

Division of Household Labor by Parenthood Status in France and Germany

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Abstract

In this study, we investigate couples' division of household labor and childcare tasks in France, eastern Germany, and western Germany. We examine whether differences between France and the two German regions in the division of housework already exist among couples who are as of yet childless, or if such differences emerge only upon entry into parenthood, and to what extent they depend on the age of the youngest child. We study to what extent differing divisions of housework can be explained by differences in maternal employment, relative income, gender values, and marital status, and whether there is convergence in housework allocation as children grow older and differences in maternal employment rates grow smaller. We employ data from the French and the German Generations and Gender Survey (GGS) and carry out our analyses using ordered logistic regression models. We find evidence that important differences in the division of household labor between France, eastern and western Germany emerge only upon entry into parenthood, and that the division of housework develops in different directions with the age of the youngest child in each of the countries or regions.

1. Introduction

In this study, we investigate how couples' division of household labor and childcare tasks differ between France, eastern Germany, and western Germany. While previous studies have conducted general international comparisons (Davis and Greenstein 2004; Fuwa 2004; Geist 2005), we focus specifically on how cross-national differences in housework allocation develop with parenthood status, age of the youngest child, and whether they persist after children leave the parental home.

Although France and Germany share a corporatist welfare state background (Esping-Anderson 1990; Gauthier 2002; Palier and Martin 2007), structural differences between France, eastern Germany, and western Germany become particularly evident with respect to the childcare infrastructure (Gornick et al. 1997; O'Reilly 2006). In France, provision of day care for children aged less than three is well developed (Hofäcker 2003), as is the case in eastern Germany (Kreyenfeld et al. 2009). On the other hand, it is much more difficult for parents in western Germany to obtain a childcare space for very young children (Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder 2009). This leads to important differences in maternal employment rates that may be expected to result in cross-country and cross-regional differences in the gender division of household labor and childcare tasks. Divergences in the division of housework may emerge upon entry into parenthood that are not yet evident between childless couples in the two German regions and France. To some extent, these differences may persist even when children grow older and maternal employment rates in France, eastern and western Germany converge again. Differences in maternal employment rates may be reflected in differences in gender ideologies concerning parental roles. These could exert an additional influence on the division of parents' household and childcare tasks beyond the impact of each partner's actual employment status.

Another factor that can be expected to affect couples' division of household labor is marital status, with cohabiting couples tending to share housework more equally than married couples (Baxter 2005; Davis et al. 2007; South and Spitze 1994). Among young couples, differences between France and the two German regions in this respect are particularly evident for parents. While for young childless couples, cohabitation rates are very similar in both German regions and France, parents' cohabitation rates are much higher in France and eastern Germany than in western Germany. This, too, may be a factor related to greater inequalities in the division of household labor upon entry into parenthood in western Germany than in eastern Germany or France.

To study differences in the division of housework as well as the division of childcare tasks between France, eastern and western Germany, we employ data from the French and the German Generations and Gender Survey (GGS), conducted in 2005. We investigate to what extent couple-level characteristics like each spouses' employment status, education, relative earnings, marital status, stepfamily status, and individual-level factors such as socialization and gender values can explain differences in the division of routine household tasks as well as childcare tasks by parenthood status and age of the youngest child between eastern Germany, western Germany, and France.

The structure of the paper is the following. The next section discusses theoretical approaches to explaining gendered divisions of housework and childcare tasks that are important for our research questions (section 2.1). We then turn to differences in the French, eastern and western German structural and institutional context (section 2.2) to discuss how these may lead to differences in the division of housework and childcare tasks in light of the theoretical approaches discussed in the preceding section. This provides the basis for our hypotheses on differences and on explanations for differences in the division of household labor by parenthood status between eastern Germany, western Germany and France (section 2.3). The data and method will be discussed in section three. In section four we will then present the results of our empirical analyses. The paper closes with a summary and concluding discussion of our main findings.

2.1 Theoretical background

In this section, we review theoretical considerations on determinants of couples' division of household labor. On this basis, we will later develop our hypotheses on differences in the allocation of household and childcare tasks in France, eastern and western Germany by parenthood status and age of youngest child.

One of the most important differences between France, eastern and western Germany that can be expected to influence couples' division of housework are divergences in maternal employment rates. From the perspective of two of the main theoretical approaches to explaining the division of household labor between couples – the time availability approach and the relative resources approach – each partner's employment status can be expected to be of major importance. The time availability approach generally predicts that the partner who spends less time in paid employment does a larger share of the housework (South and Spitze

1994). Wide support for the time availability approach has been found in international studies of the division of household labor (Bauer 2007; Bernhardt et al. 2008; Bianchi et al. 2000; Brugeilles and Sebillé 2009; Davis and Greenstein 2004; Lewin-Epstein et al. 2006; Wengler et al. 2008). In most studies, being employed and working longer hours has been found to be related to a lower share of housework, for both men and women.

According to the relative resources approach on the other hand, couples allocate more housework to the partner with lower economic resources in terms of income or education. This may be motivated by a desire to achieve an efficient division of labor (Becker 1981; Hiller 1984; Shelton and John 1996). Alternatively, in the power relations variant of this approach, housework is seen to be unpleasant, with both partners seeking to avoid it if possible. The partner with greater economic resources has greater bargaining power, and can leave a greater part of the housework burden to the partner possessing fewer economic resources (Bernhardt et al. 2008; Shelton and John 1996). In the economic dependency variant, the partner with lower economic resources is seen to exchange housework for economic support. However, the terms of exchange deviate from those in a free market situation and imply greater dependency of the partner doing the housework (Baxter 2005; Brines 1993; Brines 1994; Coltrane 2000). Support for the impact of relative resources has been found in a number of studies (Bauer 2007; Blair and Lichter 1991; Bloemen and Stancanelli 2008; Cunningham 2007; González et al. 2009; Kan 2008). Evertsson and Neramo (2004) likewise find support for the relative resources approach for Sweden, while their results for the United States are not as straight-forward.

Thus, many studies have shown that time availability and economic resources contribute significantly towards explaining the gender division of housework. None-the-less, housework allocation decisions by gender are still left partially unexplained. Even when women have higher levels of resources or earnings than their partner, they still perform a greater part of the housework (Brines 1994; Evertsson and Neramo 2007). This directs attention towards perspectives emphasizing the role of gender values. Bernhardt et al (2008) argue that path dependency is important for the development of egalitarian gender values. This perspective highlights the relevance of a long tradition of egalitarian public policies and public debate on gender equity issues in a country for the spread of egalitarian values. In our context, for instance, the very early introduction of paid maternity leave in France in 1913 is indicative of a long history of public acceptance of maternal employment (Lewis 1992). A longer history of more egalitarian divisions of labor between men and women may also impact gender values via socialization (Hiller 1984; Windebank 2001). The ‘doing gender’

approach, on the other hand, views gender as being produced in every-day practices. By performing certain types of housework, men and women continuously produce gendered identities (Brines 1993; Ferree 1991; West and Zimmermann 1987). Empirical evidence of the effect of gender values on the division of household labor has been found in several studies (Cooke 2006; Greenstein 1996; Kan 2008).

Entries into parenthood have been found to be related to changes in the direction of less egalitarian divisions of housework (Régnier-Loilier 2009; Sanchez and Thomson 1997; van der Lippe et al. 2010). This is likely to be related to changes in employment status, time availability and relative resources, as well as to role expectations attached to the status of mother and father.

Marital status has often been named as a further factor that can be expected to be related to couples' division of housework. On the one hand, people with more egalitarian values may self-select into cohabitation (Batalova and Cohen 2002). People who are cohabiting are also usually likely to be younger and to be childless, both of which are related to a more egalitarian division of housework (Baxter 2005). On the other hand, the experience of cohabitation itself may also promote a more egalitarian division of labor than in the case of marriage. Cohabitation involves fewer legal constraints and is easier to leave if the relationship is not satisfactory. As such, it is sometimes viewed as having no fixed duration and as being more unstable. As a consequence, if they are unsure about the stability of the relationship, cohabiting partners may be less inclined to specialize in specific tasks than are married couples. From the perspective of the 'doing gender' approach, it has also been argued that beyond general gender roles, roles of wife and husband exist as well that can result in greater inequality in the division of housework for married than for cohabiting couples (Shelton and John 1993; South and Spitze 1994). It has also been shown that the experience of cohabitation can carry over into marriage, resulting in more egalitarian divisions of housework for married couples that had previously cohabited than for those who did not (Batalova and Cohen 2002; Baxter 2005). Empirical studies have frequently found marital status to be an important determinant of the division of household labor. The division of housework is usually found to be more egalitarian for cohabiting couples than is the case for married couples (Baxter 2005; Davis et al. 2007; Shelton and John 1993; South and Spitze 1994).

Not only marital status, but stepfamily status, too, may be related to couples' division of labor. It has been argued that for 2nd marriages, fewer normative expectations exist with regard to family life, including the division of labor (Baxter 2005; Ishii-Kunz and Coltrane

1992). Additionally, negative experiences with the division of housework in 1st marriages may induce people to rethink this aspect of family life in their next marriages (Sullivan 1997). For these reasons, the allocation of housework and childcare tasks in stepfamilies may less closely follow gender stereotypes than is the case for other families

Contextual factors that cannot easily be captured by individual level observations may additionally affect the gender division of housework (Fuwa 2004; Geist 2005; Hook 2006). Gender values held by the majority of people in a society can influence peoples' perceptions of what is expected of them in terms of an appropriate division of labor in the household, even if this differs from individual respondents' own values (Batalova and Cohen 2002). The role women play in public life in a particular society may contribute to the position ascribed to them within the family. A higher female employment rate overall as well as institutions supporting women's employment can strengthen women's bargaining position within their partnerships, independent of their individual current employment status (Breen and Cooke 2005; Cooke 2007; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006).

2.2 Differences in institutional background characteristics between France, eastern and western Germany

Differences in maternal employment rates between France, eastern, and western Germany are likely to lead not only to differences in mothers' time availability, but also to differences in their economic resources. According to the theoretical approaches summarized above, this can be expected to lead to diverging allocations of housework. Following a long tradition of female full-time employment (Lewis 1992), women in France tend to return to full-time employment quite quickly after the birth of their child. Mothers of young children in western Germany on the other hand have tended to take parental leave for longer periods of time and to more often return to employment on a part-time basis. Kreyenfeld et al. (2009) show for 2005 that of mothers of a youngest child aged 0 – 2, 39% are employed full-time in France compared to 26% in eastern and 13% in western Germany. Among mothers of a youngest child aged 3 – 5, 50% in France, 49% in eastern and 28% in western Germany are employed full-time. Full-time employment rates for eastern German mothers thus are closer to, but do not quite reach those in France, due especially to high levels of unemployment. However, unemployment rates for men in eastern Germany are nearly as high as for women (Matysiak and Steinmetz 2008), which is likely to impact the distribution of housework as well. Trappe

and Sørensen (2006) show that women's earnings constitute a greater proportion of household income in eastern than in western Germany. Relative to the contribution from men's earnings, the difference between eastern and western Germany is even greater, since men's earnings contribute less and transfer payments contribute more to household income in eastern than in western Germany.

Extended periods of non-employment or part-time employment can lead to lower hourly wages as well (Buligescu et al. 2009; Fouarge and Muffels 2009; Ziefle 2004). Most studies find a greater motherhood hourly wage penalty in Germany than in France or find that a larger raw gender wage gap in Germany than in France can be explained by taking various factors such as employment experience into account¹ (Arulampalam et al. 2007; Davies and Pierre 2005; Gash 2008; O'Dorchai 2009). If less work experience in western Germany than in France or in eastern Germany does lead to lower wages even when children are older and maternal employment status has converged across countries and regions, differences in the distribution of housework may persist. If mothers working full-time earn less in western Germany than in France or eastern Germany relative to their partners, this should lead to a less egalitarian division of housework and childcare tasks, according to the relative resources approach.

One of the main reasons for the differences in maternal employment rates appears to lie in diverging childcare provision rates. France has had a long history of providing nursery education for children (Fagnani 2006; Lewis et al. 2008). Free nursery education is available for all children aged three to six (Windebank 2001), and take-up is practically universal (Fagnani 2006; OECD 2010). Crèche spaces were expanded strongly in the 1980s (Lewis et al. 2008). Next to nursery education and crèches, child minders and nannies have played an important role in care provided for under-3-year olds as well. Parents are supported in paying for childcare costs by tax allowances as well as cash subsidies and by state payment of employers' social security contributions when parents employ registered child minders (Windebank 2001). In 2006, 43% of children aged under 3 attended formal care (OECD 2010).

In western Germany, on the other hand, provision of childcare for under-three-year olds has been particularly low. In 2002, provision rates for under-3-year-olds were only at 2% (Statistisches Bundesamt 2004). Since then, there have been efforts to expand child care facilities for very young children (Lewis et al. 2008). However, by 2008, still only 10% of

¹ International comparative studies on gender and motherhood wage gaps usually do not differentiate between eastern and western Germany. On account of the greater population size in western Germany, findings for Germany are likely to more closely reflect the situation in western Germany.

children aged under 3 attended public day care facilities. In eastern Germany, by contrast, 38% of all under-3-year olds attended public day care in 2008 (Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder 2009). Childcare coverage for 3 – 6 year olds is more extensive, with approximately 90% in western Germany and 94% in eastern Germany attending kindergarten in 2008. However, only 20% did so on a full-time basis in western Germany compared to 62% in eastern Germany (Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder 2009). Childcare is generally organized at a municipal level in Germany. Although there were cutbacks in childcare provision for under-3-year olds in eastern Germany after unification in 1990, eastern German municipalities none-the-less chose to retain relatively high levels of day-care provision. Thus, still today, day-care provision levels are substantially higher in eastern than in western Germany (Evers et al. 2005; Kreyenfeld and Geisler 2006).

Thus, differences in the provision of childcare between eastern Germany, western Germany and France may be one explanation for differences in maternal employment rates, which in turn can be expected to influence parents' relative time availability and relative resources and thereby their division of labor in the household. Parental leave regulations, by contrast, have until recently been relatively similar in France and Germany. Parental leave is available for up to three years in both Germany and France. Until recently, it encompassed a flat-rate allowance in both countries, though in France only for parents of two or more children. In 2004, a six-month flat-rate benefit was introduced in France for parents of one child as well (Lewis et al. 2008; Revillard 2006; Windebank 2001)². One might expect the relatively long leave provisions in both countries to encourage mothers' withdrawal from the labor market. However, despite the very similar parental leave regulations in France and Germany, and identical regulations in eastern and western Germany, maternal employment rates have been substantially higher in France and eastern Germany than in western Germany, as discussed above. This is likely to be due to the described differences in the childcare infrastructure. This could indicate that, even given very similar parental leave regulations, levels of childcare provision have a strong influence on maternal employment.

Tax incentives may also influence partners' relative earnings. The tax systems in both Germany and France provide the option of income splitting. This is a system where couples can add up their earnings and, in the case of Germany, divide by two, or in the case of France,

² The analyses for this study are based on the Generations and Gender Survey, conducted in 2005. Important parental leave reforms have taken place in both countries since then. In 2007, a one-year parental leave benefit based on previous earnings was introduced in Germany. In France, a supplementary one-year benefit was introduced in 2006 for parents of three or more children (Lewis et al. 2008). The influence of these reforms on parents' division of housework can however not yet be analysed using the GGS data.

divide by a factor derived from the total number of family members. Due to progressive income taxation, couples with unequal earnings profit from income splitting. This has been said to encourage unequal earnings between partners, and thereby subsidize one partners' at least partial withdrawal from the labor market. In Germany, income splitting is available for all married couples. In France, it is available only for parents, whether married or unmarried (Fagnani 2006; Lewis 1992; Schratzenstaller 2002). Like in the case of parental leave, the regulations in the two countries are very similar and should provide very similar employment incentives. None-the-less, clear differences in maternal employment rates can be observed, which may be related to other differences in institutional background characteristics, such as the childcare infrastructure.

Important differences between eastern Germany, western Germany, and France can also be found with respect to parents' marital status. As discussed in the previous section, marital status may be a further factor affecting parents' division of household labor. For young couples, differences in cohabitations rates are relatively small among the childless between eastern Germany, western Germany, and France, but western Germany diverges quite strongly with respect to parental cohabitation rates (Table 1 below, Perelli-Harris et al. 2009). This may particularly contribute to explaining cross-regional and cross-national differences in the division of housework among young couples with small children. To some extent, it may also contribute to explaining differences in the division of housework among older childless couples, since cohabitation rates diverge cross-nationally and cross-regionally for older childless couples as well. Differences in tax incentives may be one important explanation for differences in parental cohabitation rates. As described above, only married couples can profit from income splitting in Germany, whereas this tax advantage is available to both married and unmarried parents in France. In general, as described above, only couples with unequal earnings profit from income splitting. This is likely to be one reason why many couples marry upon entry into parenthood in western Germany. If mothers reduce their employment, the couple's earnings become more unequal and the tax advantage available from income splitting increases. In eastern Germany, where maternal employment rates are higher, income splitting is less advantageous. This may be one reason why eastern German parents are not as quick to marry.

[Table 1]

2.3 Research Hypotheses

On the basis of the time availability and economic resources approaches, we expect differences in couples' division of housework between France, eastern and western Germany to become particularly evident for couples with children. Given the described differences in maternal employment rates and earnings, we expect housework to be distributed less equally between parents in western Germany than either in eastern Germany or in France. Including employment status and relative income in our models should then explain part of the difference in parents' division of housework between western Germany on the one hand and eastern Germany and France on the other.

Among parents, not only housework, but childcare tasks, too, are likely to be shared less equally in western Germany than in eastern Germany or France, and it should likewise be possible to partly explain these differences by including variables for employment status and relative income.

As children grow older, mothers' employment rates continuously increase again. Thus, the age of the youngest child is likely to affect the division of housework and childcare tasks via women's employment status. In general, we expect the division of housework and childcare tasks to be most unequal between parents of very young children, and for the division of housework and childcare tasks to become continuously more egalitarian as children grow older. Craig and Sawrikar (2009) provide descriptive results giving evidence of this type of a pattern for Australia. For parents of children aged 18 or older or of children who have already left the parental home, we expect the division of housework to have closely approached that of childless couples again. However, the division of housework may still remain somewhat less egalitarian than for childless couples if parents have become accustomed to a more unequal division of household tasks (Schulz and Blossfeld 2006).

Since differences in maternal employment rates between eastern Germany and France on the one hand and western Germany on the other are greatest for mothers of very young children, we expect cross-regional and cross-country differences in the division of housework and childcare tasks to be greatest for parents of very young children, and to grow smaller as the youngest child grows older. Yet, some differences may remain. Differences in mothers' employment biographies may affect their earning potential and thereby lead to differences in couples' relative resources in France, eastern and western Germany, even among couples whose children have already left the parental home. This in some ways relates to results by

Pittman and Blanchard (1996) who have shown that spouses' employment histories affect their current housework allocation.

Moreover, differences in gender values may also contribute to a diverging gender division of housework and childcare tasks between the two German regions and France. More egalitarian gender values expressed by respondents, particularly those referring explicitly to the roles of mothers and fathers, could be related to a more egalitarian division of housework and childcare tasks. Including variables on opinions on roles of mothers and fathers may further explain differences between France and eastern Germany on the one hand, and western Germany on the other. As indicated in the previous section, gender values may partially be formed through socialization. A further expectation would therefore be that controlling for respondents' mothers' employment status will also contribute to explaining the international and cross-regional difference in couples' division of labor.

As argued above, parents' decision whether to marry or not may be strongly related to their employment status and income in Germany, given tax subsidies for unequal earnings for married couples. To the extent that the experience of cohabitation itself leads to a more egalitarian division of housework and childcare tasks, differences in cohabitation rates may however independently further add to differences in the division of housework and childcare between the two German regions and France. If this is the case, including marital status in our models should further contribute to explaining the difference in parents' division of housework and childcare between France, eastern and western Germany.

Above, we argued that stepfamily status may affect the division of labor in the household as well. There is no reason to believe that the proportion of stepfamilies should differ substantially between eastern and western Germany and France. None-the-less, we include stepfamily status as a general control variable in our models, hypothesizing that the division of housework and childcare tasks is more egalitarian in stepfamilies than in other families.

The 'doing gender' approach may help to explain why certain types of domestic labor have become established as 'male' tasks, and others as 'female' tasks (Bianchi et al. 2000; Ferree 1991). For us, it will be important to determine whether differences in couples' division of labor between eastern and western Germany and France are stronger for some tasks than for others. This may point to cultural differences in what is regarded as a strictly 'male' or 'female' task. It will be interesting to see whether there are greater similarities in this respect between eastern and western Germany as compared to France, despite important structural differences between the two parts of Germany.

To summarize, our main hypotheses are that differences in the division of housework between France and eastern Germany on the one hand, and western Germany on the other are stronger for parents than for childless couples. We also expect that differences in the division of household and childcare tasks are greater for parents of very young children than for parents of older children, especially parents of children aged 18 or above or whose children have already left the parental home. Yet, even among parents of older children, differences between France, eastern and western Germany may remain, due to differences in mothers' employment biographies and relative resources, as well as to differences in housework allocation patterns that couples have become accustomed to. We expect that these international and cross-regional differences can partly, though not completely, be explained by controlling for partners' relative resources, employment status, gender values, socialization, and marital status.

3. Data and Method

For our analyses, we draw on Generations and Gender Survey (GGS) data. The internationally comparable Generations and Gender Surveys are coordinated by the Population Activities Unit (PAU) of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE)³. The Gender and Generations Surveys focus on the fields of fertility and family dynamics, home-leaving, and retirement (United Nations 2007). The GGS is designed as a panel survey. So far, data from wave 1 is available for analysis for both Germany and France. Interviews for wave 1 were conducted in 2005 in France and Germany. Our analyses thus refer to the year 2005.

In this study, we analyze determinants of couples' division of household labor and childcare tasks. For our dependent variables, we make use of respondents' replies to items indicating whether they themselves or their partner are mainly responsible for a number of different household and childcare tasks, or whether they share these tasks equally. In the area of housework, the items we analyze are respondents' division of cooking, dish-washing, vacuum-cleaning, grocery-shopping, household repairs, bill-paying, and organizing social events. In the area of childcare tasks, we analyze items referring to respondents' division of responsibility for staying home with sick children, playing with their children, putting their children to bed, helping them get dressed, and helping children with their homework. The

³ The GGS data used for this study were obtained from the GGP Data Archive. For a description of the survey instruments, see *Generations & Gender Programme: Survey Instruments. United Nations (2005)*.

French version of the survey includes five different possible responses for how couples divide each of the household tasks. The possible responses are “always the respondent”, “usually the respondent”, “the respondent and partner equally”, “usually the partner”, and “always the partner”. The German version of the questionnaire, however, used reduced answer categories. These categories were “usually the respondent”, “the respondent and partner equally”, and “usually the partner” (Ruckdeschel et al. 2006). In order to make comparisons between Germany and France possible, we combined the respective categories for “usually” and “always” in the French data to match the reduced German categories. It can be assumed that people who indicated that they (or their partner) are always responsible for a given task in response to the French questionnaire would have answered that they (or their partner) are usually responsible for that task had they been presented the reduced German version of the questionnaire where the alternative “always” is omitted. We excluded the very small number of cases from the analyses where other persons or the child her/ himself were mainly responsible for a given task.

We analyze couples’ division of each task separately. In studies of the division of household labor, responses to various household task items are often aggregated. The GGS, however, does not assess the exact amount of time each partner spends on each household task. Therefore, aggregate measures would have to rely on strong assumptions about how much time people invest for each type of task. This is one reason for our decision to analyze each task separately. A further motivation is that we are interested in cultural differences in gender roles attached to each type of task. Differences between France and Germany in couples’ division of one type of task may not hold for another task if important differences in gender role ascriptions exist for the first task but not for the second. Furthermore, determinants of the division of housework may vary by task. The allocation of some tasks may more strongly depend on time availability, while for others, relative resources may be a more important determinant. For childcare tasks, we additionally felt it was hardly possible to aggregate outcomes due to variations in the sample for which each task was relevant. The tasks of putting children to bed and helping them get dressed can be assumed to be irrelevant for older children. This was reflected in the large proportion of missing values for these items for parents whose youngest child was 6 years old or older. Therefore, we only analyzed responses to these items for parents of children aged 0 – 5. On the other hand, staying home with sick children and playing with the children was analyzed for parents of a youngest child aged 0 – 10. For the task of helping children with their homework, we did not use the age of the youngest child to define the sample. Parents of a youngest child aged 0 – 5, for instance,

may or may not also have an older child going to school. Therefore, for the homework item, we restricted the sample to parents of at least one child aged 6 – 13. Age 13 was the highest age of the youngest child for which parents were asked childcare questions in the survey. We did not analyze responses to the item on driving children to school and recreational activities due to high proportions of missing values.

Items on couples' division of household and childcare tasks were naturally only administered to respondents with a partner. We further restricted our samples for all items to respondents in couples where the woman was younger than 60. We did this to enable better comparability between couples with and without children.

For the analyses, we used ordered logistic regression models. Ordered logistic regression models are well-suited to our data, since we know the order of the response categories, but not the distance between them. We know that if the couple is sharing a household task equally, the man is contributing more to this task than if the task is usually done by the woman alone. We also know that if the task is usually done by the man alone, he is contributing more than if the task were shared equally between partners. However, we do not know how much more he is contributing. Thus, using ordered logistic regression models, we estimate determinants of the odds of the male partner contributing more to a given task.

The formula for our ordered logistic regression models is the following.

$$\ln \frac{p_2 + p_3}{p_1} = \beta_{01} + \beta X$$

$$\ln \frac{p_3}{p_1 + p_2} = \beta_{02} + \beta X$$

The first equation gives the log odds of both partners either sharing a household task equally or the man being primarily responsible for that task vs. the woman being primarily responsible for the task. The second equation gives the log odds of the man being primarily responsible for a household task vs. either the woman being primarily responsible or both partners sharing the task equally. While the intercepts β_{0j} vary between the two equations, the coefficients β are the same. Thus, while the absolute level of the odds can vary between the two equations, the odds ratios representing the effects of the independent variables are the same.

Our main independent variable of interest is the interaction between age of the youngest child and country or region. The 'age of the youngest child' variable includes the

categories ‘no children’, several categories for the age of the youngest child for parents whose children are still at home, and the category ‘non-resident children only’, for parents whose children have all already left home. The sample size for eastern Germany was too small to estimate models using detailed age categories for the age of the youngest child. Therefore, the main models were estimated for western Germany and France only, and further models using simplified age categories were estimated to compare eastern Germany, western Germany, and France.

Further independent variables include a number of demographic variables. These are the number of children, the woman’s age, the age difference between the partners, and the respondent’s sex. All pairs of variables indicating the respondent’s own characteristics and the partner’s characteristics were used along with the respondent’s sex to create variables indicating the male and female partners’ characteristics. The variable for the respondent’s sex was included in the models in order to control for differences in women’s and men’s perceptions of how housework is distributed. Both men and women are likely to overstate their own contribution to the various household and childcare tasks. To test for the influence of time availability and relative resources, we included a variable for the interaction of partners’ employment statuses, as well as variables for women’s education, the difference between women’s and men’s education, and the ratio of the female to male partner’s income. Furthermore, we included a variable for partnership status, indicating whether the couple was married or cohabiting. To detect the impact of socialization on the household division of labor, we used a variable on whether the respondent’s mother was employed when the respondent was age 15. To investigate the influence of gender values, we included an item on the respondent’s opinion on whether mothers’ employment is harmful to preschool age children. We also tested the effects of further indicators of gender values, but found these to be insignificant. In the models for those childcare tasks for which the sample was reduced to the group of parents with a youngest child aged 0-5, variables on the education and age difference between the partners had to be omitted due to the small sample size. For all models, we used weights to account for the household sampling design.

4. Results

In the following, we will present our empirical findings on differences in the division of household labor and childcare tasks between France, eastern and western Germany, focusing

on how these vary by age of the youngest child. We will discuss to what extent differences can be explained by factors expected to be associated with the division of household labor from a theoretical perspective. We will begin by discussing our findings for household tasks, followed by a presentation of our findings on childcare tasks.

For household tasks, our results concerning differences in the effect of country or region by age of the youngest child are shown in Tables 2 – 4. The models in Tables 2 – 3 compare only western Germany and France. The age categories used here were too detailed to include eastern Germany due to the small sample size for eastern Germany in the GGS data. In the models shown in Table 4, however, broader age categories were used in order to include eastern Germany as well.

While descriptive results shown in Table A1 in the appendix indicate quite similar allocation patterns in western Germany and France for many of the household tasks studied here, these descriptive figures appear to conceal differences by parenthood status and age of the youngest child. Table 2 shows estimation results for couples' allocation of household tasks by parenthood status and age of the youngest child in western Germany compared to France. These first models only control for demographic variables. The first four tasks shown in Table 2, that is, cooking, doing the dishes, vacuum cleaning, and grocery shopping, are likely to be the most time consuming tasks and are often regarded to be the most traditionally female tasks. For childless couples, with the exception of dish-washing, no significant differences between western Germany and France in the odds of men contributing more to each of these tasks are found⁴.

Although the results shown in Table 2 indicate no difference between western Germany and France for childless couples in the odds of men contributing more to cooking tasks, for instance, significant differences are found for couples with children aged 3-5, 6-10, 11-13, as well as for couples with children aged over 18. For couples with a youngest child aged 3-5, the odds of men contributing more to cooking are only 66% as high in western Germany as they are in France. For couples with a youngest child aged 6-10, the difference is even greater, with the odds in western Germany of men contributing more to cooking at only 55% the level found for France. Men's contributions to cooking in western Germany and

⁴ In ordered logistic regression models, odds ratios are constrained to be constant no matter at what point the ordinal scale of the dependent variable is split into two halves. In this way, the ordinal nature of the dependent variable is respected, but no assumptions are made about the distance between the categories. Thus, when we write 'differences between western Germany and France in the odds of the man contributing more' to a given task, this refers to the odds of the man being primarily responsible for that task (vs. the woman or both sharing equally). Simultaneously, it also refers to the odds of the man contributing equally or being predominantly responsible for that task (vs. the woman being primarily responsible).

France appear to converge again for parents of children aged 11-13. Here, the gap between western Germany and France is smaller, with the odds of men contributing more in western Germany at 70% the level in France. For couples whose youngest child is aged 18 or over, the situation has reversed. Here, the odds of men contributing more to cooking are actually 85% higher in western Germany than in France. Quite similar patterns by age of the youngest child are found for dish-washing, vacuum cleaning, and grocery shopping as well.

These findings support our hypothesis that differences between western Germany and France that are not evident for childless couples can emerge for parents. For couples with young children, lower contributions by men to household tasks were expected in western Germany than in France because of lower maternal employment rates in western Germany than in France. We expected differences to be particularly large for couples with very young children, since cross-national differences in maternal employment rates are largest for this group. However, it appears that differences are actually largest for those with a youngest child aged 6-10, not 0-2. Perhaps, men in western Germany offer more support for household tasks when children are very young and childcare task loads are high, even when women are not working. When children reach school age, they then appear to withdraw more strongly from participating in household tasks.

A similar pattern of differences between western Germany and France as for the traditionally female household tasks discussed above is found for the traditionally male task of doing repairs as well. On the other hand, the odds of men contributing more to doing the bills and organizing social events are actually significantly higher in western Germany than in France. Men's greater contributions to doing the bills in western Germany than in France could be related to larger income differences between partners in western Germany than in France. Possibly, bill-paying is allocated towards the partner with greater direct access to the household's income. Below, we will test this explanation when relative resources are added to the model.

[Table 2]

[Table 3]

Table 3 shows estimation results for the complete models including controls not only for demographic variables as in Table 2, but also for an interaction of partners' employment statuses, levels and differences in level of education, relative income, indicators of

socialization and opinions on parental roles, as well as marital status. (Table A3 in the appendix shows the complete results for the models in Table 3). Controlling for these variables generally explains the lower odds of men contributing more to household tasks initially found in the first model (Table 2) for western Germany for couples with children in the age range 0 – 13. As can be seen in Table 3, men’s odds of contributing more to the tasks of cooking, vacuum cleaning, grocery shopping, and doing repairs are no longer significantly lower in western Germany than in France for any age of the youngest child. However, dish-washing remains an exception, for which differences between France and western Germany cannot be explained by the control variables entered in model 2.

If the control variables are entered in a step-wise manner, controlling only for relative education, income, and employment can already explain the lower odds in western Germany compared to France for the tasks of cooking, vacuum-cleaning, grocery shopping and doing repairs⁵. Entering controls for socialization and gender values does not contribute any further to explaining these differences. Controlling for marital status further closes the gap between western Germany and France to a small extent. The results shown in Table 3 thus generally support our hypothesis that differences in the allocation of household tasks between western Germany and France for parents of young children can be explained by differences in maternal employment rates and relative resources. This was expected on the basis of theories of time availability as well as power relations. To some extent, support was also found for the impact of differences in cohabitation rates on cross-national differences in the allocation of household tasks, which was expected based on theoretical consideration predicting a more egalitarian division of labor for cohabiting couples.

[Figure 1]

Figure 1 illustrates the shape of the effect of the age of the youngest child by plotting the results for the example of vacuum-cleaning tasks⁶. The first panel shows that the odds of men contributing more to vacuum-cleaning are consistently lower in western Germany than in France when the youngest child is aged 0 – 10. After controlling for employment status, relative resources, gender values, and marital status, this gap is closed, as can be seen in the second panel. Figure 1 however also shows that men’s contributions begin to rise when the

⁵ The results of the step-wise estimation are not shown here but are available from the authors.

⁶ This plot not only makes use of the odds ratios shown in Tables 2 and 3, but also of the main effect of age of the youngest child. Complete results for model 1 are available from the authors. Complete results for model 2, including the main effect of age of the youngest child, are reported in Table A3 in the appendix.

youngest child reaches age 11 in western Germany, while they at the same time begin to fall in France. This results in clearly higher odds of men contributing more to vacuum-cleaning in western Germany than in France for couples whose youngest child is aged over 14 or has already left the parental home. A very similar pattern can be observed for cooking, doing the dishes, and grocery shopping, as can be seen from Tables 2, 3, and A3.

The general expectation was that as maternal employment rates and employment hours increase with the age of the youngest child, the division of household labor would become more egalitarian again. Our findings for western Germany support this hypothesis, and compare well to descriptive results provided for Australia by Craig and Sawrikar (2009). In France, however, the opposite pattern is found. One interpretation, as put forward by Brugeilles and Sebille (2009), may be that men's contributions are subsidiary in nature⁷. In France, given high maternal employment rates, households' total workloads are presumably quite high when children are young and require intensive care. Thus, fathers may contribute most to housework when children are young and withdraw later on when the household's total workload is lower, leaving the remaining housework largely to women. Our results suggest that more generally, couples' divisions of household tasks may react to changes in the households' workload, as opposed to being related strictly to absolute amounts of employment hours or childcare demands. In France, maternal employment rates are already high when children are young. When children grow older and require less care, this may be perceived as a decline in the households' workload. School-days in France are also generally longer than in western Germany, and in contrast to western Germany, lunch is provided at school, which may also imply a greater decline in the households' workload when children reach school age. In western Germany, on the other hand, many mothers do not return to full-time employment until their children are over 10 years old. Kreyenfeld and Geisler (2006) find that mothers' full-time employment rates in 2002 in western Germany increase from 15% when the youngest child is 3 – 5 and 19% when the youngest child is aged 6 – 9 to 32% when the youngest child is aged 10 – 14. Women's increased labor force participation at older ages of the youngest child may therefore be perceived as an increase in the households' workload. Men may increase their contributions to household tasks at this later point in time in western Germany as a reaction to changes in women's routines.

⁷ However, Brugeilles and Sebille (2009) study only childcare tasks, and we find this type of a pattern only for household tasks, and not for childcare tasks. A reason for differences in our findings for childcare tasks may be that we use more restricted age groups. As described below, we argue that many types of childcare tasks, such as putting children to bed, only apply to younger children and should not be evaluated for older age groups.

Table 4 shows odds ratios for eastern and western Germany compared to France for the odds of men contributing more to each household task. In eastern Germany, men's contributions to household tasks generally seem to be higher than in France, with the exception of dish-washing. Table 4 shows results from the complete model with all control variables. Higher odds of men contributing more to household tasks were already found for eastern Germany even before including controls for employment and relative resources, as may be expected given high maternal employment rates in eastern Germany. The odds of men contributing more to household tasks seem initially to follow the pattern in France, which serves as a baseline in these estimates. However, men's contributions generally seem to rise quite strongly again in eastern Germany after children have left the parental home.

Task-specific differences between France, eastern, and western Germany, pointing to differences in the association of different types of tasks with gender roles, become evident from Table 4 as well. It seems that both in eastern and in western Germany, dish-washing is more of a female task than in France. In contrast to all the other tasks, men's contributions are lower for this task in both German regions among couples with children under 18, even after controlling for all the variables in the complete model. On the other hand, men seem to do a much higher relative amount of bill-paying in western Germany than in France or eastern Germany, even after controlling for relative resources. Thus, bill-paying may be a part of male role ascriptions in western Germany to a greater extent than either in France or in eastern Germany.

[Table 4]

In Tables 5, 6, and 7, we report our results for childcare tasks. As can be seen in Table 5, for all of the surveyed childcare tasks, fathers contribute less to each task in western Germany than in France. Differences are greatest for playing with their children, although one would expect the possibility to play with one's child to be less affected by work schedules than for example the possibility to stay at home when the child is sick. Compared to the household tasks discussed above, differences between western Germany and France with respect to childcare tasks more often remain unexplained even when taking divergences between the countries in relative time availability, relative resources, gender values, and partnership status into account. The estimates in Table 6, where controls for these factors are included, show that differences between western Germany and France for fathers playing with their child remain unexplained. For those with a youngest child aged 3-5, significant

differences between western Germany and France in fathers' relative frequency of staying home with sick children remain unexplained as well. This also applies to helping children with their homework, for couples with at least one child aged 6-10. Differences between France and western Germany in the contribution of fathers to the childcare tasks of putting children to bed and helping children get dressed by contrast can be explained by including the additional controls in Table 6. These are the tasks for which initial differences shown in Table 5 were smallest. In eastern Germany, fathers' contributions to childcare tasks are already found to be quite similar to those in France using the models without controls for employment and relative resources. The only task for which fathers' contribution is found to be lower in eastern Germany than in France is for staying home with sick children, and this difference even becomes slightly larger using the model for which the results are shown in Table 7.

The unexplained differences in fathers' contributions to childcare tasks between western Germany on the one hand and France and eastern Germany on the other may indicate differences in parental role expectations between these countries or regions that are not captured by the variables included in the models estimated here. Possibly, it is expected less strongly of fathers and more strongly of mothers in western Germany than in France or in eastern Germany to contribute a significant amount of time to playing with their children and to helping them with their homework, for instance.

[Table 5]

[Table 6]

[Table 7]

5. Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to compare how couples divide household and childcare tasks between France, eastern and western Germany by parenthood status and age of the youngest child. Our results suggest that among childless couples, the division of household tasks is quite similar in each of the three countries or regions. Among parents, however, fathers' relative contribution to household tasks is greater in France than in western Germany when the youngest child is still quite small. Differences between France and western Germany at

young ages of the youngest child can be completely explained by controlling for parents' employment and relative income. This lends support to predictions from theories on the impact of time availability and power relations on the division of household tasks.

An interesting finding was that in France, men's contribution to household tasks decreases at older ages of the youngest child. Given mothers' early returns to employment in France, it seems that men contribute most to housework when children are still very young and the household's total workload is high. As children grow older, a greater proportion of household tasks are left to the mother. One factor that may be associated with this development is that schools in France are usually full-day and also provide lunch, in contrast to Germany where the school-day is generally already over by lunch time. Thus, the household's total workload may decline more strongly in France than in western Germany when children reach school age, encouraging men's withdrawal from housework if they see themselves primarily as providing extra support when the total amount of housework is high.

In western Germany, on the other hand, men's contribution to household tasks increases with the age of the youngest child. This was expected as mothers' employment also increases with the age of the youngest child. Since mothers in western Germany on average return to employment much later than in France, decreases in their time availability at this later point in time may be perceived as a more significant change. This may trigger increases in men's contributions to household tasks in order to compensate for women's decreased time availability. As a result of the decrease in France and the increase in western Germany in men's contributions to household tasks at older ages of the youngest child, men's contributions are actually higher in western Germany than in France by the time the youngest child has reached age 18 or left the parental home.

In eastern Germany, men's contributions to household tasks are generally even higher than in France. This difference cannot be completely explained by controlling for employment and relative resources. This may point towards cultural differences entailing especially high male contributions to household tasks in eastern Germany.

Our findings indicate that differences in gender role ascriptions are stronger for some types of household tasks than for others. Dish-washing appears to be more of a female task in both eastern and western Germany than in France, while bill-paying seems to be ascribed more strongly to men in western Germany than either in eastern Germany or in France.

We find that the relative amount fathers compared to mothers play with their children and help their children with their homework is about equal in France and eastern Germany, but significantly greater in France than in western Germany. These differences between

France and western Germany are especially strong for parents of younger children. In contrast to differences in the allocation of housework among parents with young children, these differences in the division of childcare tasks cannot be explained by our indicators for time availability and relative resources. This may point towards cultural differences specifically with respect to parental roles.

Altogether, our findings indicate that it is important to differentiate by parenthood status and age of the youngest child when comparing allocations of household and childcare tasks between countries. We have shown that although no differences in the division of housework are evident between childless couples in France, eastern, and western Germany, international and cross-regional differences do arise for parents. Moreover, the allocation of household tasks follows different patterns by age of the youngest child in each country and region.

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Appendix

[Table A1]

[Table A2]

[Table A3]

Tables and Figures

Table 1
Percentage of couples in each age group that are cohabiting

	France	eastern Germany	western Germany
parents			
woman's age			
<30	51%	46%	16%
>=30, <40	26%	27%	8%
>=40, <50	17%	12%	7%
>=50, <60	8%	7%	4%
childless couples			
woman's age			
<30	72%	83%	69%
>=30, <40	63%	71%	38%
>=40, <50	48%	45%	17%
>=50, <60	22%	6%	10%

N= 9,522

source: GGS, own calculations, weighted to account for sampling design, couples where woman is aged less than 60

Table 2
Model 1: Odds of men contributing more to each household task,
Odds ratios for western Germany vs. France for each age of the youngest child

	cooking	dishes	vacuum cleaning	groceries	repairs	bills	social events
age of the youngest child							
western Germany vs. France							
no children	1.02	0.66 ***	0.99	0.94	1.03	1.31 ***	1.19
age 0-2	0.78	0.39 ***	0.71 ***	0.71 ***	0.73 **	1.62 ***	1.35 **
age 3-5	0.66 **	0.41 ***	0.77 *	0.72 **	0.74 *	1.77 ***	1.24
age 6-10	0.55 ***	0.33 ***	0.61 ***	0.70 ***	1.26	1.87 ***	1.17
age 11-13	0.70 *	0.56 ***	0.90	1.20	0.88	1.65 ***	1.43 *
age 14-17	1.04	0.69 **	1.32	0.97	0.86	1.88 ***	1.68 ***
age 18+	1.85 ***	0.94	2.02 ***	1.10	0.99	1.87 ***	1.12
non-resident children only	1.17	1.09	1.93 ***	1.14	1.13	1.46 ***	1.57 ***
N	8614	8390	8209	8635	8362	8637	8609

* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

controlling for number of children, women's age, partners' age difference, step-family status, respondent's sex
 complete model estimates available from the authors

source: GGS, own calculations, weighted to account for sampling design, couples where woman is aged less than 60,
 excluding cases with missing values for the dependent variable

Table 3
Model 2: Odds of men contributing more to each household task
Odds ratios for western Germany vs. France for each age of the youngest child

	cooking	dishes	vacuum cleaning	groceries	repairs	bills	social events
age of the youngest child							
western Germany vs. France							
no children	1.22 *	0.74 ***	1.10	1.04	1.07	1.31 ***	1.11
age 0-2	1.54 **	0.70 **	1.15	0.88	0.79	1.41 ***	1.24
age 3-5	1.06	0.58 ***	1.07	0.88	0.80	1.55 ***	1.21
age 6-10	0.89	0.46 ***	0.88	0.88	1.39 **	1.58 ***	1.14
age 11-13	1.05	0.76	1.25	1.54 **	0.98	1.42 *	1.42 *
age 14-17	1.42	0.79	1.62 **	1.26	0.91	1.78 ***	1.80 ***
age 18+	2.32 ***	0.95	2.39 ***	1.36 *	1.03	1.61 ***	1.27
non-resident children only	1.38 **	1.07	2.20 ***	1.43 ***	1.19	1.34 ***	1.76 ***
N	8614	8390	8209	8635	8362	8637	8609


* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

controlling for number of children, women's age, partners' age difference, step-family status, respondent's sex, interaction of partners' work statuses, woman's education, difference in partners' education, partners' income ratio, respondent's mother's employment status, opinion on maternal employment, marital status

see appendix (Table A3) for complete models

source: GGS, own calculations, weighted to account for sampling design, couples where woman is aged less than 60, excluding missing values

Figure 1 : Odds ratios of men contributing more to vacuum-cleaning tasks
Odds ratios relative to couples in France with a youngest child aged 0-2



model 1: controlling for number of children, women's age, partners' age difference, step-family status, respondent's sex
 model 2: controlling for number of children, women's age, partners' age difference, step-family status, respondent's sex, respondent's mother's employment status, opinion on maternal employment, interaction of partners' work statuses, woman's education, difference in partners' education, partners' income ratio, additionally controlling for marital status

complete estimates for model 1 available from the authors, see Table A3 for complete results of model 2

source: GGS, own calculations, weighted to account for sampling design, couples where woman is aged less than 60, excluding missing values

Table 4: Odds of men contributing more to each household task, model 2
Odds ratios for eastern and western Germany vs. France for each age of the youngest child

	cooking	dishes	vacuum cleaning	groceries	repairs	bills	social events
age of the youngest child							
eastern Germany vs. France							
no children	1.07	0.90	1.49 *	0.88	0.92	1.13	0.84
age 0-5	1.48 **	0.75	1.10	0.98	1.10	1.07	1.20
age 6-17	1.41 **	0.78 *	1.30 *	1.63 ***	2.00 ***	1.05	1.26
age 18+	1.44	0.74	1.62 *	1.21	1.96 **	0.99	1.94 ***
non-resident children only	1.49 **	1.27	1.88 ***	2.33 ***	2.34 ***	1.40 **	2.13 ***
western Germany vs. France							
no children	1.20	0.74 ***	1.10	1.03	1.07	1.32 ***	1.09
age 0-5	1.28 *	0.64 ***	1.08	0.86	0.79 **	1.49 ***	1.21 *
age 6-17	1.04	0.60 ***	1.11	1.09	1.14	1.59 ***	1.37 ***
age 18+	2.26 ***	0.95	2.33 ***	1.34 *	1.04	1.61 ***	1.25
non-resident children only	1.37 **	1.08	2.17 ***	1.43 ***	1.19	1.33 **	1.73 ***
N	9458	9215	9043	9482	9196	9486	9454

* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

controlling for number of children, women's age, partners' age difference, step-family status, respondent's sex, interaction of partners' work statuses, woman's education, difference in partners' education, partners' income ratio, respondent's mother's employment status, opinion on maternal employment, marital status

complete model estimates available from the authors

source: GGS, own calculations, weighted to account for sampling design, couples where woman is aged less than 60, excluding missing values

Table 5: Odds of men contributing more to each childcare task, model 1
Odds ratios for western Germany vs. France for each age of the youngest child

	staying home when child sick ^a	playing with child ^a	helping child get dressed ^b	putting child to bed ^b	helping with homework ^c
age of the youngest child					
age 0-2	0.60 ***	0.35 ***	0.63 ***	0.81	
age 3-5	0.46 ***	0.40 ***	0.66 **	0.80	
age 6-10	0.62 ***	0.53 ***			
at least one child in age group					
age 6-10					0.54 ***
age 11-13					0.75
both 6-10; 11-13					0.70 *
N	3286	3441	2194	2218	2598

* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

^a sample: parents of children aged 0-10. Model includes controls for number of children, women's age, partners' age difference, step-family status, respondent's sex.

^b sample: parents of children aged 0-5. Model includes same controls as above, excluding partners' age difference.

^c sample: parents with at least one child aged 6 - 13. Model includes same controls as above.

complete model estimates available from the authors

source: GGS, own calculations, weighted to account for sampling design

Table 6: Odds of men contributing more to each childcare task, model 2

Odds ratios for western Germany vs. France for each age of the youngest child

	staying home when child sick ^a	playing with child ^a	helping child get dressed ^b	putting child to bed ^b	helping with homework ^c
western Germany vs. France					
age of the youngest child					
age 0-2	1.12	0.50 ***	1.22	1.06	
age 3-5	0.63 **	0.51 ***	1.11	1.00	
age 6-10	0.97	0.71 **			
at least one child in age group					
age 6-10					0.68 ***
age 11-13					0.93
both 6-10; 11-13					0.86
N	3286	3441	2194	2218	2598

* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

^a sample: parents of children aged 0-10. Model includes controls for number of children, women's age, partners' age difference, step-family status, respondent's sex, interaction of partners' work statuses, woman's education, difference in partners' education, partners' income ratio, respondent's mother's employment status, opinion on maternal employment, marital status.

^b sample: parents of children aged 0-5. Model includes same controls as above, excluding partners' age difference and difference in partners' education.

^c sample: parents with at least one child aged 6 - 13. Model includes same controls as above.

complete model estimates available from the authors

source: GGS, own calculations, weighted to account for sampling design

Table 7: Odds of men contributing more to each childcare task, model 2

Odds ratios for eastern and western Germany vs. France for each age of the youngest child

	staying home when child sick ^a	playing with child ^a	helping child get dressed ^b	putting child to bed ^b	helping with homework ^c
age of the youngest child					
eastern Germany vs. France					
age 0-5	0.75	0.81	1.55 **	0.86	
age 6-10	0.53 *	0.97			
western Germany vs. France					
age 0-5	0.86	0.50 ***	1.19	1.05	
age 6-10	0.97	0.70 **			
sample: at least one child aged 6-13					
eastern Germany vs. France					0.97
western Germany vs. France					0.77 **
N	3500	3659	2344	2370	2727

* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

^a sample: parents of children aged 0-10. Model includes controls for number of children, women's age, partners' age difference, step-family status, respondent's sex, interaction of partners' work statuses, woman's education, difference in partners' education, partners' income ratio, respondent's mother's employment status, opinion on maternal employment, marital status.

^b sample: parents of children aged 0-5. Model includes same controls as above, excluding partners' age difference and difference in partners' education.

^c sample: parents with at least one child aged 6 - 13. Model includes same controls as above.

complete model estimates available from the authors

source: GGS, own calculations, weighted to account for sampling design

Appendix

Table A1: descriptive results for household tasks
Percentage of couples in which the task is usually or always carried out by the female partner, by both partners equally, or usually or always by the male partner

		France	eastern Germany	western Germany
cooking	woman	72%	62%	71%
	both	18%	32%	23%
	man	10%	6%	6%
	N	4,734	844	3,880
dishes	woman	50%	46%	59%
	both	37%	44%	34%
	man	13%	10%	7%
	N	4,566	825	3,824
vacuum cleaning	woman	61%	50%	58%
	both	28%	36%	31%
	man	11%	14%	10%
	N	4,441	834	3,768
grocery shopping	woman	50%	42%	50%
	both	39%	46%	41%
	man	11%	12%	8%
	N	4,738	847	3,897
repairs	woman	8%	4%	8%
	both	15%	13%	16%
	man	78%	83%	77%
	N	4,647	834	3,715
bills	woman	43%	39%	28%
	both	31%	36%	41%
	man	26%	25%	31%
	N	4,732	849	3,905
organizing social events	woman	26%	21%	20%
	both	68%	72%	73%
	man	6%	8%	6%
	N	4,723	845	3,886

source: GGS, own calculations (weighted), couples where woman is aged less than 60, excluding missing values

Table A2: descriptive results for childcare tasks
Percentage of couples in which the task is usually or always carried out by the female partner, by both partners equally, or usually or always by the male partner

		youngest child aged 0 - 10		
		France	eastern Germany	western Germany
staying home when child sick	woman	68%	73%	78%
	both	23%	23%	19%
	man	9%	4%	4%
	N	1,822	214	1,464
playing with the child	woman	22%	21%	39%
	both	68%	76%	59%
	man	9%	3%	2%
	N	1,973	218	1,468
		youngest child aged 0 - 5		
helping child get dressed	woman	66%	60%	75%
	both	32%	38%	22%
	man	2%	2%	2%
	N	1,281	150	913
putting child to bed	woman	41%	45%	47%
	both	52%	52%	47%
	man	7%	4%	6%
	N	1,301	152	917
		at least one child aged 6-13		
helping child with homework	woman	55%	51%	64%
	both	34%	42%	31%
	man	11%	7%	4%
	N	1,490	129	1,108

source: GGS, own calculations (weighted), couples where woman is aged less than 60, excluding missing values

Table A3: Odds of men contributing more to each household task, model 2

Sample including western Germany and France

age of the youngest child	cooking	dishes	vacuum cleaning	groceries	repairing	bills	social events
no children	1.34 *	1.05	1.08	0.97	0.50 ***	1.28 **	1.21
<i>age 0-2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>
age 3-5	1.28	1.05	0.85	0.84	0.93	1.05	0.88
age 6-10	1.10	1.00	0.87	0.72 ***	0.54 ***	1.03	0.91
age 11-13	1.00	0.74 *	0.66 **	0.42 ***	0.61 ***	1.01	0.91
age 14-17	0.90	0.82	0.61 ***	0.57 ***	0.66 **	0.87	0.82
age 18+	0.56 **	0.67 **	0.49 ***	0.56 ***	0.62 **	0.83	0.96
non-resident children only	0.81	0.77 *	0.56 ***	0.59 ***	0.60 ***	0.88	0.78
interaction age of the youngest child/ country							
(reference: France)							
w. Germany							
no children	1.22 *	0.74 ***	1.10	1.04	1.07	1.31 ***	1.11
age 0-2	1.54 **	0.70 **	1.15	0.88	0.79	1.41 ***	1.24
age 3-5	1.06	0.58 ***	1.07	0.88	0.80	1.55 ***	1.21
age 6-10	0.89	0.46 ***	0.88	0.88	1.39 **	1.58 ***	1.14
age 11-13	1.05	0.76	1.25	1.54 **	0.98	1.42 *	1.42 *
age 14-17	1.42	0.79	1.62 **	1.26	0.91	1.78 ***	1.80 ***
age 18+	2.32 ***	0.95	2.39 ***	1.36 *	1.03	1.61 ***	1.27
non-resident children only	1.38 **	1.07	2.20 ***	1.43 ***	1.19	1.34 ***	1.76 ***
number of children							
<i>1 child</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>
2 children	0.80 **	0.88 *	0.86 **	0.85 **	0.88	0.94	0.77 ***
3 children	0.84	0.81 **	0.89	0.86	0.87	0.91	0.74 ***
woman's age							
<30	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>
>=30, <40	1.13	1.06	0.81 **	0.78 ***	1.03	0.97	0.78 ***
>=40, <50	1.17	1.03	0.76 ***	0.87	1.16	1.02	0.65 ***
>=50, <60	1.01	1.04	0.71 ***	0.81 **	1.16	1.16	0.57 ***
age difference							
woman >=6y older	1.33 *	1.21	1.30	1.28 *	0.76 *	0.94	1.51 **
woman 3-5y older	1.14	0.91	1.16	1.14	0.89	0.89	1.16
<i>same age +/- 2y</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>
man 3-5y older	0.97	0.96	0.91	0.97	0.98	1.03	0.99
man >=6y older	1.11	1.10	1.00	1.22 ***	0.92	1.35 ***	1.03
missing	0.84	0.69	0.96	0.65	0.96	0.80	1.43
step-family							
<i>no</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>
yes	1.11	1.18 *	1.20 *	1.20 **	0.83 *	1.05	1.20 *
repondent's sex							
<i>female</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>
male	1.75 ***	1.80 ***	1.66 ***	1.92 ***	1.87 ***	1.64 ***	1.70 ***

table continued next page

Table A3 continued

	cooking	dishes	vacuum cleaning	groceries	repairing	bills	social events
interaction man's/ woman's work status							
man working							
<i>woman full-time</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>
woman part-time	0.68 ***	0.76 ***	0.73 ***	0.78 ***	0.90	0.95	0.87 *
woman not working	0.44 ***	0.43 ***	0.51 ***	0.77 ***	0.73 ***	1.07	0.89
man not working							
woman full-time	2.74 ***	2.13 ***	2.19 ***	1.97 ***	1.02	0.93	1.15
woman part-time	1.33 *	1.51 **	1.78 ***	1.27	0.81	0.87	0.97
woman not working	0.96	0.72 ***	0.97	1.43 ***	1.01	1.29 ***	1.12
woman's education							
<i>no vocational degree</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>
vocational degree	1.07	1.48 ***	1.22 **	0.75 ***	1.06	1.08	0.72 ***
tertiary	1.42 ***	2.24 ***	1.54 ***	0.84 **	1.04	1.65 ***	0.56 ***
in education	2.04 ***	2.94 ***	2.17 ***	1.51 ***	1.47 *	1.06	0.88
missing	1.81	2.17	1.09	0.34 *	1.20	0.64	0.36 *
education difference							
<i>same education</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>
man higher	0.99	1.25 ***	0.99	0.85 ***	1.11	1.31 ***	0.86 **
woman higher	1.02	0.85 **	1.02	0.97	1.18 *	0.59 ***	1.05
missing	0.94	0.92	0.52	1.50	1.75	1.94 **	1.23
income ratio woman/ man							
<i>0 - <25%</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>
25% - <50%	1.16	1.24 **	1.13	0.91	0.88	0.96	0.88
50% - <75%	1.47 ***	1.35 ***	1.42 ***	0.95	1.01	0.83 **	1.07
75% - <100%	1.54 ***	1.25 *	1.25	0.87	1.05	0.62 ***	1.00
100% - <125%	1.53 ***	1.53 ***	1.63 ***	1.17 *	1.03	0.66 ***	0.84 *
>=125%	1.72 ***	1.76 ***	1.83 ***	1.19 *	0.86	0.65 ***	0.73 ***
missing	1.29 **	1.07	1.07	0.80 **	0.71 ***	0.98	1.04
socialization: mothers' employment status							
<i>mother worked</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>
mother did not work	0.94	1.00	1.02	1.18 ***	1.09	1.09 *	1.06
missing	1.03	1.04	1.23 *	1.26 **	0.87	0.95	1.01
gender values: preschool child suffers if mother works							
<i>strongly agree</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>
agree	1.08	1.12	1.13	1.00	1.17 *	0.97	0.93
neither agree nor disagree	1.22 **	1.16	1.08	1.19 **	1.01	0.98	0.87
disagree	1.21 **	1.34 ***	1.24 **	1.17 **	1.09	1.00	0.97
strongly disagree	1.30 ***	1.34 ***	1.35 ***	1.34 ***	1.06	0.95	0.88
missing	1.32	1.45	1.82 **	1.11	1.46	1.25	0.80
partnership status							
<i>married</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>
cohabiting	1.73 ***	1.35 ***	1.01	1.23 ***	0.91	1.20 ***	1.07
N	8614	8390	8209	8635	8362	8637	8609

* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

source: GGS, own calculations, weighted to account for sampling design, couples where woman is aged less than 60, excluding missing values