# Demographic Change and the
# Acceptance of Intergenerational-Transfer Policies

## A Comparison of 13 European Countries

Harald Wilkoszewski* and Elena Muth◊

---

\*   Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Laboratory of Population and Policy, Germany
    London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Social Policy, UK
    E-mail: wilkoszewski@ demogr.mpg.de, H.Wilkoszewski@ lse.ac.uk

◊   Rostock Center for the Study of Demographic Change, Germany
    E-mail: muth@ rostockerzentrum.de

# Content

# Tables

# Figures

# I  Introduction

Demographic change is increasingly putting pressure on political systems throughout Europe: budget constraints and rising numbers of old age beneficiaries tighten allocation problems between generations in these countries. With population ageing continuing in the decades to come (and in some countries, at an accelerated rate) not just relations between generations might be affected, but also the acceptance of a range of population-related policies.

Largely based on intra-family relations and transfers, existing research has mostly come to the optimistic conclusion that ties within the family remain strong, and upward as well as downward transfers between parents and children are often generous. Some authors further conclude that these strong family relationships might help the state to tackle future policy challenges related to population ageing, e.g., in the care sector.

However, in many European countries there are growing numbers not only of the elderly, but also of people who remain childless, and, successively, grandchildless over their whole life course. Thus, the implementation of policies solely relying on the traditional family model might become more difficult in the future. Very few studies have looked at whether or not preferences toward policies allocating transfers between young and old differ by age.

Most of these studies find no age effect, which is primarily due to data quality (small sample sizes, wording of questionnaires and the like). Only a handful of very recent studies (Wilkoszewski 2009, Busemeyer et al. 2009, Miettinen et al (2008), Wilkoszewski 2008) find evidence that different age groups prefer to channel transfers towards themselves, or that they at least oppose transfers to the respective other group.

While Busemeyer et al. (2009) conceptualise age as a position within the economic lifecycle (young and in the workforce vs. old and retired), and also do not look at effects of other demographic variables, such as parenthood; Wilkoszewski (2009, 2008), in his study on Germany, for the first time introduces age as a continuous independent variable, and also includes parenthood and grandparenthood into the models. All three demographic factors have strong and highly significant effects on social policy preference outcomes.

In addition, the latter approach looks at 13 specific family policies and six pension policies, thus allowing for a detailed picture of policy preferences. All other existing studies use preferences regarding, for example, the overall nature of the pension system or government spending in different policy fields (unemployment, education, health care, and pensions), which are, to a certain extent, harder to interpret.

In this paper, we therefore follow the research design proposed by Wilkoszewski, and extend the analysis to 12 further countries using the same data (International Population and Policy Survey 2003). We are particularly interested in whether the effects found for Germany also hold for other European countries.

The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we give a short literature overview, and highlight the conceptualisation of our research question. Part III introduces the research design, and the dataset and methods used. Subsequently, results from classic descriptive statistics are presented. This includes preferences on family policies, pension policies and general attitudes towards the role of the elderly within the society and the political system. The fifth part then provides the findings from our empirical models focusing on public downward transfers preferences. The paper closes with a discussion of the policy implications of the effects found, and a short summary.

# II Short Literature Overview

In this section, we present a brief literature review of existing studies that have looked at population ageing and its effects on social policies. We pay special attention to findings with regard to possible demographic effects on (social) policy preferences. For a comprehensive literature overview, see Wilkoszewski (2009).

Most of the research interest in the field of intergenerational relations and social policy has been devoted to the magnitude and direction of transfers between the young and the old. The larger fraction of this work has been devoted to private intergenerational transfers, or the effect of public transfers on intra-family exchanges. Only a few studies analysed possible age effects in this context, even though – from a theoretical point of view – age is crucial to preference patterns: (political and social) interests of different groups in the modern welfare state largely depend on rights and duties based on chronological age.

Such an age-based system of access to and restriction of benefits can only be sustained as long as its character as a contract between age groups remains credible, i.e., every age group is, to a certain extent, treated in the same way as its respective counterpart in the past or in the future. However, demographic change poses major challenges to all modern welfare states. The issue of unequal treatment for different age groups is, therefore, already moving up on the agenda, and may be expected to gain in importance in the future.

Generally, existing studies come to the conclusion that family transfers exist to a significant extent, and are given mostly from the elderly to the younger generations (e.g., McGarry/Schoeni 1997), whereas public transfers have been directed upwards (Lee 2003)—even though recent generational accounting studies have added support to the hypothesis that, in the case of the U.S., the net present value over the life cycle for current younger generations is positive (e.g., Bommier et al. 2004). According to Schokkaert, one of the most remarkable findings in the empirical work on the magnitude of transfers is the significant effect of age and education on voluntary work and charitable giving: highly educated older people give more of their resources than the less-educated and younger members of society (Schokkaert 2006).

Given the importance of preferences for redistributive policies, it is surprising that most studies dealing with the analysis of attitudes focus on private intergenerational transfers in specific social interactions in the family context (e.g., Cox and Soldo 2004). Far less research has been devoted to the analysis of preferences towards public intergenerational transfers. This is partly due to the fact that the necessary survey data are available only to a limited extent.

A comprehensive overview of studies on attitudes towards public intergenerational transfers is provided by Kohli (Kohli 2005). Two data sources were used in these studies (Andreß/Heien 2001, Blekesaune/Quadagno 2003, Hicks 2001, Smith 2000, European Commission 2004, Kohl 2003), both of which focused on international comparisons: (a) the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), a rather extensive (in terms of sample size) yearly survey with additional topical modules at larger intervals; and (b) the Eurobarometer, the regular survey of the European Union covering all member and candidate countries, which has smaller sample sizes than the ISSP, thus making the analysis of preferences according to age groups difficult, if not impossible.

The issue of whether age has an influence on attitudes towards public intergenerational transfers therefore remains controversial. Following Blekesaune, Quadagno's and Hicks' argument (Blekesaune/Quadagno 2003, Hicks 2001), Kohli draws the conclusion that "most attitude studies up to now show a level of acceptance of welfare policies that is much higher than the discourse on generational equity would lead us to think, with pensions being the most popular part of the welfare state. There is some differentiation along the age dimension, but much less than one would expect from an interest-based model of political preference" (Kohli 2005: p. 19).

On the basis of Eurobarometer data, Kohl also argues that differences in attitudes between age groups concerning the needs for social protection at old age are relatively small, even though he finds indications of weaker support for the idea of intergenerational solidarity among younger people (Kohl 2003).

In contrast, Smith, analysing ISSP data, finds systematic differences in support of governmental spending on pensions: "Across age groups the predominant pattern was for support for governmental spending for retirement benefits to rise with age […]. This occurred in 19 of 25 countries. The generational differences were often quite large." (Smith 2000: p. 12). Similar findings are presented in a very recent study by Busemeyer et al. (2009) using the 1996 wave of the ISSP, which looks at age/retirement and income effects on preferences toward education, health and pension spending. Variation across countries and policy fields is considerable, with Germany (West) showing the smallest age differences. In their analytical concept, Busemeyer et al. frame age in an economic life cycle perspective; their framework does not consider further demographic variables, such as parenthood or marital status.

The only recent existing research work which extends the analysis by a broader demographic perspective are the studies by Wilkoszewski (2009, 2008) and Miettinen et al (2008). Using the IPPAS 2003 wave, they find large effects of both age and parenthood on preferences regarding family policies. For the German case, Wilkoszewski shows that older and childless people are less prone to support an array of 13 family policies covering all dimensions of public downward transfers (money, time, education, housing).

We can summarise that existing research has been inconclusive on the question of whether age has an effect on social policy preferences, with recent studies adding increasing support to the hypothesis that support for public transfers directed to the young declines with increasing age. Except for two studies, which use family policies as proxies for downward transfers, and which are focused on Germany, the emphasis lies on overall spending preferences in education and pension policies.

# III Research Design, Data and Methods

For the analysis in this paper, we use the analytical framework suggested by Wilkoszewski (2009), which extends the classical, basic political economy approach by adding a demographic life-course perspective to the economic life-cycle phases. Whereas, for example, Busemeyer et al. (2009) conceptualise age as an individual's membership in a certain economically active or inactive phase (mostly labour market participation and retirement), the life-course perspective allows for including age as an explanatory variable of its own, and also takes into account further demographic variables, particularly parenthood and marital status. Following Wilkoszewski (2009), the working hypotheses for our analysis are as follows:

> (1) *Social policy preferences differ across age.*
> The elderly are less in favour of public transfers to the young than the younger generation and prefer public transfers channelled to the older generation.

> (2) *Social policy preferences differ between parents and childless people.*
> Childless people are less in favour of public transfers to the young and more in favour of public upward transfers than parents.

> (3) *Social policy preferences differ between married and unmarried people.*
> Unmarried people are less in favour of public downward transfers than married people.

## Data

For the sake of comparability, we use the same data as Wilkoszewski (2009, 2008): the International Population and Policy Acceptance Survey (IPPAS 2003). This is a cross-sectional dataset with a large sample size, including 14 Eastern and Western European countries, with at least 1,000 respondents per country (Table 1). For each country in the database, a nearly identical set of questions is included concerning preferences on 13 family policies, which we use as a proxy for public downward transfers.

In the framework of the EU project "Population Policy Acceptance Study – The Viewpoint of Citizens and Policy Actors Regarding the Management of Population Related Change (DIA-

LOG)," the data of the IPPAS was collected in the period from 2000 to 2003 for all countries. It contains relevant information on preferences regarding specific redistributive policies, as well as more general views on demographic trends, generational images and government responsibility.

For the majority of the countries, the sampling units were persons. Only in Austria, Poland, the Czech Republic, Cyprus and Lithuania were households used. In general, face-to-face interviews were conducted. Prior to the data collection, it was established that researchers would be required to cover the age range of at least 20-60 years. For most countries, respondents are ages 16 or 20 to at least age 65. The only exceptions are Cyprus (ages 20-45) and Italy (ages 20-50)[1] (see Table 1).

## Variables of Interest

The IPPAS dataset contains questions on specific transfer-related social policies, including a battery of items on 13 family policies, which cover a whole range of public downward transfers (money, time, education and housing). Respondents were asked to evaluate the importance of each of these policies. The detailed wording is given in Table 2. We will use these as proxies for preferences on public downward transfers. Like Wilkoszewski (2009), we argue that looking at specific policy reform options allows for a more comprehensive view of preference structures. Most existing studies put emphasis on questions about, for example, overall spending in classical policy fields, or the nature of pension systems. However, the rather complex scope of these questions might overstretch the respondents' capacities to clearly identify their preferences. Furthermore, funding for family policies has been extended over the past decade in a number of European countries (e.g., Germany), partly due to concerns about ("too") low fertility rates. Thus, they are often designed not only to support families or children, but also to tackle demographic change. In light of changing demographic realities (fewer children, more elderly, new living arrangements), the question of to what extent levels of support of these policies throughout Europe are dependent on demographic factors (age, parenthood, marriage) is of immense interest not only to scientists, but also to policy-makers.

For our analyses, all 13 family policy variables are constructed as dichotomised dependent variables (the categories "fully agree" and "agree" are coded 1, all other responses are coded 0)[2]. As a first step, we look at the support levels for each of the 13 policies and each country. Table 3 shows that the majority of respondents fully agree or agree to implement the proposed family

---

[1] From this point on, Italy will not be mentioned again. It is not included into the analysis because of too many missing variables of interest.

[2] Note: All family policy measures are not available for all countries. Table 4 in the section Tables and Figures gives an overview of the availability of the family policies, and the proportion of missing cases per country and policy item.

policies. Depending on the transfer type, the level of agreement for the policies ranges between 35% and nearly 99%. Table 3 works with colours and frames. The blue colour indicates a proportion of agreement below 70%; the grey cells show agreement of 93% and more. Thus, comparisons can be drawn between countries and family policies. In addition, the table contains frames for those cells per family policy with the lowest and highest proportion of agreement. On average, the highest level of agreement exists for the implementation of the policy measure "lower income tax for people with dependent children," while the lowest level of agreement is for the policy item "better housing for families with children." The international overview shows that the lowest percentages of agreement for all policy items are found in the Netherlands, mainly in regard to monetary policy measures. Especially for two-family policies that are of a monetary nature—i.e., that "an allowance at the birth of each child" should be implemented (38% agree) and that "better housing for families with children" should be provided (35.5% agree)—there are higher levels of agreement than disagreement in the Netherlands. The second country with quite low levels of agreement, mainly on questions of monetary policy measures, is Finland. There, more than 50% agree with policy measures which call for "a substantial decrease in the costs of education." In contrast, there are high levels of agreement with all policy measures in the Eastern European countries Romania and Slovenia.

## Explanatory variables

We are interested in finding out whether possible effects of socio-demographic and socioeconomic indicators show different characteristics across the 13 policies mentioned above. Following Wilkoszewski (2009, 2008), we include additional demographic (sex, marital status, childlessness) and socioeconomic (household income, education) indicators, which we believe influence preference patterns.

General political views might also play a role. A respondent who favours, for example, a significant increase in child benefits may want to support the younger generation. However, this opinion may also be an expression of a conservative political view, since more generous state transfers to the child advantages the male-breadwinner model. Therefore, we included a covariate to test for conservative attitudes. In the IPPAS, interviewees were asked several questions on general relations between men and women, and the role of the institutions like marriage or the family. One item asked whether respondents believe that couples who want to have children should marry (dummy: yes/no). We used this variable as a proxy to identify possible effects of conservative attitudes on the dependent variable.

In the analysis of family policy preferences, we also control for the possibly strong effects of receiving the benefits provided by the policy measures proposed. As a proxy, we use information

on whether, at the time of the survey, the respondent received child benefits, which may come in the form of either current parental leave or current child allowances.

Age is used as continuous variable, while all other confounders are used as dichotomised indicators. Consequently, the categories are as follows:

- MARITAL STATUS: married (1) vs. non-married persons (0)
- PARITY: childless(1) vs. non-childless (0)
- HOUSEHOLD INCOME: below median income (1) vs. above median income (0)
- EDUCATION: high education (including higher secondary and post-secondary education) (1) vs. low education (including primary and lower secondary education) (0)
- CURRENT CHILD BENEFITS: receipt of benefits (1) vs. no benefits (0)
- CONSERVATIVE ATTITUDE: conservative (1) vs. not conservative (0)

## Methods

As outlined above, we will use a set of dependent variables in order to test the effects of socio-demographic and socioeconomic variables on social policy preferences related to public intergenerational transfers. We first use descriptive statistics in order to give an impression of the magnitude and direction of possible effects. Then, logistic regression analysis will be applied with two models for each policy measure and each country. While the descriptive diagnostics will cover family and pension policies, general views on population ageing, intergenerational relations and government responsibility; the regression models will focus on preferences regarding the family policies only. The latter models are specified as follows: in a first step, only the demographic covariates are included (age, sex, marital status, and parity). The second model includes all covariates introduced above[3,4].

Since income usually shows higher levels of missing cases than other variables we evaluated, in how far these missing cases have an impact on our results. We run the full logit model, including all covariates, first, with the original income variable treating the missing cases as system gaps; and, second, with an income variable where the missing cases were imputed. We further included a dummy variable to control for the imputation[5]. The analysis showed that, for each country,

---

3 The covariates are included to the extent they are available. Table 5 in the section Tables and Figures gives an overview of the availability of these covariates per country. In addition, Table 4 shows for which countries the 13 family policies are available.

4 For Germany, we include the variable area of residence for measuring a potentially important attitudinal effect: i.e., the fact that respondents in West and East Germany have experienced fundamentally different welfare state regimes might be reflected in different preference levels concerning child benefits.

5 Missing cases were replaced by the country-specific variable mean.

there is no difference between these models (not shown in the results section). We therefore decided to use the original income variable.

The following section presents the results of the descriptive statistics. We begin with the preferences regarding 13 family policies, followed by pension policies and general views on population-related policies and government responsibility.

# IV Descriptive Results

## Preferences regarding 13 family policies

The descriptive analysis is a first step towards identifying possible effects of age, parenthood and marital status on social policy preferences. In the following, we will present the findings for 13 family policies in the order as given in Table 1.

In Western European countries and Hungary, there are age gradients with lower percentages of agreement at the higher ages with policies that aim at improving parental leave arrangements for working women. For the remaining countries, no clear age effects can be observed, except for Cyprus, where a reversed age effect appears, with lower agreement in the younger age groups (see Table 6).

For the policy measure that calls for lower income tax for people with children, there is a similar pattern seen for the Western European countries, as well as for Hungary and Slovenia, with age effects showing higher support ratios in the younger age groups.

Regarding the policy measure which would implement better daycare facilities for children under age three, the same age effect is seen in the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, the Czech Republic and Lithuania. For better daycare facilities for children over an age of three, no clear age patterns appear.

In contrast to the policy measures mentioned above, the measure which calls for an income-dependent allowance for families with children shows reverse age effects: in the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Lithuania and Estonia, the rate of agreement is higher with increasing age.

No clear patterns are apparent for the measure that proposes an allowance at the birth of a child. In Austria, Poland, Estonia, Cyprus and Romania, younger age groups are, however, more likely to agree with measures that provide an allowance for parents who want to take care of their children at home.

In Western European countries, as well as in the Czech Republic and Hungary, levels of agreement with the policy measure calling for a substantial rise in child allowance were shown to be more pronounced. We therefore looked more closely at the effect found.

The box plots in Figure 1 show that there are clear age gradients in Western European countries[6]: agreement levels increase with rising age. This pattern is even stronger for Finland, the

---

6 The box plots give an impression of the shape of the age distribution per country and answer category. The plots contain information on the most extreme values; in this case, the lowest and highest age covered by each answer category. In addition, they give the upper and lower quartile, as well as the median (depicted as a line in the boxes). In some cases, outliers are additionally identified.

Netherlands and Austria; and also applies to Poland, the Czech Republic and Romania. For Hungary, no clear age pattern is visible. The age distribution for Estonia is broad, and therefore does not allow us to identify an age effect.

For the policy reform providing better childcare facilities for school-age children, no general age patterns appears, except in Germany, Slovenia and Estonia, where levels of support are higher at younger ages.

Regarding the policy measure that would allow for flexible working hours for parents, varying patterns were found in the countries under study: in Finland and Estonia, levels of agreement are higher at older ages; while in the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Romania, it is clear than younger people are more likely to agree with the policy.

A similar picture is found for the policy that would create better part-time working opportunities for parents: in Germany, Finland, and Estonia, levels of agreement with this policy are higher at older ages. In Austria and Slovenia this effect is reversed.

For the last two policy measures (lower educational costs, better housing), no clear patterns are to be found, and no age effects are shown for most countries. In the case of lower educational costs, Finland and Cyprus show higher levels of agreement among the older age groups, with opposite effects seen in the Czech Republic and Slovenia. In the case of better housing for families, levels of agreement are higher for younger ages in the Netherlands, Austria and Hungary; while in Finland, older people appear to support this policy more than younger respondents.

When we look at differences in the social policy preferences of parents and childless people (Table 7), we find that that childless people are, in general, substantially less likely to agree with the policies than parents. This applies to all countries except for Hungary and Slovenia.

In regard to the differences between married and non-married persons (Table 8), the general pattern shows higher levels of support for the family policies among married respondents. Almost no differences between the groups are found in Hungary, Slovenia and Romania.

## Preferences regarding pension policies

To complement the picture of redistributive social policies, we also looked briefly at public upward transfers in the form of pension policies. In the PPAS, respondents were asked about their preferences regarding six reforms aimed at securing the financial stability of pension systems. Out of these six options, respondents were asked to choose the reforms they consider the most and the second-most important. Table 9 provides frequencies by country and age groups for the first choice made by the respondents (with the rows for each age group adding up to 100%).

In nearly all countries, the greatest number of respondents selected "abolishing early retirement programs" in order to finance the general old-age pension scheme as the most important

pension policy. Results were similar for younger and older respondents. In Belgium and Germany, levels of support for this policy were found to be even higher at older than at younger ages.

The second-most important pension policy measure was found to be "raising the monthly taxes or social premiums on the income." In this case, age effects with higher percentages at higher ages for ages 30-60 were only found for Finland and the Netherlands.

## General attitudes towards demographic change, government responsibility and intergenerational relations

Since the state of intergenerational relations is not only reflected in preferences on redistributive policies, but also in more general attitudes on demographic change and government responsibility for different age groups, we also looked at responses to questions in the IPPAS that capture these views.

When asked about the demographic change currently experienced by every European society, the predominant view expressed by respondents across all age groups is that this development is problematic. In the Czech Republic, Finland, Latvia and Romania, population ageing is even evaluated by respondents as a "very bad" development (Table 10).

When asked about the government's responsibility for providing support for either the younger or the older generation, the views expressed by respondents show remarkable patterns across age groups and in all countries. For example, on the issue of the government's responsibility for looking after the elderly, the percentages of respondents who believe that the level of responsibility is very high or high are large in Belgium, Germany, Finland, the Czech Republic and Romania, and show only small age differences (see Table 11).

The percentages range from between 73.7% and 85.5% for the youngest respondents, and between 68.9% and 89.1% for the oldest ages for the countries mentioned above. Except for Slovenia, where less than 50% of the respondents view the level of responsibility of the government as high, the percentages for the remaining countries are between 50.5% and 62.4% in the youngest, and between 50% and 68.4% in the oldest age group.

Although the picture shows that, in all countries and across all age groups, the prevailing view is that the government's degree of responsibility for the elderly is very high or high, some contrasting patterns are found in Poland, Slovenia and Cyprus. In these countries, the proportion of people who think that the government's level of responsibility is low or very low lies at more than 10%, or even at more than 20%. There, the percentages even increase with age. In Germany and Romania, the proportion of people under the age of 40 who have that same opinion is also higher than 10%.

Regarding the responsibility of the government for supporting the compatibility of work and family for women, clear differences are seen between the countries: the highest proportions of respondents who agree that the government's degree of responsibility is very high or high are found in Germany and Belgium (Table 12). Between 65.8% and 85.5% of respondents in these countries hold this view, and with no significant age differences. Compared to the remaining countries, the percentages in Hungary and Romania are high as well. The lowest level of support for this position are found in Slovenia and the Netherlands, with no age differences seen in Slovenia, but with a clear decreasing age gradient observed for the Netherlands. There, only 15.7% of people at the oldest ages think that the government's level of responsibility for helping young families should be high. Correspondingly, the percentage of older people who believe that the government should have a low or very low level of responsibility is, at 55%, very high.

Regarding the same statement, but considering the young male population, the pattern is found to be similar: in Germany, at 73.5%-81.2%, most respondents think that the government should have a very high or high degree of responsibility for supporting the compatibility of work and family for men. This is followed by Belgium and Romania. For the remaining countries, the percentages of respondents who hold with this opinion range between 23.6% and 46%, with no clear age differences. The only exceptions are the Netherlands and Poland, where only 12.6% and 14.7% of respondents aged 65 years or older agree with this position. Conversely, 63.1% and 53% of respondents think the government's level of responsibility should be low or very low (see Table 13).

A clearer picture emerges when the respondents are asked about their views on the general role of the elderly in society: whereas the age differences in evaluating the statement, "elderly people are not productive anymore," still seem to be moderate across all countries (Figure 2), older people clearly tend to reject the view that "elderly people are a stumbling block for (social) change" more often than younger ones (Figure 3).

# V  Demographic effects on preferences regarding public downward transfers

In the following, we will present and discuss the effects of age, parenthood and marital status on preferences regarding 13 family policies. The results of the binary logit models are grouped according to the type of transfer (monetary, time, education, housing). For the sake of readability, we highlight the most important findings with regard to the demographic effects, as well as concerning possible differences between countries. A comprehensive overview of all regression results is given by Table 14 in the Annex.

## Family policies providing financial assistance to families

As outlined in Table 2, family policies, which mainly address monetary transfers, include lower taxes for parents (2), a means-tested financial bonus for families (5), a financial bonus at birth (6), financial assistance to parents who give up their jobs (7) and a substantial increase in child benefits (8).[7] We will first look at the effect of age on attitudes towards these policies.

*Effect of age*

While we find large and highly significant age effects in almost all countries under study, some variation can be seen as well. The largest negative age effects can be found with regard to Policy 2 (lower taxes) and 8 (child benefits), with lowest odds ratios seen in Belgium (0.935 for Policy 2) and the Netherlands (0.933 for Policy 8). In the other EU-15 countries, Germany, Finland and Austria, support for these two policies is also shown to decrease significantly with increasing age, with an odds change of about 2% to 4% per year of life gained; i.e., the odds of a 60-year-old respondent (strongly) agreeing that taxes should be lower for parents, or that child benefits should be increased substantially, is between 55% and 80% lower than for a 20-year-old.

Findings regarding attitudes in the new EU member countries are more mixed. Whereas in Hungary and Poland a considerable and significant negative age effect for both policies (odds change of 2% to 3% per year of life) is found, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Romania and Slovenia show a similar result for only one of the two options. In the case of Romania, we even find a large positive age effect for lower taxes for parents. No age effects can be identified for Cyprus and Lithuania.

---

7    Numbers in parentheses are referring to the order of policies in Table 2.

In general, this picture holds also for the other three policy measures (5, 6 and 7). Austrian, Belgian, Dutch, Finnish, German, Hungarian and Polish respondents are less in favour of monetary transfers to families with increasing age. Cyprus, the Baltic and the other Central and Eastern European countries show no age effects, or no consistent patterns. If significant negative age effects are found, then they are on a clearly smaller scale than those identified for the first group of countries. In a very few cases (Czech Republic, Estonia), we even find a positive effect of age.

*Effect of parenthood*

The second demographic variable of main interest is parenthood. The structural outcome of this effect is very similar to that of age. In general, childless respondents are much less inclined to support any of the five financial transfers to families than are parents. The largest effects are again found for support for Policies 2 and 8.

In Belgium, for example, the odds of a childless respondent (strongly) agreeing with the implementation of lower taxes for parents are almost 82% lower than those of a parent. Finland and the Netherlands show similar effects, followed by Austria and Germany, with odds changes of about 50% to 70%, respectively.

Among the countries that joined the EU recently, the picture is again more diverse. While the findings for Poland are very similar to those of the EU-15 countries, the effects for the Czech Republic and Hungary are, for example, at lower significance levels.

In Cyprus, Lithuania and Slovenia, negative age effects can only be found for two out of five policies each. In addition, Estonia seems to be a special case. The results are mostly similar to those of Poland. With regard to an income-dependent financial support for families (Policy 5), however, the negative effect for childless respondents is reversed at a large scale, and at a high significance level. This is in line with the positive age effect for the same policy measure identified above. For Romania, no data on parenthood was available.

*Effect of marital status and gender*

Since in a range of European countries future family structures may be expected to change to a significant extent due to cohabitation and high divorce rates, we also looked at the effect of marital status on policy preferences. In order to complement the array of demographic dimensions, we will also briefly present the findings for the covariate "sex."

Being in a legal marriage increases the odds of supporting the five proposed family policy reforms in all 13 countries under study, even though the effects remain at a marginal significance level in most of the cases. The strongest effects are found in Cyprus, where the odds of supporting, for example, lower taxes for parents (2) or a significant increase in child benefits (8) are more

then twice as high for respondents within a marriage than for those outside. A similarly strong effect is identified for Romania in case of the child benefit increase. Overall the magnitude of the effect appears to be slightly higher in Central and Eastern European countries than in the Western European ones.

The regression models for the five monetary family policies also revealed an at times large gender difference in policy preferences. Generally speaking, male respondents are less inclined to support the transfers, with the effects showing some variation in magnitude and significance level across policies and countries. The strongest gender difference on the higher significance levels can be found with regard to support for a financial allowance for parents who give up their jobs to take care of their children. In Austria, Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Lithuania, the odds that male respondents will support the policy are between 30% and 50% lower than among women.

## Family policies providing more time resources to families

In a further step, we look at those downward transfers which are supposed to provide parents and families with more time, facilitating better childcare and parent-child relations. This transfer type includes the following family policies: better marital leave schemes for working mothers (1), better childcare facilities for children under the age of 3 (3), better childcare facilities for children from the age of three to the age of primary school entry (4), care facilities for children of school age for the time before and after school hours, as well as during school holidays (9), flexible working hours for working parents with small children (10), and more and better part-time work opportunities for parents with children (11).[8] Again, we will highlight the most important findings with regard to the demographic effects age, parenthood, marital status, and gender, as well as concerning possible differences between countries. A comprehensive overview of all regression results is given by Table 14 in the Annex.

*Effect of age*

For these six care policies, the age effects are certainly found to be less pronounced as than for monetary transfers: while a large fraction of countries do show lower support with increasing age, the decline is often small and non-significant. The strongest effects, with an odds change of 3% to 4% per year of life, are identified in Austria, Belgium, Finland and the Netherlands for the policy reform "improved parental leave scheme for working mothers" (1); and in Belgium also for

---

8       Numbers in parentheses are referring to the order of policies in Table 2.

the policy "flexible working hours for parents" (10). With an odds change of 1% to 2% per year of life, older respondents in Estonia and Poland also show significantly lower support ratios for Policy 1 than younger people. The effects in the other countries are marginal or non-significant.

When looking at better daycare facilities for children below the age of three, Austrian, Lithuanian and Polish respondents are found to have decreasing support levels with increasing age for Policy 3 (odds change of 1% to 2% per year of life); furthermore, older respondents in Austria, Finland and Hungary are shown to be less inclined to support the same policy for older children above the age of three (odds change of about 1% per year of life). Again, the effects for the other countries are marginal or non-significant.

Estonia is once more the outlier within the range of 13 countries. Even though older respondents in this country are clearly less in favour of improved parental leave schemes for working mothers (Policy 1, odds change of 1.5% per year of life), we find a highly significant and large positive age effect for better childcare for school children (Policy 9, odds change of about 1.5% per year of life) and better part-time working opportunities for parents (Policy 11, odds change of almost 3% per year of life).

*Effect of parenthood*

A certain divide between the Western and Northern European countries in the sample and the Central and Eastern European nations (including Cyprus) also becomes visible when looking at the effect of parenthood, with Poland, and, at certain points, also the Czech Republic and Lithuania, becoming outliers among their group by showing results similar to those of the first group of countries.

As in the case of monetary transfers, we find the strongest and most significant negative effects of childlessness for Belgium, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands: the odds of a childless respondent in these countries supporting the proposed care policies are between one-third and more than one-half lower than those for parents. In general, this effect is much smaller and/or non-significant in the second group of countries (with the above mentioned outliers).

Surprisingly high positive effects are identified – again – for Estonia in the case of Policy 9. The biggest outlier in this context is Cyprus. Here the odds of childless people supporting Policies 4, 10 and 11 are more than twice as high as those for parents. We suggest that these respondents belong to a comparatively progressive group of Cypriots who have postponed becoming parents, and who therefore display prospective preference patterns, while also forming a sort of avant-garde within a country that still relies on mostly traditional care structures.

*Effect of marital status and gender*

Cyprus is also the clear outlier with regard to effects of marital status. Across all other countries, there is a mixed picture depending on the type of care policy. In Cyprus, however, the odds of supporting four out of these six policies are two (Policies 3 and 4), three (Policy 11) and even four times higher (Policy 10) for married people than for unmarried respondents. There is also a positive effect for Policies 1 and 9, but it is statistically non-significant.

When looking at the other countries, we find that martial status mostly has a positive effect, with an odds change of between 15% and 50%, even though very often this effect is again non-significant. No clear pattern with regard to the two country groups identified above can be established. Outliers showing a significant negative effect of martial status include Belgium (Policy 1), Germany (Policy 3), Finland (Policies 3 and 4) and the Netherlands (Policies 3, 9 and 10).

With regard to gender preferences, we find a rather consistent pattern across all countries: being male decreases the odds of supporting the six childcare policies by 20% to 50%, and this negative effect is mostly highly significant, with somewhat higher significance levels seen in Western and Northern European countries. These results show that, even though the countries under study are very different in terms of their political legacies, family ideologies and concrete family policies, men still prefer women to stay home and raise the children.


## Further family policies: Education and housing

Finally, we will briefly summarise demographic effects on preferences regarding two further family policies: decreasing costs for education (12) and providing better housing for families (13).[9] Whereas age seems to have a limited effect on the first policy (most of the negative odds ratios found are non-significant, except for Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic and Estonia), we find strong and significant effects in six out of 11 countries (no data for Belgium and Estonia) for the second policy. Only Slovenia, Lithuania, Cyprus and Romania show no effects.

Parenthood and gender, on the other hand, again seem to play an important role in determining social policy preferences: being childless decreases the odds of supporting these two policies by 30% to 60% in all countries except for Slovenia; and the odds of male respondents favouring them are 15% to 60% lower in about half of the countries. No significant gender difference in preferences for at least one of the two policies can be found in Finland, the Netherlands, Cyprus and Romania.

Finally, marital status does not appear to be a decisive demographic factor in determining attitudes towards the two policies. Except in Belgium and Finland, where married people have lower

---

9    Numbers in parentheses are referring to the order of policies in Table 2.

odds of supporting the proposed reforms, the magnitude of the effects, which are all non-significant, is negligible in the other countries.

# VI  Summary and policy implications

Following recent findings regarding demographic effects on population-related policy preferences in Germany, this paper set out to analyse the situation in a further 12 European countries. To do so, we focused on attitudes towards 13 family policy reforms which covered all dimensions of public transfers to the younger generation (money, time, education, housing).

In light of demographic change, which results not only in the ageing of the population across most of Europe, but also affects traditional family structures and the expansion of family policies in many of the European countries, this focus appears to be of special relevance for scientists and policy-makers alike. This section briefly summarises the findings of our empirical analysis, and closes with some policy implications and recommendations.

## Summary: Age matters, but so do parenthood and marital status

Our main hypothesis was that older, childless and unmarried people are less inclined to support transfers to the young. We argue that – in contradiction to classic political economy concepts – age has to be seen in connection with other demographic factors which influence the life course of an individual.

We applied descriptive statistics, as well as classic logistic regression, to identify possible effects of age, parenthood and marital status. Table 15 summarises the results and gives a stylised overview for all countries and policies.

Our analytical models identify strong age effects, especially for policies providing financial assistance to families. The age effects for policies providing more time to families, e.g., in the form of childcare facilities, have a slightly lower magnitude. Parenthood also has a strong effect on policy preferences across all transfer types. Our hypotheses (1) and (2) are therefore confirmed.

The role of marital status is slightly less pronounced than those of age and parenthood. In the case of financial transfers to families, being married increases the odds of supporting these policies; while regarding care policies, the effect is mostly reversed. This is probably because married respondents are more likely to hold traditional values, and are less in favour of, for example, policies that enable women to combine work and family. We find hypothesis (3) therefore only partially confirmed.

Similar to marital status, we also find a large gender difference when it comes to supporting childcare policies. Throughout all countries under study, men seem to be significantly less in favour of mothers working than are women, and evaluate childcare that facilitates the modern up-

bringing of children as being less important. Given the different political legacies and concrete social policy set-ups in the 13 countries, this result is somewhat surprising.

Generally, all the effects found appear to be stronger in Northern and Western European countries, with some variation depending on the policy type, than in Eastern Europe and Cyprus. Among the Eastern European states, Poland, Hungary and, at times, also the Czech Republic are closest to their Western counterparts.

## Policy implications

This paper shows for the first time the relevance of several demographic factors for an individual's social policy preferences in a wide range of European countries. Older, childless and unmarried respondents are less inclined to support public transfers to the young. Furthermore, gender differences in views on the role of women persist throughout Europe.

Demographic change will lead to altered age structures and family forms in many of the countries under study: the share of elderly will increase significantly, whereas the number of people with children will become smaller and smaller. High divorce rates and the expansion of cohabitation will also result in fewer people entering into a traditional marriage.

Therefore, our findings have major implications for national as well as European policy-makers, since support for necessary social policies might decline rapidly in the decades to come. This may not only alter intergenerational solidarity, but could also narrow the scope of action for future social policy. Policy-makers have so far seldom acknowledged diverging policy preferences among different demographic groups.

This has been partly due to the fact that intra-family relations are still strong, and private transfers are generous throughout Europe. Furthermore, existing research has so far predominantly denied an age effect on policy preferences, or has not taken into account other important demographic factors, such as parenthood or marital status. This research gap has led to a reluctance among policy-makers to take varying preferences into account in setting their agendas. In light of our findings, we therefore offer the following policy recommendations:

1. Policy-makers need to acknowledge that younger and older generations, parents and childless people, as well as married couples and singles, differ in their social policy preferences.
2. The focus on the positive aspects of intra-family relations and related transfers is too short-sighted, since population ageing and changing family structures will alter demographic realities in the nearer future. It is advisable to shift the perspective towards intergenerational relations in the public domain.

3. There is a potential for conflict between different demographic groups, since each of the groups expresses preferences for the public transfers that are directed to themselves. Policy-makers will therefore have to put more effort into organising support for necessary social policy reforms.

4. In order to achieve this support, various aspects of political communication will have to be put at the centre of social policy agendas. With increasing numbers of people who are less prone to support transfers to the young, tools of political education and campaigning might help to clarify the necessity of, for example, family policies. NGOs and interest groups (e.g., of the elderly) might help to provide adequate channels to reach these people, and therefore should be better integrated into respective policy-making processes.

# VII Tables and Figures

**Table 1: Sample size of the IPPAS per country**

| Country[*] | Sample Size | | | % Females | Age Range | Median Age |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Total | Female | Male | | | |
| Belgium (Flanders)[a] | 3,957 | 2,058 | 2,058 | 52% | 20-64 | 42 |
| Germany[b] | 4,110 | 2,080 | 2,080 | 51% | 20-65 | 42 |
| Finland | 3,821 | 2,199 | 2,199 | 58% | 19-70 | 45 |
| The Netherlands | 1,989 | 917 | 917 | 46% | 16-89 | 45 |
| Austria | 1,995 | 1,169 | 1,169 | 59% | 20-65 | 42 |
| Czech Republic | 1,094 | 671 | 671 | 61% | 18-75 | 40 |
| Poland | 4,504 | 2,403 | 2,403 | 53% | 18-66 | 42 |
| Hungary | 3,057 | 1,676 | 1,676 | 55% | 17-95 | 47 |
| Slovenia | 1,550 | 780 | 780 | 50% | 20-64 | 40 |
| Lithuania | 1,400 | 787 | 787 | 56% | 18-76 | 42 |
| Cyprus[c] | 1,163 | 597 | 597 | 51% | 18-60 | 45 |
| Estonia | 1,681 | 1,002 | 1,002 | 60% | 16-80 | 33 |
| Romania | 1,556 | 802 | 802 | 52% | 18-90 | 46 |

[*] Italy is excluded from the analyses due to too many missing variables of interest

[a] data limited to the Flemish region

[b] about 50% East and 50% West Germans

[c] data limited to the territory of the EU Member State

Source: IPPAS 2003

**Table 2: Family policies and respective type of transfer**

*"What do you think of the following measures to facilitate having, looking after, and raising children? Are you strongly in favour, in favour, neither in favour nor against, against, or strongly against their implementation? (Put one cross in each line) Note: The measures described below are not just made up. Most of them have actually been implemented in some European countries. Some of these measures have already been implemented or considered by the government in our country."*

| | Family policy | Transfer type |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Improved parental leave arrangements for working women who are having a baby | Time |
| 2 | Lower income tax for people with dependent children | Money |
| 3 | Better day-care facilities for children younger than age three | Time |
| 4 | Better day-care facilities for children between age three up to school age | Time |
| 5 | An allowance for families with children dependent on the family income | Money |
| 6 | An allowance at the birth of each child | Money |
| 7 | An allowance for mothers or fathers who do not take a job because they want to take care of the children while they are young | Money |
| 8 | A substantial rise in child allowance by 7% of the monthly GNP | Money |
| 9 | Child-care facilities for school-going children before and after school and during school holidays | Time |
| 10 | Flexible working hours for working parents with young children | Time |
| 11 | More and better opportunities for parents with young children to work part-time | Time |
| 12 | A substantial decrease in the costs of education | Education / Money |
| 13 | Better housing for families with children | Housing / Money |

Source: IPPAS 2003

**Table 3: Percentage of agreement for 13 family policies by country (in percent)**

| | Family Policy | BE | DE | FI | NL | AT | PL | CZ | HU | SI | LT | EE | CY | RO |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Improved parental leave arrangements for working women who are having a baby | 62.30 | 83.85 | 73.13 | 70.79 | 84.52 | 90.41 | 88.81 | 86.68 | 97.39 | 94.86 | 89.40 | 93.52 | 97.92 |
| 2 | Lower income tax for people with dependent children | 80.23 | 86.08 | 78.97 | 67.24 | 87.01 | 85.12 | 89.55 | 88.80 | 91.01 | 92.14 | 89.37 | 95.93 | 98.79 |
| 3 | Better day-care facilities for children younger than age three | 72.54 | 84.51 | 64.35 | 66.67 | 74.95 | 83.73 | 65.11 | 69.20 | 97.75 | 84.93 | 62.69 | 90.31 | 96.55 |
| 4 | Better day-care facilities for children between age three up to school age | n.a. | 90.34 | 75.19 | n.a. | 80.83 | 82.72 | 76.88 | 82.22 | 97.88 | 86.70 | 81.38 | 90.70 | 97.23 |
| 5 | An allowance for families with children dependent on the family income | n.a. | 85.08 | 70.51 | 62.46 | 76.64 | 91.60 | 82.68 | 89.22 | 92.72 | 85.56 | 67.51 | 89.00 | 97.64 |
| 6 | An allowance at the birth of each child | n.a. | 76.18 | 56.87 | 37.95 | 60.07 | 91.15 | 91.02 | 82.35 | 97.10 | 95.85 | 86.44 | 87.19 | 96.34 |
| 7 | An allowance for mothers or fathers who do not take a job because they want to take care of the children while they are young | 67.23 | 82.26 | 78.61 | 54.46 | 68.02 | 87.47 | 88.18 | 74.39 | 91.49 | 95.85 | 80.77 | 68.66 | 86.77 |
| 8 | A substantial rise in child allowance by 7% of the monthly GNP | 69.09 | 77.56 | 60.66 | 57.26 | 65.28 | 66.91 | 83.75 | 91.35 | 94.41 | 79.21 | 91.38 | 86.84 | 95.83 |
| 9 | Child-care facilities for school-going children before and after school and during school holidays | 69.95 | 84.78 | 75.70 | 54.04 | 71.55 | 80.23 | 73.07 | 75.51 | 92.78 | 81.40 | 39.75 | 90.56 | 94.19 |
| 10 | Flexible working hours for working parents with young children | 80.50 | 90.11 | 84.59 | 72.85 | 87.25 | 78.95 | 83.95 | 89.79 | 86.97 | 86.27 | 88.57 | 91.51 | 94.07 |
| 11 | More and better opportunities for parents with young children to work part-time | 85.18 | 90.26 | 81.73 | 79.79 | 88.90 | 80.46 | 82.76 | 90.94 | 92.95 | 83.86 | 85.45 | 91.42 | 94.07 |
| 12 | A substantial decrease in the costs of education | 73.29 | 77.12 | 43.17 | 67.00 | n.a. | 91.12 | 73.44 | 94.08 | 95.48 | 90.99 | 94.56 | 91.41 | 93.41 |
| 13 | Better housing for families with children | n.a. | 74.84 | 55.85 | 35.48 | 74.19 | 88.64 | 82.49 | 94.11 | 98.16 | 90.26 | n.a. | 88.43 | 98.05 |

lower agreement (less than 70%)
high agreement (more than 93%)
lowest/ highest agreement per policy item
n.a.     item not available for this country

Source: IPPAS 2003, own calculation

**Table 4: Missing cases by family policy measures and country in percent**

| Family Policy | | AT | BE | CZ | EE | FI | DE | HU | LT | NL | PL | RO | SI | CY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Improved parental leave for working women | 1 | 0.90 | 30.15 | 0.37 | 0.65 | 3.19 | 0.24 | 3.96 | 0.00 | 39.06 | 0.42 | 4.31 | 1.16 | 0.52 |
| Lower income tax with depend. children | 2 | 0.85 | 29.95 | 0.27 | 0.42 | 3.06 | 0.39 | 3.07 | 0.00 | 39.06 | 0.44 | 4.76 | 1.68 | 0.77 |
| Better day-care for children <3 | 3 | 1.15 | 30.25 | 0.46 | 1.78 | 3.04 | 0.39 | 4.32 | 0.00 | 39.06 | 0.51 | 4.88 | 2.65 | 0.60 |
| Better day-care for children >3 | 4 | 1.40 | **n.a.** | 0.37 | 1.61 | 3.48 | 0.22 | 3.43 | 0.14 | **n.a.** | 0.56 | 4.88 | 2.77 | 1.03 |
| Income-dep. allowance for families | 5 | 1.30 | **n.a.** | 0.27 | 0.77 | 3.19 | 0.36 | 2.29 | 0.07 | 39.06 | 0.38 | 4.82 | 1.61 | 0.69 |
| Allowance at birth of child | 6 | 2.46 | **n.a.** | 0.27 | 1.73 | 3.64 | 0.32 | 2.13 | 0.14 | 39.06 | 0.44 | 3.41 | 2.19 | 0.69 |
| Allowance for parents without job due to care | 7 | 2.51 | 30.12 | 1.01 | 0.71 | 2.98 | 0.32 | 2.68 | 0.07 | 39.06 | 0.44 | 5.78 | 2.19 | 0.69 |
| Rise in child allowance | 8 | 1.10 | 30.10 | 1.01 | 0.59 | 3.35 | 0.34 | 2.03 | 0.00 | 39.06 | 0.49 | 9.13 | 3.03 | 0.69 |
| Child care for school children | 9 | 1.15 | 30.02 | 0.55 | 0.48 | 2.96 | 0.39 | 2.88 | 0.14 | 39.06 | 0.60 | 7.13 | 4.32 | 0.69 |
| Flexible working hours for parents | 10 | 0.95 | 30.02 | 1.46 | 0.59 | 2.83 | 0.32 | 2.58 | 0.14 | 39.06 | 0.73 | 5.66 | 2.97 | 0.77 |
| Better opportunities to work part time | 11 | 1.10 | 30.07 | 0.82 | 0.65 | 3.01 | 0.32 | 2.52 | 0.00 | 39.06 | 0.49 | 5.66 | 3.03 | 0.77 |
| Decrease costs of education | 12 | **n.a.** | 29.97 | 1.92 | 0.42 | 3.48 | 0.46 | 1.67 | 0.14 | 39.06 | 0.47 | 4.37 | 1.42 | 0.95 |
| Better housing for families | 13 | 1.15 | **n.a.** | 0.82 | **n.a.** | 3.19 | 0.29 | 1.64 | 0.29 | 39.06 | 0.51 | 4.37 | 1.68 | 1.12 |
| Pension policies | | **n.a.** | 9.12 | 3.84 | 9.64 | 15.41 | 31.87 | **n.a.** | 21.21 | 11.92 | 9.33 | 29.95 | 6.71 | **n.a.** |

Source: IPPAS 2003

n.a. - not available

**Table 5: Percentage of cases coded 1 in the covariates**

| Variable | AT | Belg | CzR | Eston | Finl | Germ | HU | Lith | NL | Po | Rom | Slov | Cyp |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Childless (childless=1) | 28.52 | 32.95 | 20.48 | 31.65 | 28.79 | 32.97 | 20.71 | 19.07 | 31.88 | 27.66 | **n.a.** | 26.77 | 36.20 |
| Child Benefits (receipt of benefits=1) | 36.04 | 34.22 | 36.56 | **n.a.** | **n.a.** | 36.20 | 30.75 | 3.00 | 31.93 | 31.77 | 27.83 | 40.26 | **n.a.** |
| Education (high edcuation=1) | 81.40 | 66.87 | 90.40 | 65.79 | 72.23 | 86.81 | 66.40 | 81.93 | 70.84 | 75.18 | 40.75 | 79.10 | 81.00 |
| Sex (males=1) | 41.40 | 47.99 | 38.67 | 40.39 | 42.32 | 49.39 | 45.18 | 43.79 | 53.90 | 46.65 | 48.46 | 49.68 | 46.52 |
| Marital Status (married=1) | 56.44 | 61.76 | 61.79 | 43.31 | 53.57 | 48.05 | 59.04 | 61.21 | 63.65 | 70.29 | 62.53 | 59.55 | 61.13 |
| Conservativsm (conservative=1) | 46.82 | 29.39 | 65.17 | 52.41 | 33.00 | 42.94 | 45.18 | 55.64 | 35.14 | 60.57 | **n.a.** | 34.71 | **n.a.** |
| HH income (not imputed) (below median=1) | 38.80 | 9.88 | 37.39 | 30.52 | 42.55 | 44.96 | 36.96 | 40.86 | 46.61 | 48.78 | 47.04 | 35.29 | 46.52 |

n.a. - not available
Source: IPPAS 2003

**Table 6: Percentage of agreement according to the family policy measures by country and age groups**

| Country | Age group | Family Policy Measure Agreement in % | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 |
| Belgium | <30 | 72.1 | 81.4 | 72.2 | | | | 62.9 | 66.2 | 69.1 | 82.8 | 85.8 | 70.3 | |
| | 30-45 | 60.0 | 81.2 | 72.9 | | | | 70.2 | 72.2 | 70.7 | 80.5 | 85.0 | 74.3 | |
| | 45-60 | 55.0 | 76.5 | 72.2 | | | | 65.9 | 65.4 | 69.4 | 77.4 | 84.9 | 74.9 | |
| Germany | <30 | 86.4 | 86.3 | 86.0 | 91.1 | 84.9 | 76.0 | 81.5 | 79.3 | 82.0 | 89.7 | 88.4 | 75.0 | 78.9 |
| | 30-45 | 83.3 | 88.1 | 84.2 | 89.7 | 85.1 | 77.1 | 83.4 | 81.5 | 85.5 | 89.7 | 90.2 | 78.3 | 73.7 |
| | 45-60 | 82.6 | 84.5 | 83.0 | 89.8 | 84.3 | 74.4 | 81.5 | 75.3 | 85.0 | 90.4 | 90.7 | 76.9 | 72.9 |
| | 60+ | 84.9 | 83.5 | 86.5 | 92.3 | 86.8 | 77.5 | 81.7 | 69.2 | 86.0 | 91.2 | 91.9 | 77.0 | 76.9 |
| Finland | <30 | 84.6 | 68.7 | 67.1 | 79.4 | 67.2 | 61.8 | 76.8 | 68.1 | 68.3 | 79.9 | 76.5 | 38.0 | 46.9 |
| | 30-45 | 74.4 | 83.4 | 64.2 | 76.7 | 66.2 | 57.2 | 81.6 | 68.4 | 79.7 | 85.3 | 80.9 | 39.6 | 51.0 |
| | 45-60 | 68.4 | 81.1 | 60.8 | 71.9 | 74.3 | 54.2 | 77.3 | 55.9 | 75.0 | 84.2 | 83.4 | 45.9 | 60.8 |
| | 60+ | 67.6 | 79.0 | 69.1 | 74.6 | 74.4 | 56.0 | 78.1 | 48.3 | 79.0 | 90.2 | 86.6 | 49.8 | 64.5 |
| Nether-lands | <30 | 79.9 | 69.2 | 73.6 | | 63.4 | 39.9 | 54.2 | 62.6 | 54.6 | 77.3 | 82.8 | 63.0 | 44.0 |
| | 30-45 | 69.4 | 68.8 | 65.7 | | 65.7 | 39.2 | 55.5 | 58.9 | 55.0 | 72.5 | 78.7 | 69.1 | 33.1 |
| | 45-60 | 64.8 | 60.9 | 61.7 | | 52.6 | 32.4 | 51.8 | 47.0 | 51.0 | 69.2 | 79.5 | 65.6 | 32.8 |
| Austria | <30 | 86.1 | 86.4 | 80.6 | 82.7 | 70.8 | 67.7 | 74.4 | 71.7 | 73.2 | 86.1 | 89.1 | | 79.3 |
| | 30-45 | 86.9 | 87.7 | 79.1 | 81.4 | 79.0 | 60.6 | 72.3 | 70.0 | 74.2 | 89.5 | 90.1 | | 74.1 |
| | 45-60 | 84.3 | 87.4 | 69.5 | 80.4 | 76.6 | 58.5 | 63.4 | 61.4 | 68.7 | 87.7 | 88.6 | | 73.2 |
| | 60+ | 78.2 | 85.6 | 68.9 | 78.2 | 78.1 | 53.4 | 59.5 | 54.8 | 69.0 | 82.9 | 86.7 | | 70.6 |
| Poland | <30 | 90.8 | 82.1 | 82.4 | 78.4 | 90.4 | 89.0 | 85.5 | 67.8 | 80.2 | 77.3 | 79.4 | 89.0 | 88.3 |
| | 30-45 | 90.3 | 87.7 | 85.6 | 85.2 | 92.9 | 92.9 | 90.0 | 69.5 | 80.2 | 79.3 | 79.4 | 92.1 | 88.3 |
| | 45-60 | 90.7 | 85.2 | 84.2 | 85.1 | 91.8 | 91.6 | 87.6 | 64.2 | 80.3 | 81.1 | 82.7 | 92.6 | 89.9 |
| | 60+ | 87.8 | 85.5 | 80.1 | 80.3 | 90.0 | 90.3 | 84.4 | 64.3 | 80.1 | 75.0 | 79.8 | 88.9 | 86.1 |
| Czech Republic | <30 | 88.4 | 87.6 | 71.1 | 80.6 | 77.3 | 91.3 | 88.8 | 87.0 | 69.3 | 82.6 | 84.5 | 77.0 | 84.2 |
| | 30-45 | 88.6 | 89.4 | 64.0 | 74.9 | 82.2 | 92.5 | 87.0 | 86.2 | 72.4 | 86.8 | 83.2 | 76.1 | 82.6 |
| | 45-60 | 90.4 | 91.4 | 62.6 | 75.7 | 84.3 | 88.8 | 89.3 | 81.3 | 75.2 | 84.1 | 81.4 | 72.7 | 81.3 |
| | 60+ | 87.1 | 89.4 | 62.5 | 76.9 | 88.8 | 91.2 | 87.7 | 77.7 | 75.9 | 80.0 | 82.9 | 63.5 | 81.8 |
| Hungary | <30 | 89.1 | 91.4 | 69.6 | 82.6 | 90.4 | 84.7 | 76.7 | 91.9 | 75.3 | 90.4 | 90.2 | 94.3 | 96.4 |
| | 30-45 | 86.6 | 89.4 | 66.8 | 80.2 | 89.4 | 80.9 | 75.3 | 92.4 | 71.8 | 88.7 | 90.6 | 91.9 | 94.1 |
| | 45-60 | 86.1 | 88.4 | 70.5 | 84.2 | 90.7 | 81.7 | 76.3 | 91.2 | 77.3 | 90.5 | 91.9 | 95.0 | 94.0 |
| | 60+ | 85.6 | 86.6 | 69.8 | 81.7 | 86.5 | 82.6 | 69.8 | 90.0 | 77.3 | 89.7 | 90.8 | 95.0 | 92.5 |
| Slovenia | <30 | 98.3 | 91.5 | 98.6 | 98.6 | 91.7 | 98.0 | 89.0 | 95.1 | 92.9 | 89.6 | 95.4 | 96.3 | 98.0 |
| | 30-45 | 97.0 | 92.8 | 97.1 | 97.1 | 92.7 | 96.6 | 92.8 | 93.2 | 91.5 | 87.6 | 92.6 | 95.3 | 97.7 |
| | 45-60 | 97.1 | 90.1 | 97.9 | 98.1 | 93.6 | 96.7 | 91.2 | 94.2 | 93.5 | 84.8 | 92.1 | 95.3 | 98.8 |
| | 60+ | 97.7 | 85.3 | 97.6 | 98.4 | 92.2 | 98.4 | 93.8 | 98.4 | 95.2 | 85.0 | 91.3 | 94.6 | 98.5 |
| Lithuania | <30 | 94.9 | 87.2 | 87.6 | 87.6 | 81.7 | 92.7 | 96.0 | 79.6 | 84.3 | 79.9 | 77.0 | 84.7 | 87.2 |
| | 30-45 | 94.2 | 93.4 | 86.0 | 87.7 | 86.4 | 95.9 | 95.3 | 80.2 | 79.5 | 87.2 | 84.4 | 93.4 | 92.2 |
| | 45-60 | 96.4 | 94.0 | 83.1 | 86.1 | 87.0 | 98.7 | 97.3 | 77.7 | 83.1 | 90.3 | 87.4 | 93.7 | 91.0 |
| | 60+ | 94.5 | 92.6 | 82.6 | 84.9 | 86.2 | 95.8 | 95.2 | 78.8 | 80.4 | 86.5 | 85.5 | 90.0 | 89.0 |

(Table 6 continued)

| Country | Age group | Family Policy Measure Agreement in % | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------|-----------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 |
| Estonia | <30 | 92.7 | 85.8 | 72.4 | 79.8 | 54.9 | 83.1 | 82.2 | 92.1 | 36.0 | 82.6 | 75.6 | 95.0 | n.a. |
| | 30-45 | 88.8 | 91.4 | 59.5 | 82.5 | 60.9 | 86.7 | 84.9 | 93.2 | 33.3 | 86.9 | 83.7 | 95.4 | n.a. |
| | 45-60 | 90.9 | 89.5 | 54.5 | 80.5 | 70.8 | 89.1 | 81.3 | 92.9 | 36.8 | 91.2 | 90.6 | 93.9 | n.a. |
| | 60+ | 85.7 | 91.3 | 61.1 | 82.7 | 82.0 | 87.7 | 76.1 | 88.5 | 49.8 | 93.6 | 92.6 | 94.1 | n.a. |
| Cyprus | <30 | 92.3 | 93.9 | 88.4 | 89.5 | 84.8 | 80.7 | 60.9 | 83.3 | 89.1 | 88.4 | 89.1 | 90.0 | 84.0 |
| | 30-45 | 94.3 | 97.4 | 91.6 | 91.4 | 92.7 | 92.1 | 73.9 | 89.3 | 92.2 | 93.5 | 93.0 | 92.0 | 91.0 |
| | 45-60 | 95.5 | 95.5 | 89.9 | 91.0 | 83.0 | 84.3 | 69.7 | 86.5 | 85.4 | 92.1 | 91.0 | 93.3 | 91.0 |
| | 60+ | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 50.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Romania | <30 | 96.6 | 98.8 | 95.8 | 96.8 | 98.0 | 95.6 | 85.2 | 94.9 | 92.8 | 96.3 | 94.3 | 94.4 | 98.0 |
| | 30-45 | 99.1 | 98.4 | 98.1 | 97.2 | 96.2 | 96.2 | 89.9 | 98.7 | 96.5 | 94.3 | 93.7 | 93.7 | 97.5 |
| | 45-60 | 98.3 | 98.3 | 96.3 | 98.6 | 97.5 | 97.5 | 87.3 | 97.1 | 94.8 | 92.4 | 94.4 | 92.6 | 98.0 |
| | 60+ | 98.0 | 99.5 | 96.3 | 96.5 | 98.5 | 96.1 | 85.5 | 93.2 | 93.2 | 93.1 | 93.9 | 93.0 | 98.5 |

Source: IPPAS 2003

n.a. - Policy Measure not available

Legend on Family Policy Measures:
1 Improved parental leave arrangements for working women who are having a baby
2 Lower income tax for people with dependent children
3 Better day-care facilities for children younger than age three
4 Better day-care facilities for children between age three up to school age
5 An allowance for families with children dependent on the family income
6 An allowance at the birth of each child
7 An allowance for mothers or fathers who do not take a job because they want to take care of the children while they are young
8 A substantial rise in child allowance by 7% of the monthly GNP
9 Child-care facilities for school-going children before and after school and during school holidays
10 Flexible working hours for working parents with young children
11 More and better opportunities for parents with young children to work part-time
12 A substantial decrease in the costs of education
13 Better housing for families with children

**Table 7: Percentage of agreement according to the family policy measures by country and childlessness**

| Country [a] | | Family Policy Measures | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 |
| Belgium | childless | 67.5 | 69.1 | 70.7 | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | 58.3 | 57.4 | 69.4 | 76.6 | 82.2 | 68.5 | n.a. |
| | parent | 59.0 | 87.3 | 73.7 | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | 72.9 | 76.5 | 70.3 | 83.0 | 87.1 | 76.4 | n.a. |
| Germany | childless | 82.4 | 79.4 | 83.5 | 87.8 | 79.1 | 68.8 | 76.2 | 69.9 | 80.3 | 85.9 | 85.6 | 70.2 | 72.2 |
| | parent | 84.6 | 89.3 | 84.9 | 91.5 | 88.0 | 80.0 | 85.2 | 81.5 | 87.0 | 92.1 | 92.5 | 80.7 | 76.1 |
| Finland | childless | 74.5 | 62.7 | 65.9 | 74.3 | 64.6 | 52.3 | 70.7 | 53.4 | 68.7 | 78.1 | 74.0 | 36.8 | 43.8 |
| | parent | 72.3 | 86.0 | 63.1 | 75.3 | 73.1 | 58.4 | 82.3 | 64.0 | 78.9 | 87.6 | 85.4 | 45.1 | 60.2 |
| Nether-lands | childless | 69.3 | 53.4 | 72.7 | n.a. | 53.0 | 28.1 | 45.3 | 41.2 | 54.9 | 71.2 | 79.1 | 59.0 | 30.6 |
| | parent | 71.9 | 77.6 | 62.2 | n.a. | 69.5 | 45.3 | 61.3 | 69.2 | 53.4 | 74.1 | 80.3 | 73.0 | 39.1 |
| Austria | childless | 82.8 | 81.6 | 77.1 | 80.1 | 74.3 | 58.1 | 64.6 | 61.9 | 72.6 | 84.8 | 88.2 | n.a. | 72.7 |
| | parent | 85.2 | 89.3 | 74.1 | 81.2 | 77.7 | 60.8 | 69.4 | 66.6 | 71.0 | 88.2 | 89.3 | n.a. | 74.8 |
| Poland | childless | 86.3 | 76.8 | 76.8 | 74.9 | 87.6 | 84.8 | 81.1 | 61.7 | 75.5 | 72.8 | 74.8 | 85.4 | 83.7 |
| | parent | 92.0 | 88.3 | 86.5 | 85.8 | 93.2 | 93.6 | 90.0 | 69.0 | 82.1 | 81.3 | 82.7 | 93.3 | 90.6 |
| Czech Republic | childless | 83.0 | 84.3 | 70.0 | 79.4 | 78.5 | 86.6 | 81.6 | 79.5 | 67.3 | 79.0 | 78.3 | 67.9 | 76.5 |
| | parent | 90.3 | 90.9 | 63.9 | 76.2 | 83.8 | 92.2 | 89.9 | 84.8 | 74.6 | 85.2 | 83.9 | 74.9 | 84.0 |
| Hungary | childless | 88.7 | 89.7 | 71.5 | 81.4 | 88.0 | 82.4 | 72.6 | 89.4 | 74.6 | 89.4 | 89.2 | 91.4 | 93.3 |
| | parent | 86.1 | 88.5 | 68.6 | 82.5 | 89.5 | 82.3 | 74.8 | 91.9 | 75.7 | 89.9 | 91.4 | 94.8 | 94.3 |
| Slovenia | childless | 97.3 | 90.6 | 98.0 | 98.5 | 91.6 | 97.3 | 90.0 | 94.7 | 91.1 | 88.5 | 94.0 | 95.6 | 98.0 |
| | parent | 97.4 | 91.2 | 97.7 | 97.7 | 93.1 | 97.0 | 92.0 | 94.3 | 93.4 | 86.4 | 92.6 | 95.5 | 98.2 |
| Lithuania | childless | 91.8 | 83.5 | 82.8 | 83.9 | 80.8 | 92.1 | 94.4 | 78.7 | 80.9 | 79.0 | 76.0 | 83.9 | 86.1 |
| | parent | 95.6 | 94.2 | 85.4 | 87.4 | 86.7 | 96.7 | 96.2 | 79.3 | 81.5 | 88.0 | 85.7 | 92.7 | 91.2 |
| Estonia | childless | 90.9 | 84.7 | 69.7 | 78.8 | 62.1 | 82.7 | 79.6 | 90.2 | 38.8 | 82.9 | 76.4 | 92.6 | n.a. |
| | parent | 88.7 | 91.5 | 59.5 | 82.6 | 70.0 | 88.2 | 81.3 | 91.9 | 40.2 | 91.2 | 89.7 | 95.5 | n.a. |
| Cyprus | childless | 92.4 | 94.0 | 89.0 | 90.7 | 83.7 | 79.2 | 60.4 | 81.2 | 90.0 | 89.0 | 89.7 | 89.2 | 83.5 |
| | parent | 94.2 | 97.0 | 91.0 | 90.7 | 92.0 | 91.7 | 73.4 | 90.1 | 90.9 | 92.9 | 92.4 | 92.6 | 91.3 |

Source: IPPAS 2003

[a] variable "number of children" not available for Romania

n.a. - Policy Measure not available

Legend on Family Policy Measures:
1  Improved parental leave arrangements for working women who are having a baby
2  Lower income tax for people with dependent children
3  Better day-care facilities for children younger than age three
4  Better day-care facilities for children between age three up to school age
5  An allowance for families with children dependent on the family income
6  An allowance at the birth of each child
7  An allowance for mothers or fathers who do not take a job because they want to take care of the children while they are
8  A substantial rise in child allowance by 7% of the monthly GNP
9  Child-care facilities for school-going children before and after school and during school holidays
10  Flexible working hours for working parents with young children
11  More and better opportunities for parents with young children to work part-time
12  A substantial decrease in the costs of education
13  Better housing for families with children

**Table 8: Percentage of agreement according to the family policy measures by country and marital status**

| Country | | Family Policy Measures | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 |
| Belgium | married | 57.7 | 84.4 | 72.8 | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | 71.8 | 74.3 | 69.6 | 81.8 | 86.8 | 74.0 | n.a. |
| | not married | 68.0 | 75.1 | 72.3 | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | 61.6 | 62.6 | 70.5 | 78.8 | 83.2 | 72.4 | n.a. |
| Germany | married | 84.8 | 88.2 | 83.4 | 90.6 | 87.4 | 78.5 | 84.3 | 79.4 | 85.8 | 91.6 | 91.8 | 79.4 | 75.5 |
| | not married | 82.9 | 84.1 | 85.4 | 90.1 | 83.1 | 74.1 | 80.4 | 75.9 | 83.9 | 88.9 | 89.0 | 75.1 | 74.2 |
| Finland | married | 71.4 | 85.1 | 61.5 | 73.5 | 71.1 | 56.0 | 81.7 | 61.3 | 77.8 | 87.3 | 84.5 | 42.8 | 57.8 |
| | not married | 75.1 | 71.5 | 67.5 | 77.0 | 69.8 | 57.7 | 74.9 | 59.7 | 73.2 | 81.5 | 78.5 | 43.5 | 53.4 |
| Nether-lands | married | 70.4 | 74.7 | 61.6 | n.a. | 66.6 | 42.7 | 59.0 | 65.4 | 50.0 | 71.4 | 78.9 | 71.4 | 37.1 |
| | not married | 71.4 | 57.4 | 73.3 | n.a. | 57.1 | 31.7 | 48.5 | 46.6 | 59.4 | 74.8 | 80.9 | 61.3 | 33.4 |
| Austria | married | 85.6 | 89.6 | 73.7 | 80.9 | 77.8 | 61.6 | 68.8 | 66.3 | 69.7 | 89.0 | 90.3 | n.a. | 74.6 |
| | not married | 83.1 | 83.6 | 76.4 | 80.6 | 75.1 | 57.8 | 67.1 | 63.7 | 74.0 | 85.2 | 87.1 | n.a. | 73.7 |
| Poland | married | 91.9 | 87.5 | 86.0 | 85.2 | 92.8 | 93.2 | 89.5 | 68.5 | 81.9 | 80.9 | 82.0 | 92.8 | 89.7 |
| | not married | 86.9 | 79.6 | 78.5 | 76.8 | 88.7 | 86.3 | 82.6 | 63.1 | 76.4 | 74.3 | 76.8 | 87.1 | 86.0 |
| Czech Republic | married | 89.3 | 91.3 | 63.7 | 77.0 | 83.9 | 92.0 | 89.5 | 85.5 | 74.4 | 90.9 | 84.6 | 74.3 | 83.1 |
| | not married | 87.8 | 86.6 | 67.0 | 76.6 | 80.7 | 89.3 | 86.0 | 80.8 | 70.7 | 86.8 | 79.7 | 72.0 | 81.7 |
| Hungary | married | 86.9 | 89.3 | 68.2 | 82.4 | 89.5 | 81.8 | 75.9 | 91.8 | 74.3 | 89.7 | 91.4 | 94.5 | 94.6 |
| | not married | 86.3 | 88.1 | 70.7 | 82.0 | 88.8 | 83.1 | 72.1 | 90.6 | 77.3 | 89.9 | 90.2 | 93.5 | 93.4 |
| Slovenia | married | 97.3 | 91.7 | 98.0 | 97.6 | 93.8 | 96.9 | 92.5 | 94.6 | 93.4 | 86.0 | 92.0 | 95.2 | 98.2 |
| | not married | 97.6 | 90.2 | 97.4 | 98.3 | 91.3 | 97.4 | 89.9 | 94.0 | 91.9 | 88.4 | 94.4 | 96.1 | 98.0 |
| Lithuania | married | 95.8 | 94.2 | 85.8 | 87.4 | 87.3 | 97.0 | 96.1 | 78.1 | 80.7 | 86.3 | 84.4 | 92.4 | 91.0 |
| | not married | 93.4 | 88.9 | 83.6 | 85.6 | 82.8 | 94.1 | 95.4 | 81.0 | 82.4 | 86.2 | 83.0 | 88.7 | 89.1 |
| Estonia | married | 88.1 | 91.0 | 58.4 | 82.6 | 70.5 | 87.4 | 82.0 | 91.8 | 38.3 | 90.9 | 89.2 | 95.5 | n.a. |
| | not married | 90.4 | 88.1 | 66.0 | 80.5 | 65.2 | 85.7 | 79.8 | 91.0 | 40.8 | 86.8 | 82.6 | 93.9 | n.a. |
| Cyprus | married | 95.1 | 97.2 | 91.1 | 91.1 | 91.4 | 91.0 | 72.7 | 89.7 | 91.0 | 93.8 | 93.1 | 91.8 | 91.1 |
| | not married | 91.8 | 93.1 | 87.6 | 88.1 | 84.3 | 78.0 | 59.2 | 80.2 | 89.3 | 85.6 | 87.1 | 89.0 | 84.0 |
| Romania | married | 98.3 | 98.4 | 96.6 | 97.9 | 97.8 | 97.1 | 87.0 | 96.5 | 94.7 | 94.1 | 94.6 | 94.1 | 98.4 |
| | not married | 97.3 | 99.5 | 96.5 | 96.1 | 97.4 | 95.1 | 86.4 | 94.6 | 93.3 | 94.1 | 93.1 | 92.3 | 97.5 |

Source: IPPAS 2003

n.a. - Policy Measure not available

Legend on Family Policy Measures:
1   Improved parental leave arrangements for working women who are having a baby
2   Lower income tax for people with dependent children
3   Better day-care facilities for children younger than age three
4   Better day-care facilities for children between age three up to school age
5   An allowance for families with children dependent on the family income
6   An allowance at the birth of each child
7   An allowance for mothers or fathers who do not take a job because they want to take care of the children while they are young
8   A substantial rise in child allowance by 7% of the monthly GNP
9   Child-care facilities for school-going children before and after school and during school holidays
10  Flexible working hours for working parents with young children
11  More and better opportunities for parents with young children to work part-time
12  A substantial decrease in the costs of education
13  Better housing for families with children

**Table 9: Percentage of Agreement according to the pension policy measures by country and age groups**

| Country[a] | Age | Pension Policy Measure | | | | | | other | missing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | | |
| Belgium | <30 | 9.9 | 19.7 | 6.5 | 3.8 | 39.4 | 12.5 | | 8.1 |
| | 30-45 | 6.2 | 23.0 | 7.0 | 2.9 | 39.3 | 10.8 | | 10.8 |
| | 45-60 | 8.2 | 29.2 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 40.1 | 8.0 | | 9.2 |
| | 60+ | 14.3 | 17.8 | 0.9 | 1.5 | 56.0 | 5.5 | | 4.1 |
| Germany | <30 | 12.3 | 9.7 | 7.4 | 3.5 | 18.7 | 15.4 | 6.1 | 26.9 |
| | 30-45 | 9.6 | 8.7 | 6.5 | 1.6 | 22.6 | 18.1 | 7.6 | 25.3 |
| | 45-60 | 7.5 | 10.0 | 6.7 | 1.8 | 24.5 | 18.7 | 7.0 | 23.9 |
| | 60+ | 8.0 | 10.9 | 5.3 | 2.2 | 27.4 | 16.4 | 7.2 | 22.6 |
| Finland | missing | 0.0 | 29.4 | 5.9 | 11.8 | 11.8 | 0.0 | | 41.2 |
| | <30 | 23.1 | 30.2 | 5.3 | 6.7 | 15.4 | 11.3 | | 7.9 |
| | 30-45 | 21.1 | 35.3 | 5.4 | 2.8 | 14.4 | 8.0 | | 13.0 |
| | 45-60 | 21.3 | 38.4 | 4.8 | 2.2 | 11.1 | 4.3 | | 17.9 |
| | 60+ | 37.4 | 22.3 | 3.9 | 2.0 | 11.5 | 1.1 | | 22.0 |
| Nether-lands | <30 | 16.9 | 23.8 | 7.3 | 1.5 | 26.0 | 7.0 | | 17.6 |
| | 30-45 | 11.8 | 34.4 | 4.1 | 0.9 | 32.8 | 4.5 | | 11.5 |
| | 45-60 | 10.0 | 46.1 | 3.8 | 1.5 | 27.4 | 2.5 | | 8.7 |
| | 60+ | 19.2 | 25.4 | 2.1 | 0.5 | 36.8 | 2.4 | | 13.5 |
| Poland | missing | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 | | 0.0 |
| | <30 | 11.0 | 33.6 | 3.5 | 6.0 | 18.4 | 18.4 | | 9.1 |
| | 30-45 | 7.7 | 35.7 | 1.9 | 8.2 | 17.8 | 18.6 | | 10.0 |
| | 45-60 | 7.9 | 40.6 | 2.0 | 6.1 | 17.7 | 17.0 | | 8.6 |
| | 60+ | 7.7 | 36.5 | 2.3 | 9.4 | 18.4 | 15.6 | | 10.2 |
| Czech Republic | missing | 37.5 | 25.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 37.5 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| | <30 | 13.2 | 26.0 | 4.1 | 7.0 | 24.8 | 20.3 | | 4.6 |
| | 30-45 | 8.4 | 28.1 | 2.0 | 5.3 | 34.5 | 18.9 | | 2.8 |
| | 45-60 | 12.1 | 21.6 | 3.8 | 7.6 | 32.1 | 18.4 | | 4.4 |
| | 60+ | 15.9 | 27.1 | 2.4 | 6.5 | 27.7 | 16.5 | | 4.1 |
| Slovenia | <30 | 10.0 | 36.4 | 5.0 | 3.6 | 22.8 | 18.6 | | 3.6 |
| | 30-45 | 9.4 | 38.1 | 6.4 | 1.6 | 20.7 | 17.5 | | 6.4 |
| | 45-60 | 9.4 | 35.0 | 3.7 | 2.6 | 25.2 | 15.5 | | 8.7 |
| | 60+ | 16.5 | 31.6 | 3.0 | 2.3 | 21.1 | 16.5 | | 9.0 |
| Lithuania | <30 | 10.6 | 24.1 | 1.8 | 4.7 | 21.9 | 20.4 | | 16.4 |
| | 30-45 | 6.8 | 21.8 | 1.4 | 5.6 | 21.8 | 24.9 | | 17.7 |
| | 45-60 | 6.6 | 21.3 | 2.3 | 5.7 | 18.3 | 20.9 | | 24.9 |
| | 60+ | 7.1 | 24.1 | 1.0 | 8.0 | 13.2 | 19.0 | | 27.7 |
| Estonia | <30 | 25.4 | 16.8 | 4.6 | 10.6 | 8.7 | 23.7 | | 10.2 |
| | 30-45 | 16.2 | 14.5 | 3.7 | 9.1 | 23.4 | 24.5 | | 8.6 |
| | 45-60 | 17.2 | 15.2 | 3.2 | 9.9 | 28.9 | 17.5 | | 8.2 |
| | 60+ | 21.9 | 19.0 | 1.8 | 6.9 | 28.3 | 11.3 | | 10.9 |
| Romania | <30 | 21.9 | 19.7 | 2.4 | 8.6 | 11.2 | 9.0 | | 27.3 |
| | 30-45 | 17.1 | 22.1 | 2.5 | 8.1 | 13.7 | 10.3 | | 26.4 |
| | 45-60 | 17.8 | 23.2 | 3.0 | 6.2 | 11.6 | 5.7 | | 32.6 |
| | 60+ | 17.2 | 19.5 | 3.9 | 10.4 | 10.0 | 6.3 | | 32.8 |

Source: IPPAS 2003

[a] Pension Policy Measures are not available for Austria, Hungary, and Cyprus

Legend on Pension Policy Measures:
1 To raise the retirement age
2 To raise the monthly taxes or social premiums on the income
3 To lower the monthly benefit payment to pensioners
4 To force the children to support their aged parents financially
5 To abolish early retirement programmes
6 To make old-age benefits dependent on the number of children: the more children one has, the higher the benefit

**Table 10: Opinion on the demographic ageing of the society by country and age, in percent**

| Country[a] | Age Group | Opinion on the ageing process of the society | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | excellent | good | neither nor | bad | very bad |
| Belgium | <30 | 1.66 | 10.34 | 30.78 | 44.32 | 12.90 |
| | 30-45 | 2.89 | 15.64 | 34.53 | 38.48 | 8.46 |
| | 45-60 | 6.20 | 20.82 | 38.62 | 29.76 | 4.61 |
| | 60+ | 7.37 | 28.32 | 32.45 | 27.73 | 4.13 |
| Czech Repul | missing | 12.50 | 0.00 | 12.50 | 37.50 | 37.50 |
| | <30 | 0.00 | 1.67 | 27.92 | 41.67 | 28.75 |
| | 30-45 | 0.56 | 1.96 | 20.39 | 50.00 | 27.09 |
| | 45-60 | 0.64 | 4.49 | 23.72 | 46.47 | 24.68 |
| | 60+ | 1.76 | 8.82 | 20.59 | 52.35 | 16.47 |
| Estonia | <30 | 0.84 | 4.18 | 21.13 | 45.82 | 28.03 |
| | 30-45 | 1.71 | 3.42 | 26.21 | 47.58 | 21.08 |
| | 45-60 | 0.58 | 5.25 | 23.62 | 49.85 | 20.70 |
| | 60+ | 1.78 | 4.35 | 31.82 | 50.00 | 12.06 |
| Finland | <30 | 0.27 | 3.66 | 19.78 | 46.34 | 29.95 |
| | 30-45 | 0.75 | 4.08 | 21.04 | 41.83 | 32.29 |
| | 45-60 | 1.19 | 6.69 | 18.97 | 43.78 | 29.38 |
| | 60+ | 1.20 | 9.45 | 18.38 | 43.13 | 27.84 |
| Latvia | <30 | 0.37 | 1.83 | 32.60 | 39.19 | 26.01 |
| | 30-45 | 0.78 | 2.72 | 23.35 | 43.39 | 29.77 |
| | 45-60 | 0.00 | 5.33 | 23.00 | 52.67 | 19.00 |
| | 60+ | 2.57 | 3.86 | 18.01 | 51.13 | 24.44 |
| Poland | missing | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 100.00 | 0.00 |
| | <30 | 1.06 | 4.32 | 32.93 | 43.85 | 17.83 |
| | 30-45 | 1.51 | 4.60 | 26.38 | 51.26 | 16.25 |
| | 45-60 | 1.83 | 4.43 | 26.77 | 49.19 | 17.78 |
| | 60+ | 3.12 | 4.25 | 27.48 | 50.99 | 14.16 |
| Romania | <30 | 1.05 | 3.94 | 26.25 | 37.27 | 31.50 |
| | 30-45 | 0.34 | 5.03 | 21.81 | 39.93 | 32.89 |
| | 45-60 | 0.00 | 4.11 | 19.35 | 38.12 | 38.42 |
| | 60+ | 1.03 | 5.93 | 22.68 | 36.60 | 33.76 |
| Slovenia | <30 | 2.01 | 8.60 | 28.37 | 42.69 | 18.34 |
| | 30-45 | 2.43 | 13.43 | 24.81 | 41.23 | 18.10 |
| | 45-60 | 2.35 | 18.59 | 27.99 | 36.75 | 14.32 |
| | 60+ | 2.33 | 22.48 | 22.48 | 41.86 | 10.85 |

Source: IPPAS 2003

[a]no observations for Austria, Finland, Hungary, Netherlands, Cyprus

**Table 11:** Statement on the government's responsibility to support the elderly, in % by age groups (each age group sums up to 100%)*

| Responsibility | Age Group | Belgium | Germany[a] | Finland | Netherlands | Poland | Czech Rep. | Hungary | Slovenia | Lithuania | Cyprus | Romania |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| very high/high | <25 | 81.54 | 85.51 | 73.66 | 59.29 | 50.49 | 67.21 | 60.65 | 38.38 | 52.77 | 62.44 | 73.74 |
| | 25-40 | 88.08 | 87.60 | 79.43 | 65.50 | 50.26 | 71.19 | 58.14 | 40.97 | 52.42 | 64.73 | 70.71 |
| | 40-65 | 87.40 | 89.55 | 78.76 | 69.79 | 54.73 | 70.67 | 60.51 | 44.54 | 54.18 | 63.76 | 78.33 |
| | 65+ | | 89.11 | 69.89 | 58.70 | 50.00 | 77.27 | 68.52 | | 62.33 | 62.50 | 82.87 |
| normal | <25 | 13.97 | | 23.02 | 30.97 | 25.43 | 27.05 | 29.88 | 38.92 | 37.50 | 27.70 | 11.78 |
| | 25-40 | 7.99 | | 16.65 | 27.00 | 22.83 | 22.88 | 31.39 | 37.03 | 40.75 | 23.36 | 14.50 |
| | 40-65 | 7.76 | | 16.24 | 23.60 | 21.28 | 23.03 | 28.69 | 29.90 | 37.65 | 24.39 | 12.83 |
| | 65+ | | | 18.47 | 27.65 | 17.65 | 17.27 | 18.86 | | 30.70 | 25.00 | 9.97 |
| low/no respons. | <25 | 4.24 | 14.25 | 3.07 | 9.73 | 19.48 | 5.74 | 8.29 | 21.62 | 9.72 | 8.45 | 14.48 |
| | 25-40 | 3.09 | 12.03 | 3.33 | 7.50 | 23.92 | 5.64 | 9.27 | 22.00 | 6.61 | 11.29 | 14.50 |
| | 40-65 | 4.22 | 9.96 | 3.75 | 6.51 | 22.41 | 6.30 | 9.49 | 25.19 | 8.18 | 11.15 | 8.83 |
| | 65+ | | 9.90 | 5.96 | 13.65 | 29.42 | 5.46 | 9.43 | | 6.98 | 12.50 | 6.85 |
| missing | <25 | 0.25 | 0.23 | 0.26 | 0.00 | 4.59 | 0.00 | 1.18 | 1.08 | 0.00 | 1.41 | 0.00 |
| | 25-40 | 0.83 | 0.38 | 0.59 | 0.00 | 2.99 | 0.28 | 1.19 | 0.00 | 0.22 | 0.61 | 0.30 |
| | 40-65 | 0.63 | 0.49 | 1.26 | 0.10 | 1.57 | 0.00 | 1.31 | 0.37 | 0.00 | 0.70 | 0.00 |
| | 65+ | | 0.99 | 5.68 | 0.00 | 2.94 | 0.00 | 3.20 | | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.31 |

Wording of the question: "Changes in society are everyone's concern. The government could play an important or a minor role in this. Please indicate what you think about the government's responsibility regarding the following issue: Looking after the elderly." Answer categories 'completely responsible', 'quite responsible', 'responsible', 'slightly responsible', 'not responsible'; The answer categories were translated and combined to 'very high/high responsibility', 'normal responsibility', 'low/no responsibility'

* This question is not available for Austria and Estonia; [a] Answer categories in Germany do not include "normal responsibility"
Source: IPPAS 2003, own calculation

**Table 12:** Statement on the government's responsibility to provide opportunities for women to combine a job outside the home with raising children, in % by age groups *

| Responsibility | Age Group | Belgium | Germany | Finland | Netherlands | Poland | Czech Rep. | Hungary | Slovenia | Lithuania | Cyprus | Romania |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| very high/high | <25 | 75.32 | 80.84 | 41.94 | 34.51 | 45.04 | 41.80 | 60.95 | 28.11 | 50.69 | 54.00 | 62.29 |
| | 25-40 | 77.38 | 85.48 | 48.78 | 39.67 | 43.26 | 53.11 | 61.46 | 27.19 | 59.47 | 56.03 | 63.01 |
| | 40-65 | 65.78 | 84.38 | 41.13 | 27.06 | 46.23 | 48.42 | 62.04 | 28.29 | 55.19 | 59.24 | 66.83 |
| | 65+ | | 81.18 | 38.64 | 15.70 | 35.30 | 53.64 | 61.95 | | 60.00 | 50.00 | 61.99 |
| normal | <25 | 17.21 | | 32.99 | 28.32 | 19.98 | 35.25 | 20.71 | 40.54 | 36.81 | 26.76 | 16.50 |
| | 25-40 | 14.48 | | 28.21 | 30.17 | 18.16 | 25.71 | 23.05 | 36.31 | 33.70 | 22.90 | 16.27 |
| | 40-65 | 20.85 | | 29.27 | 28.99 | 18.05 | 29.92 | 24.60 | 34.24 | 37.14 | 23.34 | 17.67 |
| | 65+ | | | 25.28 | 29.35 | 23.53 | 27.27 | 21.55 | | 33.49 | 0.00 | 22.74 |
| low/no respons. | <25 | 7.23 | 17.76 | 24.29 | 37.17 | 29.40 | 22.95 | 14.50 | 30.27 | 11.81 | 17.85 | 21.21 |
| | 25-40 | 7.39 | 13.69 | 22.33 | 30.17 | 34.06 | 20.90 | 13.11 | 35.96 | 6.61 | 20.46 | 20.41 |
| | 40-65 | 11.52 | 14.91 | 26.78 | 43.85 | 31.61 | 21.45 | 10.80 | 36.48 | 7.32 | 16.73 | 15.33 |
| | 65+ | | 17.82 | 26.13 | 54.95 | 35.29 | 19.09 | 9.09 | | 6.52 | 50.00 | 14.95 |
| missing | <25 | 0.25 | 1.40 | 0.77 | 0.00 | 5.58 | 0.00 | 3.85 | 1.08 | 0.69 | 1.41 | 0.00 |
| | 25-40 | 0.75 | 0.83 | 0.69 | 0.00 | 4.52 | 0.28 | 2.38 | 0.54 | 0.22 | 0.61 | 0.30 |
| | 40-65 | 1.84 | 0.71 | 2.82 | 0.10 | 4.10 | 0.20 | 2.55 | 0.99 | 0.34 | 0.70 | 0.17 |
| | 65+ | | 0.99 | 9.94 | 0.00 | 5.88 | 0.00 | 7.41 | | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.31 |

Wording of the question: "Changes in society are everyone's concern. The government could play an important or a minor role in this. Please indicate what you think about the government's responsibility regarding the following issue: Providing opportunities for women to combine a job outside the home with raising children." Answer categories: 'completely responsible', 'quite responsible', 'responsible', 'slightly responsible', 'not responsible'; The answer categories were translated and combined to 'very high/high responsibility', 'normal responsibility', 'low/no responsibility'

* this question was not asked for Austria and Estonia; a answer categories in Germany do not include normal responsibility

Source: IPPAS 2003, own calculation

**Table 13:** Statement on the government's responsibility to provide opportunities for men to combine a job outside the home with raising children, in % by age groups *

| Responsibility | Age Group | Belgium | Germany | Finland | Netherlands | Poland | Czech Rep. | Hungary | Slovenia | Lithuania | Cyprus | Romania |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| very high/high | <25 | 59.10 | 74.30 | 38.11 | 32.74 | 34.12 | 27.05 | 42.01 | 30.82 | 45.83 | 46.01 | 49.16 |
| | 25-40 | 59.95 | 77.23 | 42.70 | 35.16 | 29.54 | 31.92 | 39.61 | 26.48 | 39.86 | 39.85 | 53.84 |
| | 40-65 | 49.77 | 73.53 | 36.60 | 23.60 | 29.00 | 28.94 | 39.27 | 26.30 | 38.33 | 36.23 | 50.17 |
| | 65+ | | 81.19 | 36.37 | 12.63 | 14.70 | 29.09 | 37.21 | | 45.12 | 37.50 | 50.78 |
| normal | <25 | 30.67 | | 33.50 | 30.09 | 19.60 | 31.97 | 24.85 | 40.54 | 35.42 | 26.29 | 18.86 |
| | 25-40 | 26.92 | | 30.56 | 33.17 | 22.68 | 31.36 | 27.55 | 44.19 | 36.78 | 28.09 | 15.68 |
| | 40-65 | 29.64 | | 28.97 | 28.59 | 21.85 | 32.87 | 28.25 | 41.94 | 33.90 | 27.87 | 19.17 |
| | 65+ | | | 25.57 | 24.23 | 20.59 | 34.55 | 25.76 | | 36.28 | 12.50 | 20.56 |
| low/no respons. | <25 | 9.98 | 25.23 | 28.13 | 37.17 | 35.98 | 40.16 | 30.18 | 27.57 | 18.75 | 26.29 | 31.99 |
| | 25-40 | 12.37 | 22.32 | 25.67 | 31.66 | 39.24 | 36.44 | 28.48 | 28.98 | 22.90 | 31.14 | 30.17 |
| | 40-65 | 19.46 | 25.77 | 30.73 | 47.71 | 38.20 | 37.79 | 26.93 | 31.02 | 27.26 | 34.49 | 30.50 |
| | 65+ | | 17.82 | 25.57 | 63.14 | 52.94 | 35.46 | 26.26 | | 18.60 | 50.00 | 28.34 |
| missing | <25 | 0.25 | 0.47 | 0.26 | 0.00 | 10.30 | 0.82 | 2.96 | 1.08 | 0.00 | 1.41 | 0.00 |
| | 25-40 | 0.75 | 0.45 | 1.08 | 0.00 | 8.53 | 0.28 | 4.37 | 0.36 | 0.44 | 0.92 | 0.30 |
| | 40-65 | 1.12 | 0.71 | 3.69 | 0.10 | 10.95 | 0.39 | 5.55 | 0.74 | 0.51 | 1.39 | 0.17 |
| | 65+ | | 0.99 | 12.50 | 0.00 | 11.76 | 0.91 | 10.77 | | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.31 |

Wording of the question: "Changes in society are everyone's concern. The government could play an important or a minor role in this. Please indicate what you think about the government's responsibility regarding the following issue: Providing opportunities for men to combine a job outside the home with raising children." Answer categories: 'completely responsible', 'quite responsible', 'responsible', 'slightly responsible', 'not responsible'; The answer categories were translated and combined to 'very high/high responsibility', 'normal responsibility', 'low/no responsibility'

* this question was not asked for Austria and Estonia; a answer categories in Germany do not include normal responsibility

Source: IPPAS 2003, own calculation

35

**Table 14: Results of the regression analyses by countries for each family policy measure. Models 1 contain the demographic covariates age, childlessness, sex, and marital status. Models 2 contain additionally current benefits, education, conservatism, household income. In the case of empty rows or columns, this indicates, that the covariates or policy measures are not available for the respective country.**

Family policy measure 1: Improved parental leave arrangements for working women who are having a baby

| VARIABLES | Belgium Model 1 | Belgium Model 2 | Germany[a] Model 1 | Germany[a] Model 2 | Finland Model 1 | Finland Model 2 | Netherlands Model 1 | Netherlands Model 2 | Austria Model 1 | Austria Model 2 | Poland Model 1 | Poland Model 2 | Czech Rp. Model 1 | Czech Rp. Model 2 | Hungary Model 1 | Hungary Model 2 | Slovenia Model 1 | Slovenia Model 2 | Lithuania Model 1 | Lithuania Model 2 | Cyprus Model 1 | Cyprus Model 2 | Estonia Model 1 | Estonia Model 2 | Romania Model 1 | Romania Model 2 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age | 0.971*** (0.005) | 0.968*** (0.006) | 0.993+ (0.004) | 0.994 (0.005) | 0.974*** (0.003) | 0.968*** (0.004) | 0.965*** (0.008) | 0.965*** (0.009) | 0.976 | 0.967*** (0.007) | 0.980*** (0.005) | 1.001 (0.008) | 0.989 (0.007) | 0.986 (0.010) | 0.997 (0.004) | 1.000 (0.006) | 0.987 (0.015) | 0.976 (0.019) | 0.992 (0.008) | 0.995 (0.011) | 1.025 (0.023) | 1.026 (0.023) | 0.986** (0.005) | 0.982** (0.006) | 1.006 (0.010) | 1.006 (0.012) |
| Childless | 0.946 (0.103) | 0.889 (0.119) | 0.897 (0.103) | 0.927 (0.138) | 0.720** (0.079) | 0.706** (0.083) | 0.624** (0.111) | 0.749 (0.230) | 0.734 | 0.618* (0.140) | 0.530*** (0.091) | 1.238 (0.642) | 0.404** (0.117) | 0.390* (0.144) | 1.431* (0.262) | 1.346 (0.341) | 0.659 (0.341) | 0.723 (0.474) | 0.572+ (0.189) | 0.604 (0.250) | 1.130 (0.534) | 1.032 (0.487) | 0.831 (0.189) | 0.913 (0.226) | | |
| Current benefits | | 0.922 (0.099) | | 1.160 (0.154) | | | | 1.195 (0.335) | | 0.816 (0.171) | | 1.646** (0.272) | | 1.148 (0.346) | | 0.943 (0.179) | | 1.246 (0.584) | | 0.242** (0.131) | | | | | | 1.259 (0.625) |
| Education | | 0.880 (0.090) | | 0.658* (0.130) | | 0.858 (0.093) | | 1.222 (0.194) | | 1.020 (0.200) | | 1.026 (0.197) | | 0.729 (0.293) | | 0.955 (0.145) | | 0.257+ (0.194) | | 1.016 (0.424) | | 1.409 (0.483) | | 1.120 (0.215) | | 0.904 (0.372) |
| Sex | 0.951 (0.076) | 0.940 (0.079) | 0.656*** (0.058) | 0.687*** (0.065) | 0.784** (0.061) | 0.789*** (0.067) | 0.624*** (0.081) | 0.596*** (0.081) | 0.769 | 0.695* (0.100) | 0.525*** (0.056) | 0.565*** (0.087) | 0.846 (0.170) | 0.891 (0.198) | 0.671*** (0.075) | 0.773+ (0.102) | 1.008 (0.326) | 1.284 (0.450) | 0.672 (0.168) | 0.582+ (0.176) | 0.730 (0.192) | 0.739 (0.200) | 1.220 (0.206) | 1.296 (0.232) | 0.852 (0.313) | 0.931 (0.350) |
| Marital Status | 0.779* (0.077) | 0.832* (0.089) | 1.196+ (0.123) | 1.298* (0.156) | 0.901 (0.083) | 0.925 (0.098) | 0.858 (0.148) | 0.934 (0.176) | 1.288 | 1.293 (0.228) | 1.400* (0.212) | 1.390 (0.369) | 0.806 (0.189) | 0.883 (0.234) | 1.279+ (0.163) | 1.258 (0.188) | 0.824 (0.364) | 1.055 (0.535) | 1.388 (0.391) | 1.311 (0.454) | 1.464 (0.623) | 1.371 (0.591) | 0.852 (0.157) | 0.877 (0.172) | 1.563 (0.599) | 1.415 (0.626) |
| Conservatism | | 0.769** (0.076) | | 1.095 (0.109) | | 1.146 (0.108) | | 0.677* (0.104) | | 1.189 (0.178) | | 1.280 (0.198) | | 1.473+ (0.340) | | 1.003 (0.137) | | 0.779 (0.286) | | 0.991 (0.316) | | | | 1.199 (0.223) | | |
| HH income | | 1.089 (0.174) | | 1.228* (0.128) | | 1.277* (0.121) | | 1.004 (0.140) | | 1.033 (0.158) | | 1.019 (0.161) | | 1.055 (0.250) | | 0.901 (0.128) | | 2.934* (1.378) | | 0.783 (0.237) | | 0.589+ (0.163) | | 1.329 (0.269) | | 1.156 (0.479) |
| Constant | 5.702*** (1.279) | 7.959*** (2.301) | 8.511*** (1.641) | 9.922*** (3.355) | 11.68*** (2.076) | 14.21*** (3.459) | 15.19*** (5.649) | 12.43*** (6.257) | 17.12 | 27.94*** (13.432) | 29.57*** (7.623) | 7.566*** (3.799) | 19.23*** (7.984) | 19.66*** (13.988) | 7.286*** (1.675) | 6.586*** (2.634) | 81.16*** (63.983) | 230.7*** (295.808) | 30.19*** (14.682) | 38.22*** (32.235) | 6.139+ (5.330) | 6.498+ (6.444) | 17.19*** (5.081) | 14.37*** (5.260) | 30.07*** (14.956) | 28.23*** (18.307) |
| r2_p | 0.0173 | 0.0214 | 0.00915 | 0.0150 | 0.0221 | 0.0282 | 0.0262 | 0.0345 | 0.0169 | 0.0241 | 0.0328 | 0.0196 | 0.0165 | 0.0272 | 0.00801 | 0.00436 | 0.00295 | 0.0530 | 0.0180 | 0.0284 | 0.0143 | 0.0273 | 0.0108 | 0.0139 | 0.00796 | 0.00834 |
| Hosmer-Lemeshow | 0.5545 | 0.8896 | 0.299 | 0.4684 | 0.9979 | 0.5507 | 0.38 | 0.4175 | 0.7587 | 0.7013 | 0.1569 | 0.1472 | 0.1476 | 0.4217 | 0.0176 | 0.5281 | 0.2242 | 0.9566 | 0.1886 | 0.2097 | 0.7909 | 0.0862 | 0.9696 | 0.3023 | 0.0663 | 0.4952 |
| ll | -1800 | -1648 | -1774 | -1540 | -1970 | -1679 | -712.9 | -658.2 | -826.4 | -670.6 | -1363 | -679.0 | -372.1 | -307.1 | -1142 | -849.8 | -184.6 | -152.2 | -278.6 | -196.0 | -240.7 | -227.1 | -558.4 | -503.6 | -149.5 | -144.2 |
| N | 2764 | 2544 | 4047 | 3517 | 3450 | 2950 | 1212 | 1133 | 1950 | 1624 | 4476 | 2599 | 1076 | 880 | 2930 | 2158 | 1528 | 1287 | 1399 | 1065 | 1056 | 1016 | 1670 | 1476 | 1489 | 1422 |

z-statistics in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

[a] additionally controlled for Area of Residence (East/West Germany)

**Family policy measure 2: Lower income tax for people with dependent children**

| VARIABLES | Belgium Model 1 | Belgium Model 4 | Germany[a] Model 1 | Germany[a] Model 4 | Finland Model 1 | Finland Model 4 | Netherlands Model 1 | Netherlands Model 4 | Austria Model 1 | Austria Model 4 | Poland Model 1 | Poland Model 4 | Czech Rp. Model 1 | Czech Rp. Model 4 | Hungary Model 1 | Hungary Model 4 | Slovenia Model 1 | Slovenia Model 4 | Lithuania Model 1 | Lithuania Model 4 | Cyprus Model 1 | Cyprus Model 4 | Estonia Model 1 | Estonia Model 4 | Romania Model 1 | Romania Model 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age | 0.935*** (0.006) | 0.937*** (0.007) | 0.972*** (0.004) | 0.982*** (0.005) | 0.981*** (0.004) | 0.976*** (0.004) | 0.952*** (0.008) | 0.950*** (0.009) | 0.981** (0.006) | 0.981* (0.008) | 0.988** (0.004) | 1.004 (0.007) | 1.000 (0.008) | 0.990 (0.010) | 0.988** (0.004) | 0.980** (0.006) | 0.975** (0.009) | 0.989 (0.012) | 1.004 (0.007) | 0.995 (0.010) | 1.012 (0.027) | 1.010 (0.027) | 1.001 (0.005) | 0.998 (0.006) | 1.031+ (0.017) | 1.052** (0.021) |
| Childless | 0.184*** (0.025) | 0.277*** (0.045) | 0.339*** (0.041) | 0.429*** (0.066) | 0.236*** (0.027) | 0.234*** (0.029) | 0.266*** (0.047) | 0.311*** (0.086) | 0.530*** (0.095) | 0.553* (0.132) | 0.371*** (0.051) | 0.963 (0.390) | 0.737 (0.221) | 0.524+ (0.206) | 1.005 (0.191) | 0.667+ (0.162) | 0.864 (0.249) | 1.109 (0.422) | 0.391*** (0.104) | 0.327** (0.112) | 1.174 (0.666) | 1.069 (0.595) | 0.511** (0.113) | 0.445*** (0.107) | | 3.158+ (2.014) |
| Current benefits | | 1.920*** (0.279) | | 1.682*** (0.258) | | | | 1.176 (0.333) | | 0.891 (0.203) | | 1.953*** (0.272) | | 0.841 (0.264) | | 0.674* (0.135) | | 1.300 (0.353) | | 0.172** (0.078) | | 1.556 (0.641) | | 1.109 (0.216) | | 1.247 (0.684) |
| Education | | 0.594*** (0.083) | | 0.952 (0.180) | | 0.913 (0.115) | | 1.067 (0.173) | | 1.110 (0.227) | | 1.098 (0.178) | | 1.559 (0.549) | | 0.800 (0.130) | | 1.044 (0.257) | | 1.413 (0.500) | | 1.582 (0.522) | | 1.261 (0.231) | | 0.139* (0.106) |
| Sex | 1.062 (0.107) | 1.008 (0.107) | 0.886 (0.083) | 0.910 (0.092) | 1.009 (0.089) | 1.034 (0.099) | 1.027 (0.134) | 0.998 (0.135) | 0.943 (0.131) | 0.863 (0.132) | 0.830+ (0.071) | 0.865 (0.111) | 0.570** (0.118) | 0.574* (0.134) | 0.769* (0.092) | 0.824 (0.115) | 0.854 (0.157) | 0.832 (0.172) | 0.913 (0.188) | 0.690 (0.182) | 1.254 (0.393) | 1.582 (0.522) | 1.112 (0.184) | | 0.117** (0.089) | |
| Marital Status | 1.240+ (0.154) | 1.185 (0.157) | 1.096 (0.124) | 0.948 (0.127) | 1.314** (0.138) | 1.262+ (0.152) | 1.313 (0.221) | 1.327 (0.242) | 1.447* (0.236) | 1.344 (0.251) | 1.042 (0.130) | 1.061 (0.245) | 1.383 (0.325) | 1.300 (0.363) | 1.214 (0.164) | 1.376* (0.215) | 1.481+ (0.340) | 1.270 (0.326) | 1.359 (0.323) | 1.206 (0.364) | 2.671* (1.336) | 2.412+ (1.219) | 0.937 (0.189) | 0.914 (0.201) | 0.240+ (0.170) | 0.136* (0.109) |
| Conservativism | | 1.347* (0.184) | | 1.303* (0.142) | | 1.258* (0.138) | | 1.300 (0.211) | | 1.156 (0.183) | | 1.451** (0.187) | | 1.277 (0.311) | | 1.119 (0.161) | | 0.874 (0.187) | | 1.376 (0.382) | | 0.601 (0.201) | | 1.115 (0.213) | | |
| HH income | | 1.043 (0.194) | | 0.950 (0.106) | | 1.018 (0.107) | | 1.317 (0.182) | | 0.744+ (0.119) | | 1.299+ (0.174) | | 1.126 (0.283) | | 1.031 (0.156) | | 0.547** (0.117) | | 1.068 (0.293) | | | | 1.403 (0.302) | | 1.616 (0.946) |
| Constant | 87.14*** (24.976) | 78.85*** (29.482) | 32.37*** (6.836) | 16.97*** (5.824) | 13.09*** (2.550) | 16.67*** (4.560) | 19.95*** (7.304) | 14.24*** (7.014) | 16.04*** (4.865) | 17.25*** (8.628) | 13.90*** (2.925) | 3.238** (1.360) | 9.686*** (4.071) | 10.06** (7.131) | 14.40*** (3.566) | 23.91*** (9.808) | 26.33*** (11.741) | 19.15*** (12.796) | 11.46*** (4.520) | 18.27*** (12.944) | 7.558* (7.879) | 7.418+ (8.747) | 9.999*** (2.941) | 9.555*** (3.387) | 296.9*** (287.187) | 102.2*** (109.381) |
| r2_p | 0.0855 | 0.100 | 0.0370 | 0.0449 | 0.0706 | 0.0694 | 0.0745 | 0.0786 | 0.0212 | 0.0226 | 0.0277 | 0.0244 | 0.0221 | 0.0327 | 0.00876 | 0.0125 | 0.0114 | 0.0227 | 0.0393 | 0.0626 | 0.0269 | 0.0386 | 0.0154 | 0.0240 | 0.0991 | 0.121 |
| Hosmer-Lemeshow | 0.3897 | 0.788 | 0.6429 | 0.9454 | 0.2174 | 0.0012 | 0.2748 | 0.0903 | 0.2095 | 0.372 | 0.4015 | 0.6916 | 0.9711 | 0.9091 | 0.556 | 0.1793 | 0.2178 | 0.0072 | 0.2422 | 0.5191 | 0.4394 | 0.012 | 0.8942 | 0.2254 | 0.4096 | 0.657 |
| ll | -1260 | -1136 | -1789 | -1349 | -1661 | -1403 | -709.4 | -661.4 | -732.9 | -616.9 | -1829 | -890.8 | -353.6 | -280.9 | -1030 | -781.3 | -450.5 | -371.3 | -370.1 | -237.0 | -180.9 | -168.1 | -558.4 | -473.9 | -87.64 | -77.03 |
| N | 2772 | 2547 | 4041 | 3512 | 3457 | 2958 | 1212 | 1133 | 1951 | 1625 | 4475 | 2597 | 1077 | 880 | 2957 | 2168 | 1520 | 1281 | 1399 | 1065 | 1054 | 1014 | 1674 | 1480 | 1482 | 1416 |

z-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
[a] additionally controlled for Area of Residence (East/West Germany)

**Family policy measure 3: Better day-care facilities for children younger than age three**

| VARIABLES | Belgium Model 1 | Belgium Model 4 | Germany[a] Model 1 | Germany[a] Model 4 | Finland Model 1 | Finland Model 4 | Netherlands Model 1 | Netherlands Model 4 | Austria Model 1 | Austria Model 4 | Poland Model 1 | Poland Model 4 | Czech Rp. Model 1 | Czech Rp. Model 4 | Hungary Model 1 | Hungary Model 4 | Slovenia Model 1 | Slovenia Model 4 | Lithuania Model 1 | Lithuania Model 4 | Cyprus Model 1 | Cyprus Model 4 | Estonia Model 1 | Estonia Model 4 | Romania Model 1 | Romania Model 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age | 0.996 (0.006) | 0.992 (0.006) | 0.999 (0.004) | 0.998 (0.005) | 1.000 (0.003) | 0.994 (0.004) | 0.991 (0.008) | 0.990 (0.009) | 0.978*** (0.004) | 0.977*** (0.006) | 0.983*** (0.004) | 0.991 (0.006) | 0.995 (0.005) | 0.996 (0.007) | 1.004 (0.033) | 0.993 (0.004) | 0.998 (0.017) | 0.987 (0.022) | 0.989* (0.005) | 0.982* (0.007) | 1.021 (0.017) | 1.019 (0.018) | 0.995 (0.003) | 0.992* (0.004) | 0.993 (0.008) | 0.991 (0.009) |
| Childless | 0.817* (0.095) | 0.671** (0.099) | 0.789* (0.093) | 0.821 (0.129) | 0.936 (0.094) | 0.905 (0.098) | 1.223 (0.211) | 1.545 (0.477) | 0.903 (0.135) | 0.744 (0.147) | 0.476*** (0.065) | 1.014 (0.442) | 1.134 (0.237) | 1.013 (0.275) | 1.168 (0.154) | 0.889 (0.165) | 1.962 (1.086) | 2.106 (1.585) | 0.765 (0.168) | 0.705 (0.189) | 1.804 (0.696) | 1.734 (0.668) | 1.235 (0.183) | 1.069 (0.173) | | 1.269 (0.500) |
| Current benefits | | 0.704** (0.084) | | | | | | 1.327 (0.369) | | 0.744+ (0.128) | | 1.222 (0.158) | | 0.964 (0.187) | | 0.772* (0.110) | | 0.876 (0.455) | | 0.917 (0.457) | | 0.965 (0.282) | | 0.730* (0.095) | | 0.764 (0.225) |
| Education | | 0.851 (0.096) | | 0.918 (0.126) | | 0.748** (0.076) | | 1.583** (0.242) | | 1.081 (0.170) | | 1.327* (0.191) | | 1.011 (0.257) | | 0.723** (0.083) | | 0.529 (0.306) | | 0.826 (0.223) | | 0.848 (0.180) | | 1.625*** (0.190) | | 0.842 (0.271) |
| Sex | 0.697*** (0.060) | 0.677*** (0.062) | 0.739*** (0.067) | 0.756** (0.073) | 1.172* (0.085) | 1.246** (0.098) | 0.681** (0.085) | 0.635*** (0.101) | 0.917 (0.098) | 0.849 (0.086) | 0.713*** (0.059) | 0.768* (0.092) | 0.983 (0.133) | 1.049 (0.158) | 1.102 (0.091) | 1.229* (0.123) | 0.476* (0.176) | 0.483+ (0.200) | 0.812 (0.125) | 0.971 (0.183) | 0.839 (0.175) | | 1.448** (0.156) | | 0.690 (0.201) | 0.710 (0.213) |
| Marital Status | 0.921 (0.099) | 1.000 (0.117) | 0.767* (0.082) | 0.888 (0.112) | 0.735*** (0.063) | 0.747** (0.072) | 0.695* (0.116) | 0.761 (0.144) | 1.001 (0.126) | 1.063 (0.156) | 1.237* (0.149) | 0.872 (0.197) | 0.939 (0.142) | 0.908 (0.160) | 0.922 (0.088) | 0.951 (0.108) | 1.976 (0.837) | 3.060+ (1.438) | 1.108 (0.193) | 0.944 (0.203) | 1.909* (0.654) | 1.877+ (0.649) | 0.804* (0.097) | 0.844 (0.110) | 1.147 (0.355) | 1.276 (0.450) |
| Conservativism | | 0.795* (0.085) | | 0.809* (0.082) | | 0.867* (0.075) | | 0.390*** (0.058) | | 0.605*** (0.074) | | 1.639*** (0.197) | | 1.210 (0.189) | | 0.980 (0.100) | | 0.556 (0.226) | | 1.292 (0.255) | | 0.731 (0.157) | | 0.961 (0.117) | | |
| HH income | | 0.989 (0.167) | | 0.940 (0.102) | | 1.050 (0.090) | | 0.617*** (0.085) | | 0.869 (0.108) | | 1.032 (0.128) | | 1.014 (0.159) | | 0.858 (0.092) | | 0.975 (0.405) | | 0.954 (0.183) | | | | 1.225 (0.161) | | 1.819+ (0.617) |
| Constant | 4.107*** (0.983) | 7.181*** (2.246) | 8.096*** (1.582) | 15.24*** (5.165) | 1.997*** (0.314) | 3.105*** (0.680) | 3.800*** (1.340) | 3.806** (1.900) | 8.643*** (2.030) | 13.22*** (5.356) | 13.16*** (2.700) | 6.698*** (2.728) | 2.358** (0.638) | 1.945 (0.934) | 1.856*** (0.315) | 4.625*** (1.391) | 40.89*** (34.027) | 12.02** (160.415) | 10.09*** (3.065) | 17.38*** (9.339) | 2.657 (1.826) | 3.355 (2.657) | 1.865*** (0.353) | 2.595*** (0.617) | 48.88*** (23.340) | 34.54*** (18.476) |
| r2_p | 0.0679 | 0.0126 | 0.00568 | 0.0296 | 0.00443 | 0.00977 | 0.0209 | 0.0770 | 0.0135 | 0.0260 | 0.0243 | 0.0162 | 0.00253 | 0.00193 | 0.00164 | 0.00593 | 0.0188 | 0.0405 | 0.0695 | 0.0878 | 0.00949 | 0.0141 | 0.0146 | 0.0219 | 0.00641 | 0.0176 |
| Hosmer-Lemeshow | 0.9933 | 0.0056 | 0.2008 | 0.6379 | 0.6897 | 0.5338 | 0.1844 | 0.4743 | 0.5195 | 0.1753 | 0.4621 | 0.6611 | 0.8776 | 0.6802 | 0.4792 | 0.4849 | 0.9029 | 0.7793 | 0.5095 | 0.7603 | 0.836 | 0.6095 | 0.0464 | 0.018 | 0.1548 | 0.2712 |
| ll | -1611 | -1469 | -1789 | -1463 | -2252 | -1930 | -755.3 | -664.6 | -1082 | -903.1 | -1931 | -989.4 | -695.3 | -571.8 | -1799 | -1297 | -159.4 | -129.0 | -589.2 | -412.7 | -343.1 | -330.8 | -1075 | -941.5 | -2205 | -209.2 |
| N | 2760 | 2538 | 4041 | 3512 | 3458 | 2959 | 1212 | 1133 | 1946 | 1624 | 4472 | 2594 | 1075 | 879 | 2919 | 2145 | 1305 | 1266 | 1399 | 1065 | 1056 | 1016 | 1651 | 1459 | 1480 | 1416 |

z-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
[a] additionally controlled for Area of Residence (East/West Germany)

**Family policy measure 4: Better day-care facilities for children between age three up to school age**

| VARIABLES | Belgium Model 1 | Belgium Model 4 | Germany[a] Model 1 | Germany[a] Model 4 | Netherlands Model 1 | Netherlands Model 4 | Finland Model 1 | Finland Model 4 | Austria Model 1 | Austria Model 4 | Poland Model 1 | Poland Model 4 | Czech Rp. Model 1 | Czech Rp. Model 4 | Hungary Model 1 | Hungary Model 4 | Slovenia Model 1 | Slovenia Model 4 | Lithuania Model 1 | Lithuania Model 4 | Cyprus Model 1 | Cyprus Model 4 | Estonia Model 1 | Estonia Model 4 | Romania Model 1 | Romania Model 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age | | | 0.997 (0.005) | 1.000 (0.006) | | | 0.989*** (0.003) | 0.989** (0.004) | 0.989* (0.005) | 0.995 (0.007) | 0.996 (0.004) | 1.008 (0.006) | 0.999 (0.006) | 0.990 (0.008) | 0.999 (0.003) | 0.988* (0.005) | 1.017 (0.018) | 1.001 (0.023) | 0.991 (0.005) | 0.992 (0.008) | 1.016 (0.018) | 1.013 (0.018) | 1.000 (0.004) | 0.996 (0.005) | 0.995 (0.008) | 0.993 (0.009) |
| Childless | | | 0.628** (0.089) | 0.681* (0.126) | | | 0.683*** (0.076) | 0.645** (0.078) | 0.818 (0.132) | 0.723 (0.19) | 0.562*** (0.076) | 1.711 (0.795) | 1.305 (0.309) | 0.806 (0.249) | 0.939 (0.145) | 0.717 (0.154) | 1.887 (1.184) | 1.094 (0.872) | 0.713 (0.164) | 0.684 (0.191) | 2.285* (0.903) | 2.159* (0.848) | 0.807 (0.145) | 0.945 (0.190) | | |
| Current benefits | | | | 1.092 (0.185) | | | | | | 0.806 (0.155) | | 1.459* (0.186) | | 0.791 (0.174) | | 0.767 (0.131) | | 0.622 (0.330) | | 1.069 (0.585) | | | | | | 0.966 (0.422) |
| Education | | | | 1.047 (0.217) | | | | 0.943 (0.105) | | 1.338* (0.226) | | 1.423* (0.201) | | 0.418* (0.155) | | 0.862 (0.120) | | 0.682 (0.390) | | 1.196 (0.325) | | 0.865 (0.258) | | 1.398* (0.216) | | 0.991 (0.359) |
| Sex | | | 0.616*** (0.068) | 0.616*** (0.073) | | | 0.839* (0.067) | 0.916 (0.080) | 0.897 (0.105) | 0.875 (0.115) | 0.685*** (0.056) | 0.724** (0.086) | 0.766° (0.116) | 0.889 (0.151) | 0.887 (0.087) | 1.052 (0.127) | 0.557 (0.207) | 0.617 (0.247) | 0.787 (0.127) | 0.923 (0.182) | 0.712 (0.151) | 0.732 (0.157) | 0.991 (0.130) | 1.191 (0.171) | 0.802 (0.260) | 0.757 (0.251) |
| Marital Status | | | 0.867 (0.115) | 0.965 (0.150) | | | 0.739* (0.071) | 0.781* (0.086) | 0.998 (0.139) | 0.886 (0.144) | 1.221° (0.146) | 0.922 (0.205) | 1.140 (0.193) | 1.164 (0.234) | 1.024 (0.117) | 1.023 (0.139) | 0.795 (0.403) | 0.974 (0.517) | 1.065 (0.196) | 0.941 (0.214) | 2.263* (0.781) | 2.251* (0.783) | 1.033 (0.157) | 1.056 (0.173) | 1.975* (0.654) | 2.305* (0.870) |
| Conservativism | | | | 0.738* (0.091) | | | | 0.842* (0.080) | | 0.863 (0.115) | | 1.503*** (0.178) | | 0.942 (0.171) | | 1.073 (0.133) | | 1.340 (0.586) | | 1.047 (0.219) | | 0.720 (0.156) | | 1.126 (0.169) | | |
| HH income | | | | 1.009 (0.131) | | | | 1.205° (0.116) | | 0.694** (0.094) | | 0.976 (0.119) | | 1.265 (0.228) | | 0.926 (0.120) | | 0.966 (0.399) | | 1.044 (0.211) | | | | 1.370° (0.227) | | 1.261 (0.458) |
| Constant | | | 17.31*** (4.170) | 21.39*** (8.529) | | | 6.968*** (1.240) | 8.380*** (2.063) | 7.503*** (1.935) | 6.854*** (3.029) | 7.188*** (1.434) | 2.795** (1.096) | 3.354*** (1.022) | 11.96*** (7.175) | 5.092*** (1.036) | 10.66*** (3.800) | 32.10*** (28.033) | 88.22*** (116.818) | 11.07*** (3.539) | 10.49*** (5.771) | 2.808 (1.960) | 4.078* (3.272) | 4.562*** (1.069) | 3.415*** (0.988) | 32.82*** (14.654) | 31.18*** (17.947) |
| r2_p | | | 0.0143 | 0.0347 | | | 0.00818 | 0.0132 | 0.00329 | 0.00991 | 0.0228 | 0.0162 | 0.00379 | 0.0120 | 0.000713 | 0.00333 | 0.0152 | 0.0168 | 0.00645 | 0.0571 | 0.0137 | 0.0185 | 0.00208 | 0.00655 | 0.0116 | 0.0171 |
| Hosmer-Lemeshow | | | 0.5947 | 0.728 | | | 0.6687 | 0.6946 | 0.5107 | 0.272 | 0.2142 | 0.3497 | 0.1839 | 0.7552 | 0.8264 | 0.6606 | 0.8062 | 0.7783 | 0.4738 | 0.1193 | 0.631 | 0.4815 | 0.9541 | 0.0728 | 0.8166 | 0.5116 |
| ll | | | -1274 | -1090 | | | -1927 | -1632 | -945.3 | -791.9 | -2004 | -1013 | -582.3 | -469.6 | -1377 | -984.0 | -152.5 | -132.1 | -544.5 | -382.7 | -334.6 | -324.5 | -793.4 | -687.6 | -1853 | -179.0 |
| N | | | 4048 | 3519 | | | 3442 | 2947 | 1941 | 1622 | 4470 | 2293 | 1076 | 880 | 2946 | 2167 | 1503 | 1264 | 1397 | 1063 | 1051 | 1011 | 1654 | 1463 | 1480 | 1416 |

z-statistics in parentheses        *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1        [a]additionally controlled for Area of Residence (East/West Germany)

**Family policy measure 5: An allowance for families with children dependent on the family income**

| VARIABLES | Belgium Model 1 | Belgium Model 4 | Germany[a] Model 1 | Germany[a] Model 4 | Netherlands Model 1 | Netherlands Model 4 | Finland Model 1 | Finland Model 4 | Austria Model 1 | Austria Model 4 | Poland Model 1 | Poland Model 4 | Czech Rp. Model 1 | Czech Rp. Model 4 | Hungary Model 1 | Hungary Model 4 | Slovenia Model 1 | Slovenia Model 4 | Lithuania Model 1 | Lithuania Model 4 | Cyprus Model 1 | Cyprus Model 4 | Estonia Model 1 | Estonia Model 4 | Romania Model 1 | Romania Model 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age | | | 0.988** (0.004) | 0.987** (0.005) | 0.957*** (0.008) | 0.955*** (0.009) | 1.009** (0.003) | 1.004 (0.004) | 1.006 (0.005) | 1.006 (0.007) | 0.984** (0.005) | 1.002 (0.007) | 1.018** (0.007) | 1.016° (0.009) | 0.988** (0.004) | 0.986* (0.006) | 1.000 (0.010) | 0.998 (0.013) | 1.004 (0.005) | 1.007 (0.007) | 0.972* (0.015) | 0.972* (0.016) | 1.034*** (0.004) | 1.033*** (0.005) | 1.007 (0.010) | 1.000 (0.011) |
| Childless | | | 0.474*** (0.055) | 0.490*** (0.074) | 0.358*** (0.061) | 0.394* (0.118) | 0.695*** (0.073) | 0.698** (0.079) | 0.976 (0.147) | 1.080 (0.225) | 0.488*** (0.088) | 1.169 (0.607) | 1.121 (0.287) | 1.179 (0.407) | 0.677** (0.125) | 0.843 (0.219) | 1.053 (0.327) | 1.064 (0.449) | 0.817 (0.181) | 0.914 (0.244) | 0.382*** (0.128) | 0.384*** (0.130) | 1.549** (0.248) | 1.432* (0.252) | | |
| Current benefits | | | | 1.140 (0.161) | | 1.139 (0.311) | | | | 1.098 (0.199) | | 2.709*** (0.497) | | 1.251 (0.314) | | 1.259 (0.275) | | 0.991 (0.302) | | 0.784 (0.344) | | | | | | 1.243 (0.564) |
| Education | | | | 0.901 (0.166) | | 0.965 (0.149) | | 0.673** (0.076) | | 1.060 (0.178) | | 0.729 (0.166) | | 1.525 (0.463) | | 0.818 (0.141) | | 0.590° (0.183) | | 0.963 (0.265) | | 1.041 (0.298) | | 0.965 (0.134) | | 0.284*** (0.118) |
| Sex | | | 0.777** (0.071) | 0.809* (0.079) | 0.940 (0.116) | 0.925 (0.120) | 0.870** (0.066) | 0.848* (0.070) | 0.833° (0.091) | 0.801* (0.098) | 0.592*** (0.066) | 0.754* (0.122) | 0.892 (0.152) | 0.923 (0.177) | 0.796° (0.096) | 0.826 (0.122) | 0.793 (0.160) | 0.826 (0.186) | 0.845 (0.132) | 0.877 (0.163) | 1.107 (0.222) | 1.145 (0.234) | 1.070 (0.119) | 1.062 (0.128) | 0.894 (0.308) | 0.894 (0.313) |
| Marital Status | | | 1.113 (0.122) | 1.148 (0.146) | 1.023 (0.167) | 0.978 (0.174) | 0.801** (0.073) | 0.936 (0.097) | 1.068 (0.139) | 0.881 (0.135) | 1.222 (0.197) | 1.126 (0.338) | 1.168 (0.224) | 1.291 (0.292) | 0.996 (0.138) | 1.190 (0.199) | 1.486 (0.382) | 1.382 (0.450) | 1.348* (0.240) | 1.538* (0.326) | 1.240 (0.380) | 1.236 (0.385) | 0.937 (0.123) | 0.890 (0.125) | 1.079 (0.336) | 1.119 (0.487) |
| Conservativism | | | | 1.225° (0.127) | | 1.462* (0.227) | | 1.070 (0.099) | | 1.273* (0.161) | | 1.269 (0.209) | | 1.581** (0.304) | | 0.870 (0.132) | | 0.765 (0.180) | | 1.038 (0.201) | | 0.931 (0.192) | | 1.134 (0.142) | | |
| HH income | | | | 1.166 (0.125) | | 1.482** (0.196) | | 1.447** (0.133) | | 0.806° (0.103) | | 1.456* (0.252) | | 1.394 (0.283) | | 1.481* (0.240) | | 0.611* (0.141) | | 1.323 (0.258) | | | | 1.072 (0.148) | | 1.124 (0.449) |
| Constant | | | 14.15*** (2.844) | 14.17*** (4.720) | 13.23*** (4.631) | 10.39*** (4.986) | 2.179*** (0.361) | 2.801*** (0.656) | 2.654*** (0.626) | 2.782* (1.169) | 29.98*** (8.160) | 8.110*** (4.421) | 2.098* (0.715) | 0.854 (0.517) | 18.14*** (4.564) | 16.95*** (7.352) | 11.62*** (5.581) | 25.32*** (19.080) | 4.722*** (1.438) | 3.602* (1.872) | 25.20*** (16.131) | 24.52*** (18.050) | 0.422*** (0.087) | 0.441** (0.112) | 30.38*** (14.573) | 71.30*** (46.781) |
| r2_p | | | 0.0217 | 0.0311 | 0.0409 | 0.0537 | 0.00908 | 0.0182 | 0.00320 | 0.00580 | 0.0264 | 0.0437 | 0.0105 | 0.0262 | 0.00737 | 0.0170 | 0.00577 | 0.0180 | 0.00805 | 0.0131 | 0.0272 | 0.0273 | 0.0478 | 0.0518 | 0.0250 | 0.0423 |
| Hosmer-Lemeshow | | | 0.5444 | 0.6125 | 0.4464 | 0.2022 | 0.0368 | 0.9126 | 0.8486 | 0.4682 | 0.2627 | 0.1739 | 0.2852 | 0.0855 | 0.6105 | 0.487 | 0.5297 | 0.6243 | 0.4371 | 0.7856 | 0.9662 | 0.885 | 0.2898 | 0.7327 | 0.7804 | 0.9085 |
| ll | | | -1664 | -1447 | -7692 | -706.4 | -2074 | -1764 | -1052 | -865.7 | -1255 | -608.1 | -490.4 | -392.8 | -1013 | -717.4 | -392.6 | -322.4 | -572.8 | -419.9 | -359.5 | -346.7 | -1001 | -873.8 | -1652 | -157.1 |
| N | | | 4043 | 3514 | 1212 | 1133 | 3452 | 2956 | 1943 | 1621 | 4478 | 2299 | 1077 | 880 | 2981 | 2194 | 1521 | 1281 | 1398 | 1064 | 1054 | 1014 | 1668 | 1477 | 1481 | 1416 |

z-statistics in parentheses        *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1        [a]additionally controlled for Area of Residence (East/West Germany)

Family policy measure 6: An allowance at the birth of each child

| VARIABLES | Belgium Model 1 | Belgium Model 4 | Germany[a] Model 1 | Germany[a] Model 4 | Finland Model 1 | Finland Model 4 | Netherlands Model 1 | Netherlands Model 4 | Austria Model 1 | Austria Model 4 | Poland Model 1 | Poland Model 4 | Czech Rp. Model 1 | Czech Rp. Model 4 | Hungary Model 1 | Hungary Model 4 | Slovenia Model 1 | Slovenia Model 4 | Lithuania Model 1 | Lithuania Model 4 | Cyprus Model 1 | Cyprus Model 4 | Estonia Model 1 | Estonia Model 4 | Romania Model 1 | Romania Model 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age | 0.981*** (0.006) | 0.977*** (0.006) | 0.985*** (0.003) | 0.981*** (0.004) | 0.983*** (0.003) | 0.979*** (0.003) | 0.961*** (0.008) | 0.963*** (0.009) | 0.980*** (0.004) | 0.973*** (0.006) | 0.983*** (0.005) | 0.994 (0.009) | 0.986+ (0.008) | 0.987 (0.011) | 0.998 (0.003) | 0.997 (0.005) | 0.996 (0.015) | 1.006 (0.020) | 1.013 (0.010) | 1.004 (0.014) | 1.004 (0.016) | 1.001 (0.016) | 1.003 (0.005) | 1.003 (0.006) | 0.996 (0.007) | 0.983+ (0.009) |
| Childless | 0.483*** (0.053) | 0.549+ (0.075) | 0.474*** (0.047) | 0.561*** (0.075) | 0.536*** (0.053) | 0.467*** (0.050) | 0.388*** (0.063) | 0.513* (0.162) | 0.807 (0.106) | 0.679* (0.122) | 0.391*** (0.069) | 2.615 (2.010) | 0.458* (0.144) | 0.471+ (0.188) | 0.972 (0.152) | 1.121 (0.252) | 0.982 (0.503) | 1.433 (0.936) | 0.737 (0.281) | 0.888 (0.474) | 0.462* (0.149) | 0.529+ (0.177) | 0.662* (0.135) | 0.697 (0.154) | | |
| Current benefits | | 1.151 (0.130) | | 1.166 (0.142) | | | | 1.361 (0.383) | | 0.812 (0.127) | | 1.684** (0.320) | | 1.306 (0.430) | | 1.251 (0.218) | | 1.333 (0.589) | | 0.236+ (0.144) | | 0.574 (0.194) | | 0.817 (0.150) | | 1.255 (0.511) |
| Education | | 0.694*** (0.077) | | 0.544*** (0.096) | | 0.769** (0.076) | | 0.594*** (0.087) | | 0.894 (0.131) | | 1.144 (0.255) | | 0.521 (0.255) | | 0.662** (0.095) | | 1.903* (0.731) | | 0.889 (0.486) | | 1.037 (0.201) | | | | 0.224*** (0.079) |
| Sex | 1.031 (0.086) | 1.001 (0.087) | 0.771*** (0.059) | 0.737*** (0.063) | 0.988 (0.070) | 0.973 (0.075) | 1.03 (0.127) | 1.038 (0.135) | 0.810* (0.077) | 0.740** (0.079) | 0.482*** (0.054) | 0.485*** (0.087) | 0.829 (0.183) | 0.819 (0.196) | 0.733** (0.072) | 0.815* (0.097) | 0.544** (0.174) | 0.363** (0.132) | 0.456** (0.130) | 0.397* (0.149) | 1.013 (0.189) | 1.037 (0.201) | 0.860 (0.127) | 0.916 (0.149) | 1.054 (0.296) | 1.036 (0.307) |
| Marital Status | 1.239* (0.127) | 1.239* (0.136) | 1.035 (0.095) | 1.218* (0.135) | 0.807* (0.067) | 0.877 (0.084) | 1.079 (0.179) | 0.988 (0.181) | 1.259* (0.142) | 1.302* (0.172) | 1.408* (0.223) | 1.529 (0.476) | 1.061 (0.265) | 1.020 (0.290) | 0.942 (0.108) | 1.022 (0.141) | 0.889 (0.380) | 0.816 (0.372) | 1.864+ (0.608) | 1.929 (0.817) | 1.534 (0.442) | 1.853* (0.560) | 0.918 (0.164) | 1.033 (0.197) | 1.736+ (0.495) | 2.081* (0.725) |
| Conservativism | | 1.187 (0.128) | | 1.331** (0.121) | | 1.110 (0.095) | | 1.784*** (0.262) | | 0.995 (0.107) | | 1.758* (0.309) | | 1.403 (0.352) | | 1.006 (0.124) | | 1.430 (0.528) | | 1.051 (0.399) | | 1.754** (0.351) | | 0.949 (0.164) | | |
| HH income | | 1.143 (0.183) | | 1.425** (0.136) | | 1.337** (0.113) | | 1.438* (0.190) | | 1.107 (0.124) | | 1.887** (0.357) | | 1.064 (0.273) | | 1.201 (0.156) | | 0.723 (0.254) | | 1.484 (0.584) | | | | 1.027 (0.193) | | 1.332 (0.452) |
| Constant | 4.790*** (1.098) | 6.474*** (1.940) | 8.968*** (1.520) | 23.19*** (7.185) | 3.696*** (0.577) | 5.627*** (1.229) | 3.696*** (1.291) | 2.642* (1.296) | 3.641*** (0.761) | 6.258*** (2.295) | 34.32*** (9.263) | 8.106*** (4.694) | 23.01*** (10.339) | 28.61*** (22.964) | 6.156*** (1.258) | 6.912*** (2.533) | 61.08*** (46.560) | 26.99*** (29.219) | 15.45*** (8.555) | 30.08** (31.369) | 6.236** (3.809) | 7.325** (5.446) | 7.133*** (1.913) | 7.982*** (2.641) | 22.23*** (8.549) | 74.22*** (41.272) |
| r2_p | 0.0220 | 0.0253 | 0.0216 | 0.0756 | 0.0116 | 0.0224 | 0.0383 | 0.0663 | 0.0131 | 0.0182 | 0.0524 | 0.0472 | 0.0167 | 0.0281 | 0.00411 | 0.0114 | 0.0105 | 0.0359 | 0.0448 | 0.0496 | 0.0499 | 0.0648 | 0.00804 | 0.00639 | 0.0859 | 0.0710 |
| Hosmer-Lemeshow | 0.4336 | 0.6938 | 0.3235 | 0.455 | 0.7292 | 0.8377 | 0.6304 | 0.9064 | 0.2882 | 0.7546 | 0.438 | 0.9691 | 0.1707 | 0.8744 | 0.2968 | 0.0047 | 0.3025 | 0.7825 | 0.9497 | 0.9983 | 0.4026 | 0.5805 | 0.896 | 0.987 | 0.0209 | 0.5867 |
| ll | -1710 | -1561 | -2169 | -1746 | -2326 | -1974 | -773.8 | -700.8 | -1277 | -1057 | -1266 | -538.3 | -322.8 | -271.7 | -1387 | -983.5 | -196.9 | -168.2 | -230.5 | -143.0 | -3977 | -373.9 | -650.4 | -557.7 | -2339 | -207.8 |
| N | 2765 | 2540 | 4044 | 3516 | 3436 | 2945 | 1212 | 1133 | 1921 | 1606 | 4475 | 2999 | 1077 | 881 | 2986 | 2199 | 1512 | 1277 | 1397 | 1063 | 1055 | 1015 | 1652 | 1464 | 1503 | 1437 |

z-statistics in parentheses    *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

[a] additionally controlled for Area of Residence (East/West Germany)


Family policy measure 7: An allowance for mothers or fathers who do not take a job because they want to take care of the children while they are young

| VARIABLES | Belgium Model 1 | Belgium Model 4 | Germany[a] Model 1 | Germany[a] Model 4 | Finland Model 1 | Finland Model 4 | Netherlands Model 1 | Netherlands Model 4 | Austria Model 1 | Austria Model 4 | Poland Model 1 | Poland Model 4 | Czech Rp. Model 1 | Czech Rp. Model 4 | Hungary Model 1 | Hungary Model 4 | Slovenia Model 1 | Slovenia Model 4 | Lithuania Model 1 | Lithuania Model 4 | Cyprus Model 1 | Cyprus Model 4 | Estonia Model 1 | Estonia Model 4 | Romania Model 1 | Romania Model 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age | 0.981*** (0.006) | 0.977*** (0.006) | 0.983*** (0.004) | 0.991+ (0.005) | 0.984*** (0.003) | 0.978*** (0.003) | 0.982* (0.008) | 0.979+ (0.008) | 0.971*** (0.004) | 0.970 (—) | 0.983*** (0.004) | 0.996 (0.007) | 0.989*** (0.007) | 0.990 (0.010) | 0.991*** (0.003) | 0.990+ (0.005) | 1.000 (0.009) | 0.997 (0.012) | 0.996 (0.009) | 1.000 (0.013) | 1.003 (0.011) | 1.005 (0.011) | 0.985*** (0.004) | 0.977*** (0.005) | 0.992** (0.004) | 0.991+ (0.005) |
| Childless | 0.483*** (0.053) | 0.549+ (0.075) | 0.485*** (0.053) | 0.632** (0.089) | 0.453*** (0.052) | 0.409*** (0.051) | 0.472*** (0.077) | 0.579+ (0.169) | 0.608*** (0.085) | 0.594 (—) | 0.464*** (0.071) | 1.215 (0.580) | 0.526* (0.151) | 0.522+ (0.198) | 0.847 (0.114) | 1.044 (0.198) | 0.922 (0.266) | 0.996 (0.385) | 0.702 (0.270) | 0.974 (0.506) | 0.771 (0.183) | 0.853 (0.206) | 0.688** (0.119) | 0.638+ (0.120) | | |
| Current benefits | | 1.151 (0.130) | | 1.678*** (0.224) | | 1.009 (0.122) | | 1.155 (0.307) | | 0.946 (—) | | 1.309** (0.224) | | 1.018 (0.313) | | 1.259 (0.190) | | 1.009 (0.284) | | 0.359 (0.238) | | 0.923 (0.179) | | — | | 1.175 (0.244) |
| Education | | 0.694*** (0.077) | | 0.811 (0.145) | | 0.524*** (0.049) | | 0.813 (0.120) | | 1.019 (—) | | 1.263 (0.213) | | 1.154 (0.435) | | 0.855 (0.102) | | 0.581** (0.181) | | 1.101 (0.515) | | 0.789+ (0.109) | | 0.770+ (0.122) | | 0.669** (0.118) |
| Sex | 1.031 (0.086) | 1.001 (0.087) | 0.748*** (0.063) | 0.751*** (0.069) | 0.544*** (0.046) | 0.524*** (0.049) | 0.773+ (0.092) | 0.772* (0.096) | 0.651*** (0.066) | 0.655 (—) | 0.544*** (0.051) | 0.533*** (0.075) | 0.475*** (0.094) | 0.382*** (0.087) | 0.763** (0.066) | 0.875 (0.091) | 1.095 (0.205) | 1.043 (0.215) | 0.624+ (0.172) | 0.496* (0.172) | 0.826 (0.112) | 0.789+ (0.109) | 0.901 (0.116) | 0.963 (0.136) | 0.544*** (0.087) | |
| Marital Status | 1.239* (0.127) | 1.239* (0.136) | 1.088 (0.111) | 1.020 (0.122) | 1.147 (0.118) | 1.317* (0.154) | 1.055 (0.167) | 1.165 (0.199) | 1.085 (0.131) | 1.264 (—) | 1.305* (0.177) | 1.340 (0.328) | 1.089 (0.249) | 1.203 (0.330) | 1.225* (0.121) | 1.170 (0.137) | 1.329 (0.317) | 1.482 (0.397) | 1.125 (0.356) | 1.179 (0.476) | 1.423 (0.311) | 1.600* (0.359) | 1.233 (0.182) | 1.269 (0.203) | 0.880 (0.138) | 0.898 (0.146) |
| Conservativism | | 1.187 (0.128) | | 1.117 (0.108) | | 1.237* (0.131) | | 1.049 (0.152) | | 0.728 (—) | | 1.448** (0.201) | | 1.005 (0.244) | | 1.126 (0.120) | | 1.639* (0.396) | | 0.672 (0.252) | | 1.269* (0.179) | | 1.129 (0.170) | | 1.085 (0.211) |
| HH income | | 1.143 (0.183) | | 1.199* (0.121) | | 1.556*** (0.163) | | 1.562*** (0.198) | | 1.188 (—) | | 1.346* (0.194) | | 1.144 (0.279) | | 1.141 (0.128) | | 1.131 (0.251) | | 0.788 (0.269) | | — | | 1.361+ (0.224) | | 1.679** (0.308) |
| Constant | 4.790*** (1.098) | 6.474*** (1.940) | 13.91*** (2.624) | 9.003*** (2.860) | 12.48*** (2.402) | 11.97*** (3.173) | 3.554*** (1.173) | 2.931+ (1.348) | 10.27*** (2.347) | 11.06 (—) | 20.25*** (4.674) | 5.531*** (2.514) | 18.98*** (7.801) | 16.93*** (12.003) | 4.716*** (0.840) | 4.196*** (1.298) | 9.074*** (4.030) | 12.35*** (8.560) | 35.42*** (19.316) | 48.99*** (47.738) | 1.847 (0.807) | 1.468 (0.746) | 9.124*** (2.101) | 13.68*** (4.010) | 12.14*** (3.165) | 9.378*** (2.793) |
| r2_p | 0.0220 | 0.0253 | 0.0217 | 0.0303 | 0.0376 | 0.0483 | 0.0256 | 0.0372 | 0.0298 | 0.0370 | 0.0366 | 0.0278 | 0.0356 | 0.0524 | 0.00788 | 0.00933 | 0.0387 | 0.0203 | 0.00999 | 0.0233 | 0.0179 | 0.0222 | 0.0112 | 0.0188 | 0.0137 | 0.0211 |
| Hosmer-Lemeshow | 0.4336 | 0.6938 | 0.0056 | 0.0404 | 0.001 | 0.0129 | 0.2233 | 0.7181 | 0.8248 | 0.9287 | 0.787 | 0.9471 | 0.8562 | 0.5116 | 0.2703 | 0.0255 | 0.4145 | 0.3378 | 0.4061 | 0.4856 | 0.3744 | 0.5469 | 0.9097 | 0.503 | 0.2583 | 0.0949 |
| ll | -1710 | -1561 | -1852 | -1593 | -1723 | -1449 | -813.9 | -751.8 | -1166 | -966.2 | -1624 | -793.4 | -373.9 | -290.9 | -1678 | -1221 | -439.1 | -364.8 | -238.9 | -160.1 | -650.1 | -625.6 | -808.0 | -696.2 | -565.1 | -532.0 |
| N | 2766 | 2540 | 4045 | 3516 | 3457 | 2959 | 1212 | 1133 | 1919 | 1605 | 4475 | 2598 | 1069 | 876 | 2969 | 2181 | 1512 | 1276 | 1398 | 1064 | 1054 | 1014 | 1669 | 1475 | 1466 | 1404 |

z-statistics in parentheses    *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

[a] additionally controlled for Area of Residence (East/West Germany)

**Family policy measure 8: A substantial rise in child allowance by 7% of the monthly GNP**

| VARIABLES | Belgium Model 1 | Belgium Model 4 | Germany[a] Model 1 | Germany[a] Model 4 | Finland Model 1 | Finland Model 4 | Netherlands Model 1 | Netherlands Model 4 | Austria Model 1 | Austria Model 4 | Poland Model 1 | Poland Model 4 | Czech Rp. Model 1 | Czech Rp. Model 4 | Hungary Model 1 | Hungary Model 4 | Slovenia Model 1 | Slovenia Model 4 | Lithuania Model 1 | Lithuania Model 4 | Cyprus Model 1 | Cyprus Model 4 | Estonia Model 1 | Estonia Model 4 | Romania Model 1 | Romania Model 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age | 0.959*** (0.006) | 0.954*** (0.006) | 0.963*** (0.003) | 0.970*** (0.004) | 0.958*** (0.003) | 0.951*** (0.004) | 0.933*** (0.008) | 0.933*** (0.009) | 0.971*** (0.004) | 0.969*** (0.006) | 0.984*** (0.003) | 0.986** (0.005) | 0.979*** (0.006) | 0.982* (0.009) | 0.987*** (0.004) | 0.985* (0.006) | 1.005 (0.011) | 0.997 (0.014) | 0.997 (0.004) | 0.999 (0.006) | 0.989 (0.015) | 0.989 (0.015) | 0.983*** (0.005) | 0.978*** (0.006) | 0.979*** (0.007) | 0.980* (0.008) |
| Childless | 0.311*** (0.036) | 0.393** (0.056) | 0.329*** (0.034) | 0.507*** (0.067) | 0.306*** (0.032) | 0.301*** (0.035) | 0.200*** (0.036) | 0.281*** (0.087) | 0.581*** (0.079) | 0.595** (0.108) | 0.609*** (0.067) | 1.070 (0.108) | 0.596* (0.153) | 0.807 (0.268) | 0.627* (0.126) | 0.644* (0.171) | 1.465 (0.533) | 1.601 (0.755) | 0.849 (0.171) | 0.824 (0.197) | 0.618 (0.198) | 0.717 (0.239) | 0.541** (0.127) | 0.499** (0.125) |  |  |
| Current benefits |  | 1.519*** (0.179) |  | 1.845*** (0.235) |  |  |  | 1.444 (0.394) |  | 1.032 (0.168) |  | 1.411*** (0.135) |  | 1.796* (0.476) |  | 1.154 (0.270) |  | 0.947 (0.305) |  | 0.980 (0.405) |  | 0.846 (0.242) |  |  |  | 2.421° (1.147) |
| Education |  | 0.569*** (0.067) |  | 0.614** (0.106) |  | 0.794* (0.082) |  | 0.661** (0.106) |  | 0.957 (0.142) |  | 0.867 (0.098) |  | 0.636 (0.233) |  | 0.640* (0.120) |  | 0.920 (0.308) |  | 0.955 (0.224) |  | 0.965 (0.182) |  | 0.939 (0.198) | 0.464** (0.131) | 0.501* (0.157) |
| Sex | 0.847 (0.072) | 0.797* (0.072) | 0.840* (0.066) | 0.882 (0.076) | 0.850* (0.062) | 0.849* (0.068) | 0.975 (0.123) | 0.934 (0.124) | 0.993 (0.098) | 1.07 (0.111) | 0.752*** (0.049) | 0.654*** (0.058) | 0.697* (0.120) | 0.619* (0.118) | 0.631*** (0.085) | 0.701* (0.111) | 0.764 (0.175) | 0.783 (0.192) | 0.759* (0.102) | 0.741° (0.118) | 1.022 (0.188) |  | 1.090 (0.200) | 1.181 (0.235) | 0.871 (0.229) | 0.889 (0.257) |
| Marital Status | 1.262* (0.134) | 1.170 (0.134) | 1.043 (0.098) | 1.219* (0.138) | 0.910 (0.079) | 1.065 (0.106) | 1.264 (0.210) | 1.229 (0.219) | 1.128 (0.131) | 1.229 (0.166) | 1.097 (0.106) | 1.258 (0.202) | 1.258 (0.243) | 1.169 (0.263) | 1.080 (0.166) | 1.167 (0.209) | 1.311 (0.379) | 1.616 (0.301) | 0.817 (0.129) | 0.897 (0.170) | 1.644* (0.476) | 1.985* (0.601) | 1.055 (0.219) | 1.036 (0.231) | 1.953* (0.549) | 1.768° (0.574) |
| Conservativism |  | 1.374** (0.156) |  | 0.945 (0.087) |  | 0.880 (0.077) |  | 1.524** (0.240) |  | 1.013 (0.114) |  | 1.174* (0.107) |  | 1.567* (0.318) |  | 0.756* (0.123) |  | 1.273 (0.346) |  | 0.791 (0.134) |  | 1.730** (0.340) |  | 1.227 (0.256) |  |  |
| HH income |  | 1.243 (0.208) |  | 1.279* (0.123) |  | 1.367** (0.121) |  | 1.771** (0.241) |  | 1.201 (0.138) |  | 1.226* (0.113) |  | 1.217 (0.254) |  | 0.986 (0.169) |  | 1.635* (0.450) |  | 1.524* (0.258) |  |  |  | 1.150 (0.257) |  | 1.363 (0.442) |
| Constant | 15.65*** (3.795) | 21.94*** (6.975) | 28.74*** (5.243) | 30.08*** (9.346) | 17.11*** (2.952) | 22.79*** (5.363) | 30.66*** (11.372) | 20.36*** (10.206) | 7.591*** (1.659) | 7.216*** (2.686) | 4.748*** (0.767) | 3.253*** (0.985) | 15.27*** (5.443) | 11.29*** (7.160) | 26.63*** (7.416) | 38.68*** (17.882) | 12.19*** (6.560) | 11.44** (9.134) | 5.839*** (1.580) | 5.548*** (2.527) | 8.184*** (4.866) | 6.416*** (4.509) | 28.08*** (8.967) | 31.41*** (12.304) | 65.74*** (30.604) | 49.22*** (25.644) |
| r2_p | 0.0496 | 0.0653 | 0.0464 | 0.0784 | 0.0540 | 0.0647 | 0.101 | 0.127 | 0.0225 | 0.0236 | 0.0130 | 0.0230 | 0.0251 | 0.0437 | 0.0143 | 0.0237 | 0.00375 | 0.0144 | 0.00510 | 0.0131 | 0.0236 | 0.0347 | 0.0136 | 0.0173 | 0.0317 | 0.0487 |
| Hosmer-Lemeshow | 0.4872 | 0.7778 | 0.7909 | 0.0606 | 0.014 | 0.0062 | 0.0726 | 0.2526 | 0.2838 | 0.3777 | 0.4825 | 0.4401 | 0.1233 | 0.402 | 0.7915 | 0.9417 | 0.7234 | 0.3119 | 0.6485 | 0.6201 | 0.9779 | 0.643 | 0.8879 | 0.2017 | 0.2945 | 0.4249 |
| ll | -1626 | -1469 | -2051 | -1704 | -2185 | -1851 | -7439 | -676.7 | -1230 | -1023 | -2801 | -1541 | -464.7 | -379.0 | -868.3 | -643.1 | -322.5 | -2816 | -711.7 | -524.6 | -412.3 | -391.3 | -484.0 | -425.6 | -2374 | -215.8 |
| N | 2766 | 2544 | 4043 | 3515 | 3447 | 2951 | 1212 | 1133 | 1947 | 1625 | 4473 | 2994 | 1070 | 876 | 2989 | 2201 | 1499 | 1266 | 1399 | 1065 | 1055 | 1015 | 1671 | 1478 | 1414 | 1353 |

z-statistics in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
[a] additionally controlled for Area of Residence (East/West Germany)

**Family policy measure 9: Child-care facilities for school-going children before and after school and during school holidays**

| VARIABLES | Belgium Model 1 | Belgium Model 4 | Germany[a] Model 1 | Germany[a] Model 4 | Finland Model 1 | Finland Model 4 | Netherlands Model 1 | Netherlands Model 4 | Austria Model 1 | Austria Model 4 | Poland Model 1 | Poland Model 4 | Czech Rp. Model 1 | Czech Rp. Model 4 | Hungary Model 1 | Hungary Model 4 | Slovenia Model 1 | Slovenia Model 4 | Lithuania Model 1 | Lithuania Model 4 | Cyprus Model 1 | Cyprus Model 4 | Estonia Model 1 | Estonia Model 4 | Romania Model 1 | Romania Model 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age | 1.006 (0.006) | 0.997 (0.006) | 1.001 (0.004) | 0.998 (0.005) | 1.002 (0.003) | 1.001 (0.004) | 1.000 (0.008) | 0.995 (0.009) | 0.993° (0.004) | 0.995 (0.006) | 0.992* (0.003) | 1.001 (0.006) | 1.008 (0.005) | 1.019* (0.008) | 1.005° (0.003) | 1.002 (0.005) | 0.998 (0.010) | 1.001 (0.014) | 0.997 (0.005) | 0.995 (0.007) | 0.999 (0.017) | 0.994 (0.017) | 1.017*** (0.003) | 1.014*** (0.004) | 0.995 (0.006) | 1.001 (0.007) |
| Childless | 0.979 (0.112) | 0.288° (0.114) | 0.614*** (0.072) | 0.636*** (0.100) | 0.630*** (0.070) | 0.667*** (0.081) | 0.725° (0.119) | 0.715 (0.216) | 0.896 (0.128) | 0.854 (0.166) | 0.710** (0.092) | 1.130 (0.417) | 0.867 (0.188) | 1.078 (0.314) | 0.965 (0.134) | 0.773 (0.152) | 0.844 (0.273) | 0.911 (0.379) | 0.907 (0.191) | 1.054 (0.271) | 1.151 (0.440) | 1.281 (0.499) | 1.281* (0.185) | 1.151 (0.181) |  |  |
| Current benefits |  | 0.695** (0.081) |  | 0.959 (0.137) |  |  |  | 1.109 (0.306) |  | 0.891 (0.149) |  | 1.237° (0.141) |  | 1.561** (0.334) |  | 0.896 (0.136) |  | 0.992 (0.298) |  | 1.057 (0.459) |  |  |  |  |  | 1.760° (0.575) |
| Education |  | 0.794* (0.088) |  | 1.237 (0.207) |  | 0.985 (0.114) |  | 1.641*** (0.243) |  | 1.221 (0.186) |  | 1.030 (0.136) |  | 0.601° (0.184) |  | 1.232° (0.149) |  | 0.918 (0.279) |  | 1.009 (0.246) |  | 0.703 (0.226) |  | 0.940 (0.117) | 1.655** (0.441) |
| Sex | 0.649*** (0.054) | 0.630*** (0.056) | 0.668*** (0.060) | 0.639*** (0.064) | 0.445*** (0.036) | 0.463*** (0.042) | 0.702*** (0.083) | 0.646*** (0.082) | 0.774* (0.082) | 0.713** (0.082) | 0.672*** (0.052) | 0.643*** (0.068) | 0.808 (0.117) | 0.906 (0.148) | 0.808*** (0.070) | 0.865 (0.091) | 0.437*** (0.095) | 0.478*** (0.110) | 0.681*** (0.096) | 0.667*** (0.111) | 0.669** (0.143) | 0.674° (0.147) | 0.886 (0.093) | 0.845 (0.096) | 0.565* (0.132) | 0.657° (0.157) |
| Marital Status | 0.873 (0.092) | 0.962 (0.110) | 0.899 (0.099) | 1.015 (0.132) | 0.982 (0.097) | 0.941 (0.107) | 0.547*** (0.088) | 0.564*** (0.101) | 0.816° (0.100) | 0.761° (0.110) | 1.209° (0.138) | 1.259 (0.237) | 1.099 (0.179) | 1.045 (0.200) | 0.833° (0.086) | 0.822 (0.101) | 1.157 (0.323) | 1.357 (0.411) | 0.907 (0.149) | 0.919 (0.182) | 1.321 (0.458) | 1.509 (0.535) | 0.806° (0.096) | 0.818 (0.105) | 1.483 (0.338) | 1.191 (0.329) |
| Conservativism |  | 0.820° (0.086) |  | 0.726** (0.075) |  | 0.816** (0.081) |  | 0.422** (0.062) |  | 0.627*** (0.073) |  | 1.224° (0.131) |  | 1.166 (0.197) |  | 0.938 (0.102) |  | 0.736 (0.169) |  | 1.160 (0.203) |  | 0.925 (0.203) |  | 1.236° (0.147) |  |  |
| HH income |  | 1.128 (0.193) |  | 0.955 (0.105) |  | 0.804** (0.079) |  | 0.621*** (0.080) |  | 0.739** (0.088) |  | 1.101 (0.120) |  | 0.916 (0.155) |  | 1.078 (0.123) |  | 1.361 (0.328) |  | 1.435* (0.254) |  |  |  | 1.115 (0.141) |  | 1.419 (0.363) |
| Constant | 2.502*** (0.584) | 5.581*** (1.712) | 8.226*** (1.628) | 15.35*** (5.144) | 4.990*** (0.900) | 6.507*** (1.650) | 2.236* (0.731) | 3.09° (1.433) | 4.479*** (1.006) | 5.594*** (2.152) | 6.572*** (1.245) | 3.217*** (1.130) | 2.009* (0.583) | 1.536 (0.820) | 3.045*** (0.553) | 3.353*** (1.058) | 21.63*** (10.941) | 16.28*** (11.872) | 6.608*** (1.870) | 5.776*** (2.762) | 9.468*** (6.553) | 13.67** (11.102) | 0.327*** (0.061) | 0.334*** (0.077) | 21.41*** (7.038) | 10.81*** (4.376) |
| r2_p | 0.00837 | 0.0156 | 0.0151 | 0.0530 | 0.0366 | 0.0345 | 0.0145 | 0.0645 | 0.00599 | 0.0229 | 0.0131 | 0.0109 | 0.00739 | 0.0181 | 0.00457 | 0.00460 | 0.0234 | 0.0270 | 0.00678 | 0.0126 | 0.00701 | 0.0100 | 0.0142 | 0.0200 | 0.0120 | 0.0209 |
| Hosmer-Lemeshow | 0.6544 | 0.1825 | 0.3353 | 0.3608 | 0.69 | 0.4312 | 0.048 | 0.5599 | 0.5334 | 0.7433 | 0.952 | 0.2998 | 0.9475 | 0.2806 | 0.2264 | 0.6012 | 0.9563 | 0.895 | 0.9644 | 0.1853 | 0.9762 | 0.3426 | 0.0716 | 0.6754 | 0.3299 | 0.2702 |
| ll | -1678 | -1517 | -1697 | -1405 | -1847 | -1547 | -8240 | -730.2 | -1156 | -954.5 | -2192 | -1202 | -621.8 | -503.4 | -1642 | -1186 | -375.1 | -329.2 | -666.8 | -489.9 | -332.9 | -319.0 | -1108 | -972.5 | -3166 | -299.1 |
| N | 2769 | 2545 | 4041 | 3513 | 3459 | 2956 | 1212 | 1133 | 1945 | 1626 | 4468 | 2993 | 1074 | 880 | 2963 | 2178 | 1479 | 1247 | 1397 | 1064 | 1055 | 1015 | 1673 | 1480 | 1445 | 1381 |

z-statistics in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
[a] additionally controlled for Area of Residence (East/West Germany)

**Family policy measure 1t: Flexible working hours for working parents with young children**

| VARIABLES | Belgium Model 1 | Belgium Model 4 | Germany' Model 1 | Germany' Model 4 | Finland Model 1 | Finland Model 4 | Netherlands Model 1 | Netherlands Model 4 | Austria Model 1 | Austria Model 4 | Poland Model 1 | Poland Model 4 | Czech Rp. Model 1 | Czech Rp. Model 4 | Hungary Model 1 | Hungary Model 4 | Slovenia Model 1 | Slovenia Model 4 | Lithuania Model 1 | Lithuania Model 4 | Cyprus Model 1 | Cyprus Model 4 | Estonia Model 1 | Estonia Model 4 | Romania Model 1 | Romania Model 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age | 0.965*** (0.006) | 0.967*** (0.007) | 0.988* (0.005) | 0.987* (0.006) | 1.003 (0.004) | 1.001 (0.005) | 0.980* (0.009) | 0.981* (0.009) | 0.982** (0.006) | 0.987 (0.008) | 0.994* (0.003) | 1.008 (0.006) | 0.990 (0.006) | 0.989 (0.009) | 0.998 (0.004) | 0.999 (0.006) | 0.983* (0.007) | 0.985 (0.010) | 1.004 (0.005) | 1.007 (0.008) | 1.026 (0.019) | 1.021 (0.019) | 1.023*** (0.006) | 1.020** (0.007) | 0.986* (0.006) | 0.984* (0.007) |
| Childless | 0.507*** (0.065) | 0.546** (0.087) | 0.483*** (0.067) | 0.454*** (0.080) | 0.588*** (0.076) | 0.589*** (0.081) | 0.567** (0.102) | 0.704 (0.223) | 0.772 (0.144) | 0.811 (0.202) | 0.653*** (0.083) | 1.230 (0.456) | 0.672 (0.173) | 0.573+ (0.190) | 0.991 (0.194) | 0.827 (0.219) | 0.838 (0.212) | 0.842 (0.272) | 0.507+ (0.114) | 0.656 (0.180) | 2.477* (1.024) | 2.547+ (1.056) | 0.835 (0.188) | 1.065 (0.273) | | |
| Current benefits | | 1.146 (0.154) | | 1.025 (0.172) | | 1.096 (0.147) | | 1.256 (0.364) | | 0.968 (0.222) | | 1.275+ (0.144) | | 0.942 (0.242) | | 1.005 (0.215) | | 0.928 (0.206) | | 1.406 (0.770) | | | | 1.649** (0.319) | | 1.260 (0.395) |
| Education | | 0.936 (0.117) | | 1.398+ (0.271) | | 1.096 (0.147) | | 1.310+ (0.208) | | 1.020 (0.221) | | 1.298+ (0.167) | | 0.940 (0.312) | | 1.071 (0.181) | | 0.743 (0.171) | | 0.963 (0.278) | | 0.447+ (0.176) | | | | 0.451** (0.117) |
| Sex | 0.717*** (0.070) | 0.688*** (0.071) | 0.646*** (0.071) | 0.655*** (0.077) | 0.647*** (0.062) | 0.694*** (0.072) | 0.797+ (0.105) | 0.746+ (0.104) | 0.549*** (0.076) | 0.518*** (0.081) | 0.668*** (0.050) | 0.633*** (0.067) | 0.556*** (0.096) | 0.610* (0.117) | 0.612*** (0.076) | 0.636** (0.094) | 0.991 (0.154) | 0.978 (0.166) | 0.603** (0.096) | 0.624* (0.118) | 0.526* (0.119) | 0.549* (0.126) | 0.616** (0.097) | 0.772 (0.136) | 1.013 (0.229) | 1.004 (0.237) |
| Marital Status | 1.076 (0.130) | 1.096 (0.143) | 1.066 (0.141) | 1.109 (0.169) | 1.138 (0.133) | 1.116 (0.147) | 0.652+ (0.116) | 0.725+ (0.142) | 1.434+ (0.235) | 1.287 (0.248) | 1.174 (0.131) | 1.049 (0.203) | 1.250 (0.247) | 1.194 (0.273) | 1.031 (0.150) | 0.965 (0.165) | 0.885 (0.182) | 0.993 (0.226) | 0.805 (0.155) | 0.845 (0.195) | 3.826*** (1.365) | 3.930*** (1.425) | 0.987 (0.202) | 0.921 (0.200) | 1.112 (0.264) | 0.993 (0.275) |
| Conservativism | | 0.835 (0.101) | | 0.910 (0.111) | | 1.072 (0.127) | | 0.606** (0.093) | | 1.033 (0.167) | | 1.646*** (0.173) | | 1.323 (0.268) | | 1.051 (0.160) | | 0.829 (0.146) | | 0.914 (0.182) | | | | 1.343 (0.251) | | |
| HH income | | 0.975 (0.180) | | 1.159 (0.147) | | 0.893 (0.102) | | 0.773+ (0.110) | | 0.694+ (0.114) | | 1.130 (0.122) | | 1.092 (0.226) | | 0.886 (0.141) | | 1.130 (0.205) | | 1.584+ (0.327) | | 0.843 (0.191) | | 1.084 (0.224) | | 0.932 (0.242) |
| Constant | 22.22*** (6.065) | 21.08*** (7.394) | 24.69*** (5.934) | 19.61*** (7.405) | 6.850*** (1.445) | 6.728*** (1.964) | 10.34*** (3.838) | 8.766*** (4.477) | 18.06*** (5.609) | 18.64*** (9.744) | 5.944*** (1.102) | 1.899+ (0.660) | 9.929*** (3.548) | 8.986*** (5.508) | 11.91*** (3.085) | 12.34*** (5.396) | 15.26*** (5.765) | 17.38*** (9.759) | 8.898*** (2.852) | 6.883*** (3.745) | 1.963 (1.476) | 4.714* (4.185) | 3.958*** (1.191) | 2.408* (0.877) | 29.04*** (9.911) | 51.44*** (23.414) |
| r2_p | 0.0223 | 0.0259 | 0.0237 | 0.0317 | 0.0234 | 0.0209 | 0.0132 | 0.0281 | 0.0244 | 0.0271 | 0.0157 | 0.0202 | 0.0237 | 0.0247 | 0.00826 | 0.00813 | 0.00602 | 0.00715 | 0.0243 | 0.0258 | 0.0473 | 0.0557 | 0.0421 | 0.0371 | 0.00862 | 0.0250 |
| Hosmer-Lemeshow | 0.0263 | 0.4431 | 0.8995 | 0.4176 | 0.0216 | 0.466 | 0.509 | 0.198 | 0.2609 | 0.4029 | 0.772 | 0.115 | 0.2078 | 0.7373 | 0.7912 | 0.1954 | 0.5264 | 0.0809 | 0.9051 | 0.9903 | 0.0264 | 0.6061 | 0.3744 | 0.1955 | 0.783 | 0.0361 |
| ll | -1336 | -1221 | -1276 | -1118 | -1444 | -1240 | -6993 | -639.4 | -720.9 | -591.7 | -2260 | -1210 | -456.3 | -377.9 | -970.7 | -714.4 | -578.0 | -495.4 | -545.6 | -399.9 | -3062 | -2955 | -569.9 | -481.8 | -3274 | -302.0 |
| N | 2769 | 2543 | 4045 | 3516 | 3463 | 2960 | 1212 | 1133 | 1949 | 1626 | 4462 | 2992 | 1064 | 872 | 2972 | 2186 | 1500 | 1263 | 1397 | 1064 | 1053 | 1013 | 1671 | 1478 | 1468 | 1405 |

z-statistics in parentheses   *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1   ' additionally controlled for Area of Residence (East/West Germany)

**Family policy measure 1l: More and better opportunities for parents with young children to work part-time**

| VARIABLES | Belgium Model 1 | Belgium Model 4 | Germany' Model 1 | Germany' Model 4 | Finland Model 1 | Finland Model 4 | Netherlands Model 1 | Netherlands Model 4 | Austria Model 1 | Austria Model 4 | Poland Model 1 | Poland Model 4 | Czech Rp. Model 1 | Czech Rp. Model 4 | Hungary Model 1 | Hungary Model 4 | Slovenia Model 1 | Slovenia Model 4 | Lithuania Model 1 | Lithuania Model 4 | Cyprus Model 1 | Cyprus Model 4 | Estonia Model 1 | Estonia Model 4 | Romania Model 1 | Romania Model 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age | 0.985* (0.007) | 0.994 (0.008) | 0.994 (0.005) | 0.993 (0.006) | 1.007* (0.004) | 1.005 (0.005) | 0.993 (0.010) | 0.993 (0.010) | 0.987* (0.006) | 0.988 (0.008) | 0.996 (0.003) | 1.007 (0.005) | 0.996 (0.006) | 0.992 (0.009) | 0.998 (0.004) | 0.991 (0.006) | 0.983+ (0.010) | 0.989 (0.013) | 1.009+ (0.005) | 1.013+ (0.008) | 1.008 (0.018) | 1.006 (0.019) | 1.028*** (0.005) | 1.027*** (0.007) | 0.995 (0.006) | 0.996 (0.007) |
| Childless | 0.671** (0.097) | 0.879 (0.156) | 0.467*** (0.066) | 0.466*** (0.084) | 0.585*** (0.072) | 0.596*** (0.079) | 0.739 (0.147) | 0.756 (0.275) | 1.008 (0.202) | 0.829 (0.226) | 0.645*** (0.084) | 1.057 (0.403) | 0.805 (0.203) | 0.590 (0.192) | 0.819 (0.164) | 0.629+ (0.171) | 0.799 (0.275) | 1.278 (0.551) | 0.576*** (0.122) | 0.717 (0.184) | 2.028+ (0.824) | 2.102+ (0.858) | 0.702* (0.144) | 0.980 (0.231) | | |
| Current benefits | | 1.296* (0.194) | | 1.096 (0.188) | | 1.052 (0.135) | | 0.985 (0.325) | | 0.665* (0.163) | | 1.179 (0.137) | | 0.897 (0.222) | | 0.742 (0.167) | | 1.643* (0.474) | | 0.524+ (0.198) | | | | 1.823*** (0.325) | | 1.691 (0.560) |
| Education | | 1.004 (0.140) | | 1.680*** (0.313) | | | | 1.672** (0.284) | | 1.766** (0.368) | | 1.275+ (0.167) | | 0.782 (0.264) | | 1.038 (0.187) | | 0.945 (0.283) | | 1.223 (0.316) | | 0.712 (0.238) | | | | 0.334*** (0.089) |
| Sex | 0.591*** (0.065) | 0.563*** (0.066) | 0.673*** (0.074) | 0.727** (0.086) | 0.480*** (0.044) | 0.513** (0.051) | 0.757** (0.110) | 0.725* (0.112) | 0.651** (0.095) | 0.603** (0.102) | 0.611*** (0.047) | 0.664*** (0.071) | 0.748** (0.127) | 0.893 (0.168) | 0.737** (0.096) | 0.805 (0.127) | 0.623** (0.130) | 0.638+ (0.144) | 0.776+ (0.116) | 0.710+ (0.124) | 0.613* (0.136) | 0.616+ (0.139) | 0.737** (0.107) | 0.821 (0.134) | 1.032 (0.232) | 0.997 (0.240) |
| Marital Status | 1.154 (0.155) | 1.163 (0.170) | 0.985 (0.133) | 0.996 (0.155) | 1.063 (0.118) | 1.003 (0.125) | 0.751 (0.147) | 0.862 (0.190) | 1.523* (0.261) | 1.439* (0.289) | 1.069 (0.124) | 0.811 (0.169) | 1.291 (0.245) | 1.305 (0.287) | 1.116 (0.168) | 1.075 (0.192) | 0.743 (0.213) | 0.783 (0.248) | 0.898 (0.159) | 0.950 (0.200) | 3.074*** (1.084) | 3.163*** (1.134) | 0.938 (0.178) | 0.871 (0.178) | 1.352 (0.314) | 1.045 (0.289) |
| Conservativism | | 0.946 (0.131) | | 0.930 (0.115) | | 1.127 (0.126) | | 0.539*** (0.090) | | 1.078 (0.187) | | 1.607*** (0.173) | | 1.389* (0.270) | | 0.856 (0.138) | | 1.079 (0.252) | | 0.970 (0.179) | | | | 1.244 (0.214) | | |
| HH income | | 1.079 (0.226) | | 1.120 (0.144) | | 0.976 (0.106) | | 0.736+ (0.117) | | 0.565** (0.100) | | 0.895 (0.099) | | 1.226 (0.245) | | 0.996 (0.170) | | 1.572** (0.394) | | 1.403** (0.263) | | 0.921 (0.207) | | 1.021 (0.194) | | 0.480*** (0.127) |
| Constant | 14.15*** (4.257) | 8.716** (3.381) | 20.09*** (4.848) | 13.04*** (4.919) | 5.563*** (1.113) | 5.614*** (1.559) | 7.871*** (3.187) | 7.572*** (4.294) | 13.85*** (4.497) | 14.98*** (8.370) | 6.846*** (1.309) | 3.205** (1.163) | 5.841*** (1.994) | 6.541*** (3.958) | 12.76*** (3.444) | 21.67*** (9.919) | 44.83*** (22.938) | 20.16*** (14.642) | 4.797*** (1.417) | 3.166* (1.568) | 3.876+ (2.838) | 5.385* (4.561) | 2.579*** (0.709) | 1.512 (0.507) | 16.50*** (5.246) | 44.48*** (20.071) |
| r2_p | 0.0182 | 0.0201 | 0.0235 | 0.0302 | 0.0398 | 0.0316 | 0.00609 | 0.0338 | 0.0138 | 0.0323 | 0.0175 | 0.0176 | 0.00886 | 0.0165 | 0.00479 | 0.00591 | 0.0153 | 0.0294 | 0.0170 | 0.0236 | 0.0279 | 0.0309 | 0.0600 | 0.0557 | 0.00324 | 0.0395 |
| Hosmer-Lemeshow | 0.4774 | 0.5803 | 0.6242 | 0.0644 | 0.6335 | 0.2909 | 0.5305 | 0.2007 | 0.5156 | 0.7463 | 0.8139 | 0.0194 | 0.7849 | 0.6881 | 0.359 | 0.7637 | 0.3249 | 0.5135 | 0.7659 | 0.3646 | 0.3485 | 0.5106 | 0.8816 | 0.2524 | 0.2881 | 0.7488 |
| ll | -1140 | -1027 | -1259 | -1096 | -1566 | -1344 | -606.4 | -542.9 | -665.0 | -533.1 | -2169 | -1167 | -485.4 | -401.2 | -900.8 | -663.5 | -377.1 | -324.7 | -608.1 | -450.0 | -312.6 | -303.4 | -651.2 | -538.9 | -329.1 | -289.4 |
| N | 2267 | 2544 | 4044 | 3513 | 3458 | 2957 | 1212 | 1133 | 1947 | 1624 | 4473 | 2997 | 1071 | 879 | 2974 | 2187 | 1499 | 1262 | 1399 | 1065 | 1054 | 1014 | 1670 | 1477 | 1468 | 1405 |

z-statistics in parentheses   *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1   ' additionally controlled for Area of Residence (East/West Germany)

**Family policy measure 12: A substantial decrease in the costs of education**

| VARIABLES | Belgium M1 | Belgium M4 | Germany[a] M1 | Germany[a] M4 | Finland M1 | Finland M4 | Netherlands M1 | Netherlands M4 | Austria M1 | Austria M4 | Poland M1 | Poland M4 | Czech Rp. M1 | Czech Rp. M4 | Hungary M1 | Hungary M4 | Slovenia M1 | Slovenia M4 | Lithuania M1 | Lithuania M4 | Cyprus M1 | Cyprus M4 | Estonia M1 | Estonia M4 | Romania M1 | Romania M4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age | 1.006 (0.006) | 0.998 (0.007) | 0.990** (0.003) | 0.994 (0.004) | 1.007* (0.003) | 0.999 (0.004) | 0.989 (0.008) | 0.988 (0.009) | | | 0.987** (0.005) | 1.006 (0.009) | 0.979*** (0.005) | 0.982* (0.007) | 1.001 (0.005) | 0.990 (0.008) | 0.984 (0.012) | 0.982 (0.015) | 1.002 (0.006) | 1.009 (0.009) | 0.995 (0.017) | 0.999 (0.018) | 0.985* (0.006) | 0.976** (0.008) | 0.994 (0.006) | 0.999 (0.006) |
| Childless | 0.633*** (0.074) | 0.725* (0.108) | 0.500*** (0.050) | 0.600*** (0.079) | 0.655*** (0.064) | 0.632*** (0.068) | 0.527*** (0.089) | 0.721 (0.218) | | | 0.388*** (0.067) | 0.587 (0.261) | 0.510** (0.114) | 0.530* (0.152) | 0.611* (0.144) | 0.471* (0.153) | 0.843 (0.352) | 1.148 (0.601) | 0.438* (0.112) | 0.507* (0.162) | 0.700 (0.261) | 0.768 (0.290) | 0.451** (0.129) | 0.397** (0.125) | | |
| Current benefits | | 1.172 (0.142) | | 1.259+ (0.152) | | | | 1.348 (0.377) | | | | 2.006*** (0.364) | | 1.191 (0.229) | | 0.701 (0.196) | | 1.243 (0.453) | | 0.975 (0.615) | | 1.378 (0.393) | | 1.059 (0.280) | | 1.984* (0.615) |
| Education | | 0.392*** (0.051) | | 0.935 (0.145) | | 0.567*** (0.055) | | 0.722* (0.116) | | | | 0.890 (0.194) | | 0.632 (0.188) | | 0.826+ (0.190) | | 0.275+ (0.148) | | 1.690+ (0.539) | | | | | | 1.167 (0.282) |
| Sex | 0.775** (0.067) | 0.712** (0.066) | 0.864* (0.066) | 0.826* (0.069) | 0.946 (0.067) | 1.003 (0.078) | 1.071 (0.134) | 1.089 (0.143) | | | 0.632*** (0.069) | 0.652* (0.108) | 0.759+ (0.111) | 0.734+ (0.119) | 0.710* (0.112) | 0.978 (0.189) | 0.427** (0.115) | 0.353*** (0.110) | 1.156 (0.225) | 1.236 (0.296) | 1.035 (0.224) | 1.079 (0.237) | 0.904 (0.202) | 0.964 (0.241) | 1.133 (0.242) | 1.178 (0.256) |
| Marital Status | 0.782* (0.086) | 0.800+ (0.096) | 1.011 (0.093) | 1.088 (0.119) | 0.716*** (0.059) | 0.829* (0.079) | 1.117 (0.184) | 1.159 (0.206) | | | 1.135 (0.178) | 1.092 (0.327) | 0.949 (0.158) | 0.993 (0.190) | 0.977 (0.183) | 1.273 (0.282) | 0.891 (0.314) | 1.015 (0.389) | 1.085 (0.240) | 1.163 (0.315) | 1.099 (0.378) | 1.275 (0.446) | 1.197 (0.317) | 1.178 (0.346) | 1.358 (0.297) | 1.175 (0.289) |
| Conservativism | | 1.145 (0.131) | | 1.056 (0.094) | | 0.953 (0.082) | | 1.120 (0.174) | | | | 1.285 (0.215) | | 1.126 (0.195) | | 0.782 (0.156) | | 1.762+ (0.561) | | 0.580+ (0.149) | | 1.011 (0.224) | | 1.257 (0.338) | | |
| HH income | | 1.209 (0.220) | | 1.158 (0.108) | | 1.500*** (0.127) | | 1.482* (0.197) | | | | 1.017 (0.175) | | 1.004 (0.174) | | 1.318 (0.281) | | 0.745 (0.213) | | 2.368** (0.647) | | | | 1.606 (0.482) | | 1.363 (0.324) |
| Constant | 3.436*** (0.826) | 8.577*** (2.783) | 7.291*** (1.239) | 6.550*** (1.890) | 0.745* (0.114) | 1.204 (0.257) | 3.673*** (1.255) | 2.886* (1.382) | | | 27.81*** (7.347) | 9.127*** (4.971) | 9.286*** (2.830) | 10.33*** (5.527) | 20.87*** (6.882) | 36.06*** (20.092) | 77.58*** (49.187) | 212.7*** (210.881) | 10.02*** (3.706) | 5.196*** (3.275) | 12.36*** (8.561) | 6.923* (5.479) | 45.28*** (17.771) | 56.75*** (27.978) | 14.63*** (4.424) | 8.626*** (3.262) |
| r2_p | 0.0106 | 0.0323 | 0.0161 | 0.0286 | 0.00904 | 0.0251 | 0.0183 | 0.0310 | | | 0.0337 | 0.0245 | 0.0215 | 0.0261 | 0.0106 | 0.0143 | 0.0240 | 0.0629 | 0.0219 | 0.0443 | 0.00473 | 0.00756 | 0.0163 | 0.0241 | 0.00449 | 0.0153 |
| Hosmer-Lemeshow | 0.674 | 0.4509 | 0.3512 | 0.3292 | 0.2237 | 0.5486 | 0.6712 | 0.1079 | | | 0.1148 | 0.5876 | 0.2502 | 0.6208 | 0.9207 | 0.5423 | 0.7568 | 0.8632 | 0.3427 | 0.6539 | 0.1664 | 0.7973 | | | | |
| ll | -1591 | -1431 | -2136 | -1812 | -2325 | -1950 | -7546 | -696.3 | | | -1293 | -596.7 | -601.8 | -494.6 | -668.2 | -473.5 | -271.2 | -224.2 | -414.0 | -285.4 | -324.3 | -315.0 | -347.7 | -286.7 | -3597 | -343.5 |
| N | 2771 | 2545 | 4038 | 3509 | 3442 | 2950 | 1212 | 1133 | | | 4474 | 2596 | 1060 | 871 | 3000 | 2209 | 1524 | 1282 | 1397 | 1063 | 1052 | 1012 | 1674 | 1480 | 1488 | 1422 |

z-statistics in parentheses    *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1    [a] additionally controlled for Area of Residence (East/West Germany)

---

**Family policy measure 13: Better housing for families with children**

| VARIABLES | Belgium M1 | Belgium M4 | Germany[a] M1 | Germany[a] M4 | Finland M1 | Finland M4 | Netherlands M1 | Netherlands M4 | Austria M1 | Austria M4 | Poland M1 | Poland M4 | Czech Rp. M1 | Czech Rp. M4 | Hungary M1 | Hungary M4 | Slovenia M1 | Slovenia M4 | Lithuania M1 | Lithuania M4 | Cyprus M1 | Cyprus M4 | Estonia M1 | Estonia M4 | Romania M1 | Romania M4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age | 0.992 (0.003) | 0.988+ (0.004) | 1.012*** (0.003) | 1.004 (0.003) | | | 0.968*** (0.008) | 0.963*** (0.009) | 0.987*** (0.004) | 0.977*** (0.006) | 0.986*** (0.004) | 1.001 (0.007) | 0.988* (0.006) | 0.987 (0.007) | 0.981*** (0.005) | 0.982* (0.006) | 1.020 (0.020) | 1.007 (0.028) | 0.996 (0.006) | 0.995 (0.009) | 1.007 (0.016) | 1.006 (0.017) | | | 1.003 (0.010) | 0.992 (0.012) |
| Childless | 0.772** (0.075) | 0.659*** (0.085) | 0.530*** (0.051) | 0.527*** (0.056) | | | 0.304*** (0.088) | 0.474* (0.148) | 0.814 (0.118) | 0.669* (0.130) | 0.420*** (0.066) | 1.826 (1.013) | 0.501*** (0.125) | 0.687 (0.226) | 0.648+ (0.155) | 0.644 (0.201) | 1.395 (0.869) | 1.563 (1.406) | 0.606+ (0.156) | 0.688 (0.225) | 0.544** (0.184) | 0.604 (0.210) | | | | |
| Current benefits | | 0.968 (0.109) | | | | | | 0.870 (0.243) | | 0.783 (0.134) | | 2.219*** (0.342) | | 1.774* (0.457) | | 0.899 (0.248) | | 0.820 (0.528) | | 1.060 (0.665) | | | | | | 0.611 (0.299) |
| Education | | 0.939 (0.147) | | 0.639*** (0.064) | | | | 0.772+ (0.114) | | 0.934 (0.151) | | 0.936 (0.173) | | 0.557 (0.212) | | 0.931 (0.200) | | 0.230 (0.241) | | 0.639 (0.235) | | 1.046 (0.304) | | | | 0.521 (0.228) |
| Sex | 0.779*** (0.058) | 0.783** (0.063) | 0.927 (0.066) | 0.956 (0.073) | | | 1.001 (0.123) | 0.998 (0.130) | 0.881 (0.093) | 0.891 (0.105) | 0.606*** (0.059) | 0.662** (0.150) | 0.773 (0.130) | 0.666* (0.125) | 0.675* (0.108) | 0.796 (0.150) | 0.531 (0.213) | 0.423+ (0.213) | 0.727+ (0.134) | 0.607 (0.138) | 0.955 (0.189) | 0.956 (0.195) | | | 1.110 (0.424) | 1.097 (0.440) |
| Marital Status | 1.037 (0.091) | 1.158 (0.119) | 0.764** (0.064) | 0.826* (0.079) | | | 0.931 (0.154) | 0.963 (0.176) | 1.067 (0.134) | 1.095 (0.160) | 0.924 (0.132) | 0.827 (0.235) | 0.878 (0.170) | 0.935 (0.212) | 1.192 (0.214) | 1.376 (0.287) | 1.094 (0.572) | 1.881 (1.128) | 1.072 (0.229) | 1.248 (0.335) | 1.129 (0.348) | 1.234 (0.394) | | | 1.546 (0.608) | 1.803 (0.844) |
| Conservativism | | 1.082 (0.092) | | 1.068 (0.091) | | | | 1.503** (0.221) | | 0.996 (0.120) | | 1.827*** (0.257) | | 1.928*** (0.380) | | 0.982 (0.191) | | 1.352 (0.728) | | 0.949 (0.227) | | | | | | |
| HH income | | 1.472*** (0.131) | | 1.252** (0.106) | | | | 1.882*** (0.250) | | 1.058 (0.131) | | 1.231 (0.181) | | 1.387 (0.285) | | 1.083 (0.222) | | 1.038 (0.309) | | 2.311** (0.618) | | 1.175 (0.243) | | | | 0.996 (0.440) |
| Constant | 5.144*** (0.838) | 3.928*** (1.103) | 1.070 (0.164) | 1.744** (0.373) | | | 2.498* (0.860) | 2.519* (1.226) | 5.536*** (1.283) | 9.976*** (3.984) | 25.08*** (5.990) | 6.285*** (3.041) | 11.44*** (3.980) | 9.583*** (6.112) | 48.60*** (16.150) | 41.32*** (22.116) | 30.63*** (28.595) | 179.4*** (315.002) | 13.94*** (5.098) | 18.85*** (12.531) | 7.622** (4.883) | 6.366* (4.769) | | | 31.94*** (16.315) | 80.59*** (79.501) |
| r2_p | 0.00577 | 0.0204 | 0.0218 | 0.0253 | | | 0.0171 | 0.0462 | 0.00510 | 0.00871 | 0.0254 | 0.0407 | 0.0139 | 0.0467 | 0.0166 | 0.0140 | 0.0130 | 0.0445 | 0.0104 | 0.0345 | 0.0220 | 0.0193 | | | 0.0626 | 0.0163 |
| Hosmer-Lemeshow | 0.2131 | 0.0071 | 0.0967 | 0.0352 | | | 0.1437 | 0.1689 | 0.8405 | 0.8679 | 0.8449 | 0.7381 | 0.8645 | 0.6694 | 0.6454 | 0.5929 | 0.4622 | 0.8707 | 0.6012 | 0.1602 | 0.3482 | 0.4298 | | | 0.4257 | 0.631 |
| ll | -2270 | -1949 | -2322 | -1982 | | | -7748 | -702.2 | -1105 | -916.5 | -1539 | -763.0 | -489.3 | -387.4 | -661.5 | -498.1 | -137.8 | -98.40 | -441.1 | -299.8 | -366.8 | -349.0 | | | -142.0 | -131.6 |
| N | 4045 | 3516 | 3450 | 2951 | | | 1212 | 1133 | 1945 | 1622 | 4472 | 2595 | 1072 | 879 | 3001 | 2206 | 1520 | 1278 | 1395 | 1061 | 1049 | 1009 | | | 1488 | 1421 |

z-statistics in parentheses    *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1    [a] additionally controlled for Area of Residence (East/West Germany)

**Table 15: Stylised overview over the results of the regression analyses by country for the demographic covariates of the full models ('+', '++', and '+++' refer to odds ratios above 1, '–', '– –', '– – –' refer to odds ratios below 1; see legend below the table)**

| Family Policy | VARIABLES | BE | DE" | FI | NL | AT | PL | CZ | HU | SI | LT | CY | EE | RO |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Age | – – – | – | – – – | – – – | – – – | ° | – – | ° | – – | – | + + | – – | + |
| | Childless | – | – | – | – | – – | + | – – – | + + | – | – – | + | – | |
| | Sex | – | – – | | – – | – – | – | | – | + | – – | – | + | – |
| | Marital Status | – | + | – | – | + | + + | – | + | + | + + | + + | – | + + |
| 2 | Age | – – – | – – | – – | – – – | – – | + | | – – | – – | – | + + | – | + + + |
| | Childless | – – – | – – | – – – | – – – | – – | – | – – | – – | + | – – – | + | – – | |
| | Sex | ° | – | + | ° | – | – | – – | – | – | – – | + + | + | – – – |
| | Marital Status | + | – | + | + + | + + | + | + + | + + | + | + | + + + | – | – – – |
| 3 | Age | – | – | | – | – – | | – | | – – | – – | + + | – | – |
| | Childless | – – | – | – | + + | – | + | + | – | + + + | – | + + + | + | |
| | Sex | – – | – | + | – – | – | – | + | + | – – | – | – | + + + | – |
| | Marital Status | ° | – | – | – | + | – | – | – | + + + | – | + + | – | + |
| 4 | Age | | ° | – – | | – | + | – | – – | ° | – | + + | – | – |
| | Childless | | – – | – – | | – | + + + | – | – | + | – – | + + + | – | |
| | Sex | | – – | – | | – | – | – | + | – – | – | – | + | – |
| | Marital Status | | – | – | | – | – | + | + | – | – | + + + | + + | + + + |
| 5 | Age | | – – | + | – – – | + | + | + + | – – | – | + | – | + + + | ° |
| | Childless | | – – | – – | – – – | + | + | + | – | + | – | – – – | + + | |
| | Sex | | – | – | – | + | – | – | – | – | – | + | + | – |
| | Marital Status | | + | – | + | – | + | + | + | + + | + + | + | – | + |
| 6 | Age | | – – | – – | – – – | – – | – | – – | – | + | + | ° | + | – – |
| | Childless | | – – | – – | – – | – – | + + + | – – | + | + + | – | – – | – – | |
| | Sex | | – | – | + | – | – – | – | – – | – – – | – – – | + | – | + |
| | Marital Status | | + | – | – | + + | + + | + | + | – | + + + | + + + | + | + + + |
| 7 | Age | – – | – | – – | | – – | – | | – | – | ° | + | – – | – |
| | Childless | – – | – – | – – | – – | – – | + | – – | + | – | – | – | – – | |
| | Sex | ° | – | – – | – | – – | – – | – – – | – | + | – – | – | – | – |
| | Marital Status | + | + | + + | + | + | + + | + | + | + + | + | + + + | + | + |

(shaded) indicates statisticical significanee

for age:
° 0.999-1.001
+ 1.002 – 1.009    – 0.990 – 0.998
++ 1.01 – 1.029    –– 0.970 – 0.989
+++: 1.03 –    ––– – 0.969

for childless, sex, marital status:
° 0.990 – 1.009
+ 1.01 – 1.299    – 0.7 – 0.989
++ 1.3 – 1.599    –– 0.4 – 0.699
+++ 1.6 –    ––– – 0.399

Legend on Family Policy Measures:
1    Improved parental leave arrangements for working women who are having a baby
2    Lower income tax for people with dependent children
3    Better day-care facilities for children younger than age three
4    Better day-care facilities for children between age three up to school age
5    An allowance for families with children dependent on the family income
6    An allowance at the birth of each child
7    An allowance for mothers or fathers who do not take a job because they want to take care of the children while they are
8    A substantial rise in child allowance by 7% of the monthly GNP
9    Child-care facilities for school-going children before and after school and during school holidays
10    Flexible working hours for working parents with young children
11    More and better opportunities for parents with young children to work part-time
12    A substantial decrease in the costs of education
13    Better housing for families with children

# (Table 15 continued)

| Family Policy | VARIABLES | BE | DE" | FI | NL | AT | PL | CZ | HU | SI | LT | CY | EE | RO |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8 | Age | − − − | − − | − − − | − − − | − − − | − − | − − | − − | − | ° | − − | − − | − − |
| | Childless | − − − | − − | − − − | − − − | − − | + | − | − − | + + + | − | − | − − | |
| | Sex | − | − | − | − | ° | − − | − − | − | | − | − | + | − |
| | Marital Status | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + + + | − | + + + | + | + + + |
| 9 | Age | − | − | ° | − | − | ° | + + | + | ° | − | − | + + | ° |
| | Childless | − | − − | − − | − | − | + | + | − | − | + | + | + | |
| | Sex | − − | − − | − − | − − | − | − − | − | | − − | − − | − − | − | − − |
| | Marital Status | − | + | − | − − | − | + | + | − | + + | − | + + | − | + |
| 10 | Age | − − − | − − | ° | − − | − − | + | − − | ° | − − | + | + + | + + | − − |
| | Childless | − − | − − | − − | − | − | + | − − | − | − | − − | + + + | + | |
| | Sex | − − | − − | | − − | − − | − − | − − | − | − | − − | − − | | ° |
| | Marital Status | + | + | + | − | + | + | + | | ° | − | + + + | − | ° |
| 11 | Age | − | − | + | − | − − | + | − | − | − − | + + | + | + + | − |
| | Childless | − | − − | − − | − | − | + | − − | − − | + | − | + + + | − | |
| | Sex | − − | − | − − | − | − − | − | | − | − − | − | − − | | − |
| | Marital Status | + | ° | ° | − | + + | − | + + | + | − | − | + + + | − | + |
| 12 | Age | − | − | ° | − − | | + | − − | − | − − | + | ° | − − | ° |
| | Childless | − | − − | − − | − | | − − | − − | − − | + | − − | − | − − − | |
| | Sex | − | − | ° | + | | − − | − | − | − − − | + | + | − | + |
| | Marital Status | − | + | − | + | | + | ° | + | + | + | + | + | + |
| 13 | Age | | + | − − − | − − | ° | − − | − − | + | − | + | + | | − |
| | Childless | | − − | − − | − − | − − | + + + | − − | − − | + + | − − | − − | | |
| | Sex | | − | ° | − | − − | − − | − | − − | − − | − | | | + |
| | Marital Status | | + | − | − | + | − | − | + + | + + + | + | + | | + + + |

Source: own depiction based on own calculations, PPAS 2003
" controlled for area of residence

    indicates statisticical significanee

**for age:**

  °  0.999-1.001

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| + | 1.002 – 1.009 | − | 0.990 – 0.998 |
| ++ | 1.01 – 1.029 | − − | 0.970 – 0.989 |
| +++: | 1.03 – | − − − | – 0.969 |

**for childless, sex, marital status:**

  °  0.990 – 1.009

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| + | 1.01 – 1.299 | − | 0.7 – 0.989 |
| ++ | 1.3 – 1.599 | − − | 0.4 – 0.699 |
| +++ | 1.6 – | − − − | – 0.399 |

Legend on Family Policy Measures:
1. Improved parental leave arrangements for working women who are having a baby
2. Lower income tax for people with dependent children
3. Better day-care facilities for children younger than age three
4. Better day-care facilities for children between age three up to school age
5. An allowance for families with children dependent on the family income
6. An allowance at the birth of each child
7. An allowance for mothers or fathers who do not take a job because they want to take care of the children while they are
8. A substantial rise in child allowance by 7% of the monthly GNP
9. Child-care facilities for school-going children before and after school and during school holidays
10. Flexible working hours for working parents with young children
11. More and better opportunities for parents with young children to work part-time
12. A substantial decrease in the costs of education
13. Better housing for families with children

**Figure 1: Age gradient in family policy preference "Child benefits should be increased significantly"**

Figure 1 (continued)



Source: IPPAS 2003, Own calculations

**Figure 2: Age gradient in the opinion on "The elderly are no longer productive and take away economic resources from the society", by country**

Source: IPPAS 2003, own calculation

**Figure 3: Age gradient in opinions regarding "the elderly are an obstacle to change," by country**

Source: IPPAS 2003, own calculation

# VIII Literature

Andreß, Hans-Jürgen/Heien, Thorsten (2001): Four worlds of welfare state attitudes? A comparison of Germany, Norway, and the United States. In: European Sociological Review. Vol. 17/4. PP. 337-356

Blekesaune, Morten/Quadagno, Jill (2003): Public attitudes toward welfare state policies. A comparative analysis of 24 nations. In: European Sociological Review. Vol. 19/5. PP. 415-427

Bommier, Antoine/Lee, Ronald/Miller, Timothy/Zuber, Stéphane (2004): The development of public transfers in the US: historical generational accounts for education, social security, and medicare. Paper for the PAA annual meetings 2004, Boston

Busemeyer, Marius R. et al. (2009): Attitudes towards redistributive spending in an era of demographic ageing: the rival pressures from age and income in 14 OECD countries. In: Journal of European Social Policy. 13. PP. 195-212

Cox, Donald/Soldo, Beth J. (1994): Motivation for money and care that adult children provide for parents, Center for Retirement Research Working Papers 2004. http://escholarship.bc.edu/retirement_papers/11

European Commission (2004): The future of pension systems. Special Eurobarometer 161/ Wave 56.1, European Opinion Research Group EEIG

Hicks, Peter (2001): Public support for retirement income reform. OECD Occasional papers No. 55

Kohl, Jürgen (2003): Principles of distributive justice in pension policies. Cross-national variations in public opinion, paper for the Annual Meeting of the ISA Research Committee 19. Toronto: August 2003

Kohli, Martin (2005): Aging and justice, Research Report 74 of the Research Group on Aging and the Life Course (FALL). Berlin: Free University of Berlin

Lee, Ronald (2003): Intergenerational Transfers. In: Demeny, Paul and Geoffrey McNicoll (eds.): Encyclopedia of Population. New York: MacMillan. PP. 542-545

McGarry, Kathleen/Schoeni, Robert F. (1997): Transfer behaviour within the family. Results from the Asset and Health Dynamics (AHEAD) Study. In: Journal of Gerontology: Psychology and Social Sciences. 52B special issue. PP. 82-92

Miettinen, Anneli/Esveldt, Ingrid/Fokkema, Tinneke (2008): Family Policies: Financial or Institutional Measures? Preferences of Childless Persons and One-Child Parents. In: Höhn, Charlotte et al. (Eds): People, Population Change and Policies. Lessons from the Population Policy Acceptance Study: Vol.1: Family Change. Springer, 391-410

Schokkaert, Erik (2006): The empirical analysis of transfer motives. In: Kolm, S/ Ythier, Jean Mercier (Eds.): Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity. Volume I. Oxford: Elsevier. PP. 127-181

Smith, Tom W. (2000): Public support for governmental benefits for the elderly across countries and time. Paris: OECD-report

Wilkoszewski, Harald (2008): Demographic pressure and attitudes towards public intergenerational transfers in Germany – how much room left for reforms? In: Tremmel, Jörg (Ed.): Demographic change and intergenerational justice: the implementation of long-term thinking in the political decision-making process. Springer, 175-205

Wilkoszewski, Harald (2009): Age trajectories of social policy preferences. Support for intergenerational transfers from a demographic perspective, MPIDR Working Paper WP 2009-034, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research