies based on the willingness of rural people to look for relatively badly paid hard work and jobs outside the local agrarian economy (Massey 1999, Sassen 1998). This type of world-systemic relationship has been formulated by Massey in the following way for basically non-European societies:


International migration originates in the social economic, cultural and political transformations that accompany the penetration of capitalist markets into non-market and pre-market societies (as hypothesized under world system theory). In the context of a globalizing economy, the entry of markets and capital-intensive production technologies into peripheral regions disrupts existing social and economic arrangements and brings about a displacement of people from customary livelihoods, creating a mobile population of workers who actively search for new ways of achieving economic sustenance. (Massey 48).

Our claim in this paper is that this relationship applies historically to the semi-peripheral countries of Europe and in our region. Historically the above mentioned semi-agrarian countries and economies were located in circular way around Western and North-Western Europe including areas of Southern Europe (Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, other Balkan countries), Central and Eastern Europe (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary) and parts of Northern Europe most notably Finland (see the table of Bonifazi, 2008, 110, also 112). The secular trend has been that gradually these countries have changed their position in this world-systemic relationship and has reduced these rural spheres and parallel being niches of cultures of emigration (Black et al 2006).

I also claim in this paper that to some extent interestingly after the freeze of the socialist closure this relationship also applies to the break-up of the so called Socialist Block, which has industrialized its societies rather rapidly between the 1950s and 1980s. Nonetheless, we argue that even at the fall of state socialism there were differences in this respect between Eastern Bloc countries and some have abolished peasant type relationships (like Hungary by the 1960s) while others did this only partially. In other words this gradual process has not been completely finished by the end of socialism and the semi-rural countries were more open to out migration than others.

If we look at our region this macro relationship can also be clearly seen. In Graph 1 and Graph 2 we can observe that there is a clear negative relationship between the ratio of people employed in agriculture and negative or positive net migration here based on the population estimates of the United Nations:

First when we look at Graph 1 we can clearly see that in the beginning of the period (in the 1950s) most countries had a negative migration balance while at the end the picture is much more diverse. Some countries are in the positive (the balance is positive) while others are still providing migrants for other countries. These later countries are Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, while others like Austria and the Czech Republic are well into the positive. Austria actually was the first to get out of this pattern by the 1960s. We have to note that ex-Yugoslavia has been left out from this analysis due to the civil war in the 1990s, which disturbed 'normal processes'. But we can clearly see that in general terms it fitted into the migratory system of an exchange between a poorer and more agrarian region providing migrants (guest workers) for industrial and service demand in wealthier countries.




These net migration rates can be related to employment in agriculture, which can be understood not only as an indirect macro indicator of a certain world systemic relationship, but also as a possible indicator of a culture of emigration very much in line with the above argument of Massey.

In graph 2 we can clearly see that those countries which even today show a clear positive attitude to massive out migration are the ones, which still retained a relatively large employment ratio concerning agriculture. The clearest case for this type is Albania, which even after state socialism retained a ratio of 60 percent and became a country of massive out migration when several hundreds of thousands left for Italy and many other European countries. We can also mention Romania here, which actually became somewhat more rural after the collapse of state socialism and like Albania it produced and produces large number of emigrants. The other often mentioned emigrant country is Poland, which never abolished small scale peasant farming like Hungary did during the 1960s and 1970s. This relationship may also explain why some countries also emerging from state socialism did not produce any huge wave of out migrants regardless of the similar economic processes and similar labor market figures (Map 1). Most notably this can be the case with Hungary which even regardless of having similarly bad labor market figures as in other countries of


the previous semi-agrarian fringe of Europe has shown relatively low interest in finding employment and migration opportunities throughout Europe. In other words we can see countries of emigration with some immigration (Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania), countries of lower emigration and limited immigration (Hungary, Slovakia) and rather urban and low emigrant countries welcoming relatively more immigrants than others in the region (Austria, Czech Republic)

Employment in Agriculture (% of total employment) 1980-2008




In the macro structures not only the supply side is important and not only this position in the world-systemic relationships, but also the demand side, namely the need for immigrant labor. In other words we also have to explain why the Czech Republic and earlier Austria have become more ‘welcoming’ as opposed to Slovakia and Hungary (plus the emigrant countries). One answer can be the demand emerging from the local labor markets, which relationship has been rather well demonstrated for some OECD countries between 1960 and 2007.

Figure I.6. Net migration rate and the business cycle in selected OECD countries, 1960-2007



Source: Annual Labour Force Statistics (OECD), National Accounts Statistics (OECD).

See also <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/635707821768>



1.6 Employment rate in 2005 and employment rate deficit compared to Lisbon target




Sources: Eurostat, DG-REGIO

0 500 Km

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GDP per capita of Selected Central European Countries as related to EU 27, 1997-2008

GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) (EU-27 = 100)



In Graph 3 we can see that Austria and the Czech Republic are the economies which may present larger demand for immigrants due to their higher per capita income, while all other countries have considerably less wealth. Nonetheless, it has been mentioned that even these countries are rich enough to attract migrants from the post-Soviet area and China and Vietnam which is a common migratory feature in the Central and East European region. Only Austria differs somewhat in the sense that it also attracts large number of immigrants from Turkey (due to the guest worker system introduced in the 1960s following the German example and also from a wider number of Asian countries as opposed to the other countries of the region, which welcome only a few people from these areas.

Altogether we can conclude that region can be divided into 3 categories as related to word-systemic relationships and migratory patterns:

- There are countries of emigration, where net migration balances have remained negative throughout a longer period. They also receive immigrants from post-Soviet and some Asian territories, but mainly they appear as a 'labor reservoir' for other European areas. Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and also Yugoslavia (with the exception of Slovenia) and Albania can be such examples.

- There are countries which due to a somewhat different historical development receive immigrants in a closer range of countries, but at the same time they do not provide large number of emigrants. Hungary and Slovakia can be put into this category, within which two countries Hungary has a special attraction toward a larger number of Hungarians living in neighboring countries.
- Also there are countries which earlier or later became countries which receive larger ratios of immigrants, due to their different historical development and earlier deruralization: Austria and the Czech Republic can be such countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

The above structural positions and historical changes surely have an impact on the institutional, discursive and social aspects of integration and including statistical practices and the long terms should be guiding lines for developing appropriate integration policies. The above analysis may point toward two alternative long term consequences.

1. The present emigration countries follow the pattern of those countries which have already moved out this position like other Central European countries or countries of Southern Europe most notably countries like Italy and Portugal. In this case we may expect that just like in the case of Southern Europe new neighboring areas will take over the above positions. This may lead to tensions as Russia also attracts migrants in large numbers from countries like Ukraine or Moldova. In addition Turkey has been already very well integrated into the Central and Western European migratory system. So it may not be able to provide further labor stocks (Bonifazi 2008, Molodikova 2008). This might mean that further countries of Asia and possibly Africa would provide additional laborers.
2. The present countries of emigration maintain an emigration culture in which emigration is a viable and approved strategy in families lacking better options locally. They may maintain channels and networks in order to remain the 'service people' of Europe. Even more this may mean that emigration is further integrated into the local and transnational social practices which has been widely demonstrated by

ethnographic and sociographic analysis (a very good example Turai, 2010, which shows that gender and long term strategies are built on in the business of taking care of elderly people throughout Europe, also Gödri 2009). In this case the internal division of the region is going to stay with us and this may lead to diverging political interests also. This may deepen the conflict around certain rural and poorer Eastern European migrant groups who can be easily scapegoated in the key South and West European immigration countries. Actually they can be labeled is the key groups of integration problems.

Beyond these long term consequences we may understand the above described macro structural positions (Including migratory processes, labor market conditions, GDP hierarchies, economic structures as being the ultimate possibilities and restraints over the integration of immigrants and the ultimate engines for providing emigrants for other regions challenging their integration capabilities

Structural positions and opinion polls: the atmosphere of integration

Concerning both options it is clear that most countries in the region has had limited time to get accustomed to larger scale immigration and even relatively small groups of immigrants may cause concern among the 'local' population. On the basis of the 2006 ESS database we formulate some ideas how the perception of foreigners being ethnically-racially similar or different can be related to the structural positions analyzed above and what public atmosphere they can demonstrate. First let us have a look at how foreigners with similar background are seen in the analyzed countries with the exception of the Czech Republic and Albania for which do not have this data.

Table 1. Attitudes toward immigrants insome countries of the region. ESS 2006

(

			Allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority				Total
			Allow many to come and live here	Allow some	Allow a few	Allow none	
Country	Austria	Count	416	1076	663	130	2285

	% within Country	18,2%	47,1%	29,0%	5,7%	100,0%
Bulgaria	Count	510	370	153	157	1190
	% within Country	42,9%	31,1%	12,9%	13,2%	100,0%
Hungary	Count	338	404	469	249	1460
	% within Country	23,2%	27,7%	32,1%	17,1%	100,0%
Poland	Count	501	835	267	78	1681
	% within Country	29,8%	49,7%	15,9%	4,6%	100,0%
Romania	Count	710	590	409	229	1938
	% within Country	36,6%	30,4%	21,1%	11,8%	100,0%
Slovakia	Count	507	674	359	156	1696
	% within Country	29,9%	39,7%	21,2%	9,2%	100,0%
Total (25 European countries)	Count	10958	19373	10877	4124	45332
	% within Country	24,2%	42,7%	24,0%	9,1%	100,0%

On the basis of this data we can very clearly see that in our region “emigrant” countries are generally more positive toward the immigration of the “us” group than countries which have net immigration. Slovakia and Poland seem to be an outlier in this respect as they are rather close to each other, but we have to note that in Poland 80 percent of the people are welcoming to some degree, while in Slovakia this ratio is a little bit below 70 percent. It is worth noting that Slovakia is also close to Poland in terms of migration potential at least around the mid 1990s (Hárs 2010) when Slovakia just turned to be a net immigrant country. The case of Slovakia and the also the Czech Republic is somewhat modified by the break up of Czechoslovakia and the consequent migration flows between the two countries.

Austria is even less supportive, while Hungary seems to be the least positive among all the analyzed countries and even among all the 25 countries in the database only Spain, Cyprus and Portugal showed less enthusiasm (also being rather recent switchers from emigrant to immigrant countries along similar lines of our analysis)).

If we look at the same opinion poll concerning the item of accepting foreigners with different background the above dividing line between emigrant and immigrant countries is clear again although with some interesting switch.

Table 2 Attitudes toward immigrants insome countries of the region. ESS 2006

	Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority	Total
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			Allow many to come and live here	Allow some	Allow a few	Allow none	
Country	Austria	Count	202	752	1035	301	2290
		% within Country	8,8%	32,8%	45,2%	13,1%	100,0%
	Bulgaria	Count	317	360	222	278	1177
		% within Country	26,9%	30,6%	18,9%	23,6%	100,0%
	Hungary	Count	70	191	623	575	1459
		% within Country	4,8%	13,1%	42,7%	39,4%	100,0%
	Poland	Count	403	756	386	130	1675
		% within Country	24,1%	45,1%	23,0%	7,8%	100,0%
	Romania	Count	596	536	519	301	1952
		% within Country	30,5%	27,5%	26,6%	15,4%	100,0%
	Slovakia	Count	346	668	448	242	1704
		% within Country	20,3%	39,2%	26,3%	14,2%	100,0%
Total	Count		6134	16511	15185	7379	45209
	% within Country		13,6%	36,5%	33,6%	16,3%	100,0%

Concerning the acceptance of 'other' immigrants once again countries with emigrant culture seem to be rather open as they may show some solidarity toward migrants. Nonetheless even some of these countries are very harsh and a very large percentage of respondent say that they would accept zero such immigrants. Slovakia is close to the emigrant group or better to say to the European average, which once again can be explained by becoming immigrant country only very late and some local historical reasons. Austria and Hungary are less receptive. Nonetheless Austria is less prepared to say a complete no to such immigrants, while Hungary once again is very restrictive (again in line with the South European switchers like Portugal)

If poverty of the sending country is asked once gain a very similar picture emerges (emigrant countries are more supportive) with the interesting phenomenon that Bulgaria is divided into supporters of immigration and respondents of zero tolerance.

Table 3. Attitudes toward immigrants insome countries of the region. ESS 2006

			Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe				Total
			Allow many to come and live here	Allow some	Allow a few	Allow none	
Country	Austria	Count	215	767	961	317	2260

	% within Country	9,5%	33,9%	42,5%	14,0%	100,0%
Bulgaria	Count	269	311	247	329	1156
	% within Country	23,3%	26,9%	21,4%	28,5%	100,0%
Hungary	Count	44	136	591	677	1448
	% within Country	3,0%	9,4%	40,8%	46,8%	100,0%
Poland	Count	405	783	373	111	1672
	% within Country	24,2%	46,8%	22,3%	6,6%	100,0%
Romania	Count	538	486	598	321	1943
	% within Country	27,7%	25,0%	30,8%	16,5%	100,0%
Slovakia	Count	324	710	432	222	1688
	% within Country	19,2%	42,1%	25,6%	13,2%	100,0%
Total	Count	5744	15116	15359	8639	44858
	% within Country	12,8%	33,7%	34,2%	19,3%	100,0%

Hungary is once again very negative (in line once again with South European switchers) And Austria with its longer history of immigration is also not open, but also not looking for iron curtains to seal of poor country immigrants.

Unfortunately the Czech Republic could not be included, but other analysis show that they are also presenting the negative picture of recent switchers.

**Table 4. Attitudes toward immigrants in some countries of the region.
Population Policy, Acceptance Survey 2002 (**

Mean number of statements (= agrees or fully agrees) on positive and negative attitudes towards resident foreigners in the country (2001-2002)

Country	Composite variable on positive attitudes towards immigrants – standardized*	Composite variable on negative attitudes towards immigrants – standardized**
Czech Republic	2.6	6.1
Eastern Germany	3.2	6.2
Western Germany	3.5	5.1
Estonia	2.3	6.0
Hungary	1.9	6.9
Austria	4.6	3.2
Poland	2.4	4.4
Slovenia	3.0	5.2
Finland	4.2	6.7

* Standardized for number of items per country

** Standardized for number of items per country and number of items in the composite variable on positive attitudes

Source: FEMAGE-MIG database

Thus we can conclude that

- Emigrant countries in the region are more than average receptive for immigrants, but they are somewhat concerned when poor country immigrants or immigrants of different 'type' are considered.
- Recent switchers are not receptive and also very negative toward all groups. (Slovakia maybe an exception close to the emigrant group in this way due to some special reasons and becoming immigrant only very late). This we may term as a model of closure for the sake of defending fragile positions after the recent transition.
- Countries like Austria with a longer history of immigration are also not very receptive, but much less negative as compared to recent switchers. This can be a model offering some institutionalized ways of inclusion toward immigrants. Probably the Czech Republic is close to this model or it is going to be like this rather soon

Integration, integration policies and integration statistics in Central and Eastern Europe

As described above since the 1960s the region has been going through a transition from emigrant to immigrant countries, which process is certainly has not got to its end. Therefore these countries have had limited amount of time to develop strategies and institutional frameworks for handling political and social problems related to larger scale immigration.

Ethnic privileges

Nonetheless it is to be noted that these countries have had developed earlier a set of institutions handling or trying to handle national minority issues and related cultural and political conflicts. Also as previously all out migration countries they have also developed policies for maintaining contacts with emigrant co-ethnics (Iglicka-Okólski 2005, Melegh 2009; see also Joppke 2005). Thus we cannot say that they were completely unprepared for at least to comprehend some of the key concerns of

integration. Even more we can argue that in many countries migration policy has been either subordinated to such concerns or it has been developed parallel or even in conflict with minority policies (e.g. the definition of national minorities excluding long term immigrant groups in Austria). Hungary can be the case for developing sophisticated national minority legislation inside the country offering special “minority” local councils to the concerned groups, while subsequent governments have also developed a special support and even from the point of view of immigration, a special legislation for incoming Hungarians from neighboring countries being extended as far as now offering citizenship without residing in the country itself (Feischmidt – Zakariás 2010; Melegh 2001, Hegyesi-Melegh 2003; Illés-Melegh 2009). In this respect the country has been a pioneer, where opinion polls are sharply divided in attitudes toward immigrants of Hungarian ethnic background or that of outside the region and where Hungarians receive a full support. In the early 2000s in national policy there was the offer of Hungarian cards to ethnic Hungarians containing some privileges in maintaining relationship with the country (including help in visa issuance in countries termed as third countries, i.e. Ukraine) has been followed in Poland and also in Slovakia. Interestingly double citizenship has been pioneered not in Hungary (despite of early attempts and a current introduction) but by Romania trying to secure citizenship to ethnic Romanians in Moldavia on massive scale. It seems that the policies of ethnic privileges rapidly spread around the region. Thus we can clearly argue that the region has some possibility to translate some of the minority and ethnic privilege policies to larger scale migration policy and to other groups of migrants, but this possibility has not been utilized and even it seems that walls between these two areas are increasing. This is all the more demanding as from a focus group analysis on discussing the integration of female immigrants it turned out that understanding migration from the perspective of minority issues could be a common ground for experts with differing views and approaches (Melegh, 2010). Concerning migrant groups the following areas may emerge which have been previously just for ethnically privileged groups:

- providing easier transnational rights (now set for co-ethnic groups living outside the respective countries) for commuting internationally (visa practice, denizen rights, citizenship)
- allowing some local council and media representation (set for inner minorities)

- using ombudsman or some form of constitutional protection (provided for inner minorities now)
- extra funding for cultural and social activities

Integration policies toward migrants in the region

It is somewhat difficult to find a direct link between structural positions in migratory processes, overall climate of attitudes and the development of integration and migration policies. This can be related to the fact that integration policies and practices are set into a complex institutional framework and very importantly to overall discourses on identity and migration which can be detached somewhat from the structural positions (Favell, 1998). Even more there are non-national discourses and policies coming from the EU which may present a clear push toward developing certain policies and the actual practice may diverge from the policy developments. Even more we can argue with Favell that there is no guarantee that countries with a set of developed integration practices provide better integration to migrants as compared to chaotic countries being negligent or being confused concerning these issues (Favell 2000). The actual integration is very much dependent on social practices out of the scope of any kind of integration policy. For instance in Hungary neighborhood seems to provide better integration than other social spheres as revealed by an analysis of integration based on 50 interviews in 2009 (Turai-Meleg 2009)

Nonetheless we can still argue that structural positions versus integration policies and relevant institutional practices are linked to some extent. It can be clearly seen that (in this order) Austria, the Czech Republic and even Slovakia has formulated much more sophisticated policies and practices as compared to Hungary, Poland, Romania or other countries mentioned above.

Austria originally ventured on a guest worker system when it shifted from being an emigrant country and becoming an immigrant country and it faced substantially the problems of integration only after joining the European Union. By now it has developed concepts and practices of integration courses, integration centers and has been very active in utilizing European Integration Fund and has developed ideas of developing statistics concerning the integration of migrants. The Czech Republic has followed this pattern somewhat and conceptualizing very early immigrant integration

(by 2000) and set up integration consultation bodies. This system was revised in 2006, when the focus shifted toward individuals and developed the idea of support measures and targeted specific measures (counterbalancing disadvantages). In 2009 it opened integration centers after the original consultative bodies were closed earlier (Molodikova 2010).

Very interestingly Slovakia followed these examples and by 2009 it accepted the “Concept of the Foreigner Integration in The Slovak Republic” on a governmental level for 10 years. This policy revised every 2-3 years aims at most immigrants residing legally in Slovakia for a longer period of time and it understands integration as a dynamic two-sided process, which requires changes even on the side of the host community. Even more based on the work of Bargerová and Dívinsky the concept included a wide range of indicators well beyond the scope of the EU core indicators on integration. It is definitely more careful in terms of housing, and segregation, and the use of services intended to protect immigrants, but even this concept is rather short on discrimination and attitudes toward immigrants although it includes the above mentioned opinion polls and even the image of immigrants in the media (Tóth 2010). This paper cannot answer the question whether this concept is implemented or not.

Hungary and Poland even have not got any overall policy document on the integration of migrants. In Hungary there was an attempt in 2007 seven to achieve at least a white paper, but the leaking of the document led to a public scandal raised by the right wing politicians in opposition. The scandal was based on the false claim that the socialist government was actively looking for the immigration of millions of Chinese immigrants. (see Melegh 2007). Ever since the concept has not been formulated, and it is still regarded as an awkward issue. This lack of institutional framing actually suits the above analysis on attitudes and migration processes.

Poland also has been rather cautious on framing an integration policy for immigrants and up till recently it has only a document on the integration of refugees (Górny et al, 2008, Iglicka-Okólski, 2005) and of course being active concerning the immigrants of co-ethnics. Romania is more involved in scandals concerning some of its emigrant groups in Italy, Spain and very recently France then in formulating concepts of immigrants beyond Moldavian co-ethnics coming to Romania in massive numbers. In 2004 it adopted “the National Strategy on Migration” which can be more regarded as a collection of wishes than as a careful consideration of institutional policies and

practices. (Horvath 2008, Baldwin-Edwards, 2005). Bulgaria also interested in Bulgarians leaving the country and it probably has even less than Romania concerning immigration and most probably it is mainly looking for some limited ideas and the setting up of working groups (Beleva, 2008).

Altogether we can see that overall positions in migratory systems has an impact on integration and migration policies (and on its lack), although there some countries which might be an outlier like Slovakia. Even more we can see that overall in the region there is some ambivalence concerning the adoption of overall EU integration policies and concerns and only some of the countries may look for a more active role in this (Austria and the Czech Republic).

Statistics and sources for measuring integration in some selected countries

Naturally data sources and statistics have their own logic which most times do not support analytical interest of scholars and policy makers and in the case of migration the situation is even more complex (Fassmann, 2009) If we turn to the integration of migrants then the situation is even gloomier as we have to consider fluid and disperse fragments of information in an institutional arena which might be even interested in suppressing key aspects of integration. Also we could see that the supranational European Union is also just interested in certain aspects in being embedded in to promoting global positions and looking for compromises between different member states Thus we confront a very difficult task and well in advance we can state that without systematic surveys none of the concerned countries can be analyzed properly concerning issues of integrating immigrants. It is even the case if as in most analyzed countries there are plenty of claims to link administrative sources for the sake of formulating more comprehensive picture on the integration of immigrants. These proposal not only raise serious concerns on the protection of the rights of immigrants, but it will not be able to overcome the fact that administrative data is basically collected for administrative purposes and statistical concerns are generally pushed aside due to internal reasons. Nonetheless, it is important to consider the relevant data sources which can be used for such purposes. It is also important to note that the available information is sporadic and fragmented and we can only look at some countries and even they are not covered to a full extent. So

here we consider mainly Hungary, the Czech Republic and Austria. But first let us return to the European Union.

The statistical regulation of the EU concerning migration (862/2007/EK) is aiming at establishing systematic basis for measuring migration flows and stocks, but it has no demand concerning even one of the Zaragoza integration indicators analyzed above. As we could see above there was a definite tendency to look for such indicators which suit EU policy principles and can be established on the basis of available international statistics. We can certainly claim that in order to proceed in this respect there will be a need for revising this statistical regulation and some of aspects of integration should be somehow incorporated.

Census

Out of all available sources the best possible statistical source for measuring some aspects of integration are the censuses in the relevant countries. These sources are not well-established systems, but even the relevant public informants are ordered to provide data and there are sophisticated apparatuses to implement them. Of course unregistered migrants are excluded, but that should not be seen as surprising.

2001 censuses in Austria, Hungary and the Czech Republic all contain information on people born outside the country and having foreign citizenship and these people can be measured from the point of view of employment, economic activity, education and the Hungarian and Austrian censuses also contain information on denomination and colloquial language and even minorities. It also has the advantage that different subpopulations can systematically compared, which is always a problem in comparing a “massive” majority with a homogeneously understood minority. The comparison may become much more specific and may consider whether immigrants just show a social situation and not ethnic “essence” in terms of social behavior (Melegh-Kovács-Gödri 2010)

In all the relevant censuses there is the problem that out of the cross sectional data we are not able to follow the integration process due to the problems of not knowing

- when the person became citizen if born outside the country
- when he/she entered the country (In Hungary this will be asked in the next census)
- in what legal status did this happen for the first time

These pieces of information has been proposed by several researchers (Gödri 2010, Fassmann 2009, 114):and they would be extremely relevant for setting hypothetical cohorts of immigrants in order to follow that how much groups differ according to different length, status and time of acquiring citizenship.

Population registers

These administrative sources are vital sources of information on the inflow and outflow of migrants inside and between countries, nonetheless it has the disadvantage that groups and countries differ in reporting on making the relevant moves. Deregistering is a problem in all the relevant countries and there is a lot of thinking on how these administrative activities can supported and what incentives can be envisaged (Fassmann, 2009, 116, Gárdos et al 2010) Also there can be problems of the reality of addresses (which would be crucial when analyzing for instance segregation) as migrants do provide “unreal” addresses due to administrative costs. In the Hungarian analysis it turned out that migrants do maneuver with these addresses as the procedure puts an emphasis on the type of residence when deciding applications (Melegh-Molodikova 2010).

Labor Force Survey

In all countries this survey would be vital to have data on the employment characteristics of foreign citizens, but in the relevant countries migration stocks are not large enough to make large enough parts in the sample for this survey. We may have to consider how these surveys can be combined and/or changed in order to increase the sampled number of immigrants.

Administrative data sources

The abundance of such sources in the relevant countries is very clear. In Hungary and the Czech republic more than 30 such databases could be counted including relevant information on the integration of immigrants or special groups of immigrants (Molodikova 2010, Gárdos et al 2010, Fassmann et al 2007) Of course all countries

have a specific administrative body and database for registering foreigners and in addition to this there are numerous databases on employment, education, health and social services, professional organizations even civic groups.

Among these databases (mainly based on citizenship) the registration of aliens is of primary importance for all concerned analysts and there are constant claims in all the relevant countries to link these data to other data sources. Nonetheless we need to be extra cautious if we intend to use these datasets for several reasons. First as it turns out from the Hungarian case the ratio of missing data is shocking especially in fields where integration may be measured (e.g. education). Second there is no real control how these pieces of information are taken and in what circumstances. Also it turns out that especially those immigrant groups which experience the greatest distance and largest discrimination are the ones which not speaking the language apply advocates and lawyers to fill these brochures and forms (Melegh-Molodikova 2010, Turai-Melegh 2009). This intermediate layer is certainly interested in shaping information in such a way which suits the relevant administrative procedure we can hardly be sure that the emerging picture systematically reflects reality. Even without these intermediate persons many times exploiting migrants themselves, migrants do maneuver in what way they want to present their case as they would like to make this costly procedure as short and as successful as possible. Therefore no real analysis can be executed on integration based on these datasets, they indirectly show only a sphere of discrimination and control which is extremely clear with regard to non-privileged groups at least in countries like Hungary and Poland as it appears from qualitative analyses (Melegh-Molodikova 2010, also in the 8 country analysis of female immigrants Melegh-Kovács 2008, Melegh-Kovács-Gödri 2010)

Among the other datasets the ones concerning education could be of great value if they are filled with care. Schools are prime spheres of integration, but due to a certain lack of interest in many of the countries in the region the ethnic and cultural issues are consciously ignored and this appears in the datasets also (Feischmidt-Nyiri, 2007) In the Hungarian case even the most basic “qualitative” data (ethnicity etc.) are ignored and suppressed regardless of the fact that the school itself works with these information (Gárdos et al, 2010; Melegh-Molodikova 2010).

Need for additional measures

It is of paramount importance that we should take into account the relational and ideational aspect of integration, which can only be measured through additional sources. In the Hungarian analysis of sources of measuring integration we have made a proposal for regularly repeated surveys to measure some the relational and more nuanced aspects of integration on a larger sample drawn either from the census or other large-scale databases. It seems that there is a need to plan this internationally as it would make comparison possible. Actually this, together with the reform of censuses would put us into a far better position.

In addition we have to consider the measurement of some cognitive structures and discourses on migration as this seems to guide institutional and media practices and in some way give a character to social practices as well (Favell 1998). When analyzing identities of migrant women in eight EU countries and migrants in the region it clearly turned out that these structures guide the identity formation of migrants and the way they can or they try to interact with the host groups (Kovács-Melegy 2000, Melegy-Kovács-Gödri 2010). Of course the measurement on a massive scale is almost impossible also due to methodological reasons, but as the Slovakian indicator concept shows above we should make an attempt to identify some of discursive patterns through the analysis of the media or other public terrains (Tóth 2010). In case we fail to invent something in this respect we would lose not the meat, but most possibly some of the skeletons of the integration process.

Conclusions

We may conclude that regardless of the increasing interest throughout the European Union we can hardly say that proposals like the Zaragoza indicators would allow the systematic analysis of regions like ours or that they can be the basis of any systematic policy making. Concerning this unifying attempt within the Union the paper concludes that the set of indicators of integration finalized by the April meeting in Zaragoza is not able to give any real insight into the integration process and it reflects basically some of the cornerstones of European maneuvering and the need to manage and control an “extra” labor force for increasing the competitiveness of this supranational entity. In other words due to some statistical problems also it will not provide any real insight to integration, because it ignores the relational problems of

integration as clarified in the conceptual part of the paper. The paper considers some ways of improvement in this respect.

This paper has been arguing that in order to proceed with analyzing migration and integration we have to understand the processes, institutional and social practices in their complexity. It argued that even in our region there is need to relocate migration processes into relevant world-systematic relationships in order to see longer trends guiding migration processes. These positions are relevant in understanding public attitudes and migration and integration policies, which thus cannot be simply subordinated to EU level approaches having their own institutional logics.

The paper also argued that the region can be understood as being in a transition of world-systematic positions and here countries of immigration and emigration and also countries being in an intermediate position. The outcome of these systemic changes is still not clear, but we can see that the different groups of countries have differing public opinions on immigration and have different institutional approaches. Paradoxically countries which have a rather limited institutional framework are the ones which are the most welcoming in terms of public opinions, while countries with larger scale immigration (having better institutional framework) are somewhat negative on migration, but definitely not so much as intermediate countries like Hungary. We may really take the warning of Favell seriously in saying that it is not absolutely certain that countries lacking policies are the ones which offer the worst situation for immigrants (Favell, 2000). Even emigrant countries may have some solidarity as they also experience the problem of emigration.

Concerning institutional practices and statistical systems we may conclude that the region is not unprepared for handling these issues if minority policies could be linked to immigration. Unfortunately there is an overall attempt in the region to handle separately the cases of minorities, co-ethnic migration and other processes of immigration and this may prove to counterproductive politically and also in terms of following and measuring integration.

The paper also argues that there is a set of possible databases which would allow better measurement of migration and integration if they are transformed and changed in a way to see migrant groups in their development within the relevant countries. The censuses could be of prime importance if they could introduce some common questions concerning the length of stay and some other simple facts (Fassmann 2009, Gödri 2010). This reform in itself would make the analysis of integration far

more productive as compared to the Zaragoza indicators. The improvement of population registers is also possibility and it has been considered even on a cross-national level (Pulain reports, Fassmann 2009), but there is some skepticism whether the incentives of reporting can be secured, whether the right information is provided and whether it can be used for the analysis of integration.

In general we have to make clear that administrative data sources and the linkage of these sources may provide false illusions as they very much reflect the process to be analyzed. As argued on the basis of Hungarian interview analysis they cannot be regarded as independent sources for analysis and beyond maneuvering the intermediary persons play a crucial role in “manufacturing” the data. Thus, as a final argument of the paper, it would be far more important to venture on cross-national surveys and some new forms of measurement concerning the integration of immigrants in a comparative perspective. This together with qualitative studies on identity mechanisms would really provide a better picture how host and immigrant groups are maneuvering in our global world and in particular in our region.

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