Lone Mothers' Participation in Active Labor Market Programs in Germany

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Abstract

This study investigates determinants of lone mothers' participation in active labor market programs in Germany. In many countries, policy reforms in recent years have aimed at increasing lone mothers' employment rates. This study examines to what extent lone mothers in Germany, too, are increasingly addressed by labor market programs. As of yet, lone mothers in Germany have not been an explicit focus group of policy reforms to the same extent as for example in Great Britain, Norway, or the United States. However, a large proportion of lone mothers belong to the group of the long-term unemployed, for whom regulations for unemployment benefit receipt were significantly altered in 2005 in the course of the Hartz IV reforms. Efforts of reintegrating long-term unemployed persons into the labor market were increased, especially entailing assignments to labor market programs.

This study analyzes entries into labor market programs using large-scale administrative data. The method of analysis used is event-history analysis. A first research question compares lone mothers to parents in partnerships and lone fathers. Each of these population groups should in principle be confronted with the same difficulties organizing childcare. However, assumptions by case managers and unemployed parents themselves on gendered divisions of labor in the household may lead to strongly varying levels of program participation. Comparisons are also conducted by region. It is possible that differences in program participation by family type are smaller in eastern than in western Germany due to a better childcare infrastructure.

1. Introduction

This study investigates determinants of lone mothers' participation in active labor market programs in Germany and draws comparisons to other population groups. In many countries, policy reforms in recent years have aimed at increasing lone mothers' employment rates. This study examines to what extent lone mothers in Germany, too, are increasingly addressed by labor market programs. As of yet, lone mothers in Germany have not been an explicit focus group of policy reforms to the same extent as for example in Great Britain, Norway, or the United States. However, a large proportion of lone mothers belong to the group of the long-term unemployed, for whom regulations for unemployment benefit receipt were significantly altered in 2005 in the course of the Hartz IV reforms. Efforts of reintegrating long-term unemployed persons into the labor market were increased, especially entailing assignments to labor market programs.

This study analyzes entries into labor market programs using large-scale administrative data. The method of analysis used is event-history analysis. A first research question refers to comparisons between lone mothers and other population groups in terms of their participation in active labor market programs such as training programs, job subsidies, and so-called 'One-Euro-Jobs'. Lone mothers should in principle be confronted with the same difficulties organizing childcare as parents in partnerships or lone fathers. However, assumptions by case managers and unemployed parents themselves on gendered divisions of labor in the household may lead to strongly varying levels of program participation. The analyses in this study will show to what extent these differences persist after taking the number and age of children, own age, as well as the duration of benefit receipt, duration since the last regular employment, and level of education into account. Furthermore, comparisons will be drawn by region. It is possible that differences in program participation by family type are smaller in eastern than in western Germany due to a better childcare infrastructure.

The next section briefly discusses the nature of the labor market policy reform that took place in Germany in 2005. This is followed by a summary of international studies on labor market programs directed towards lone mothers. The research questions are then discussed in section 4. Section 5 describes the data and the method of analysis applied. In section 6, the empirical results are presented, followed by a conclusion in section 7.

2. The Hartz IV reform in Germany

Prior to 2005, unemployed persons in Germany first received unemployment benefit payments, followed by unemployment assistance if they remained unemployed for longer durations. Both unemployment benefit and unemployment assistance payments were income-related, but unemployment benefit was paid at a higher percentage of previous earnings than unemployment assistance. People who were not eligible for unemployment benefit or unemployment assistance payments often depended on means-tested welfare benefits if they were without a job.

In 2005, the former unemployment assistance for long-term unemployed persons and the welfare benefit were merged to form unemployment benefit II. Now, both long-term unemployed persons whose entitlement to the income-related unemployment benefit I has run out as well as those who did not contribute to unemployment insurance but are capable of working are eligible for the means-tested unemployment benefit II (Hohmeyer and Wolff 2007).

One of the main goals of the labor market reform was to reintegrate long-term unemployed persons into the labor market, both those who had previously received unemployment assistance, as well as previous welfare benefit recipients. On the one hand, this encompasses more pressure on benefit recipients to actively search for employment and accept available job offers. Benefits can be cut if job offers are not accepted. On the other hand, the reform also entails increased assignments to labor market programs, such as training programs, job creation schemes or job subsidies. Benefit recipients can also be sanctioned if they refuse to participate in labor market programs. Prior to the reform, labor market programs had been directed more strongly towards unemployment benefit and unemployment assistance recipients. Welfare benefit recipients much more seldom participated in labor market programs.

Lone mothers in western Germany depended on welfare benefits to a far greater degree than mothers with a partner (Konietzka and Kreyenfeld 2005). It is likely that many had interrupted their employment careers during their partnerships to take care of their children, and then had difficulties reentering employment after their partnership ended. Those who had not contributed to unemployment insurance for a long time were not eligible for unemployment benefit or unemployment assistance and thus received welfare payments. As welfare benefit recipients, they were not a focus group of most labor market programs, which were mainly directed towards unemployment benefit and unemployment assistance recipients.

After the labor market policy reform in 2005, their status was changed from welfare benefit recipient to unemployment benefit II recipients. As unemployment benefit II recipients, they in principle became a focus group of labor market programs.

In eastern Germany, on the other hand, lone mothers depended to a larger extent on unemployment benefit and unemployment assistance payments prior to 2005, and to a lesser extent on welfare benefit payments than in western Germany (Konietzka and Kreyenfeld 2005). Due to a better childcare infrastructure and possibly a higher work orientation, it appears they remained closer to the labor market than in western Germany. After 2005, those who had previously received unemployment assistance now also became unemployment benefit II recipients.

This study will examine for both eastern and western Germany whether lone mothers receiving unemployment benefit II participate in labor market programs to an extent comparable to that of other population groups. Although many, especially in western Germany, became newly eligible for labor market programs, barriers to participation are still likely to exist. In western Germany, day care provision for children aged less than three is particularly low. In recent years, efforts have been made to improve the childcare infrastructure. However, day care provision rates so far have only increased from 2% in 2002 to 10% in 2008 (Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder 2009; Statistisches Bundesamt 2004). In eastern Germany, day care spaces are available for children aged less than 3 at a much higher rate than in western Germany, at 38% in 2008. For children aged 3-6, kindergarten attendance is generally quite high in both eastern and western Germany at around 90%. However, only 20% attend kindergarten on a full-day basis in western Germany, compared to 63% in eastern Germany.

Thus, inadequate availability of childcare is likely to be an important barrier to both employment and to program participation, especially in western Germany. However, parents in partnerships, as well as lone fathers, should be confronted with the same problems organizing childcare as lone mothers. Due to assumptions about gendered divisions of labor in the household held by case managers as well as benefit recipients themselves, differences in rates of program participation may none-the-less occur.

Parents responsible for caring for children aged less than 3 are generally not considered to be available for employment and do not need to accept job offers. Those responsible for caring for children older than 3 are only considered to be available for employment in as far as adequate childcare arrangements are available (Sozialgesetzbuch, Zweites Buch 2003). Those considered to be unavailable for employment are also likely to be

considered unavailable for program participation. Thus, program participation rates of parents of young children can generally be expected to be lower than those of childless unemployment benefit II recipients.

Another group that, next to welfare benefit recipients, was largely excluded from labor market program participation prior to 2005 consisted of family members of unemployment assistance recipients who were not receiving unemployment assistance themselves. A goal of the reform was to more strongly focus on activating all members of households depending on benefit payments. Each member of a benefit recipient household now has the status of unemployment benefit II recipient, and all household members aged 15 or above who are not participating in education are in principle eligible for program participation. Thus, it will be interesting to compare mothers and childless women with partners to lone mothers and childless single women, to see whether partnership status really has become irrelevant for program participation.

In 2005, many of the labor market programs previously available to unemployment insurance benefit recipients were extended to unemployment benefit II recipients. These for example include job creation schemes, job subsidies, and training measures. Additional employment programs were created exclusively for unemployment benefit II recipients, most prominently the 'job opportunities', the most common variant of which is popularly referred to as 'One-Euro-Jobs'. The requirement for One-Euro-Jobs is that the job needs to have been created in addition to previously existing jobs, so as not to replace regular employees, and to produce goods of public utility. One-Euro-Job participants receive 1 – 2 Euros an hour in addition to their regular benefit as a compensation for added expenses. One-Euro-Jobs are intended to help long-term unemployed persons regain basic job skills and to become accustomed to a regular work schedule. They are also sometimes used as a work test to check benefit recipients' availability for employment (Hohmeyer and Wolff 2007). In regions with high levels of unemployment and very low employment chances, they can also be used as a substitute for regular employment to maintain job skills. This study will focus on One-Euro-Jobs, job subsidies, as well as class-room and in-firm training schemes, comparing participation rates between population groups.

3. Labor market policy reforms directed towards lone mothers in international comparison

In several countries, labor market policy reforms have taken place in recent years focusing especially on increasing lone parents' employment rates. As described above, the labor market reform that took place in Germany by contrast was not directed explicitly towards lone mothers. However, lone mothers were formerly strongly overrepresented within the group of welfare benefit recipients, and thus are likely to be particularly affected by the reform. One main element of the reform consisted of an extension of labor market programs, such as job subsidies and training programs, to former welfare benefit recipients. In other countries, increased assignments to labor market programs seem to play less of a central role in recent labor market policy reforms. Instead, the focus appears to be more on increasing work incentives, introducing activity requirements or time limits for benefit receipt, or increasing support for childcare expenses.

In Norway, for instance, a reform of benefits for lone parents was introduced in 1998 that limited the duration of receipt to 3 years (Mogstad and Pronzato 2008). In addition, activity requirements were introduced for lone parents of children aged 3 or above. In order to continue receiving the benefit, lone parents had to work for at least 50% of full-time hours or enroll in education. Simultaneously, the maximum benefit level was raised and an additional supplement for lone parents of children under 3 years of age was introduced. Benefit receipt could also be prolonged for two years by participating in education. Mogstad and Pronzato (2008) find the reform to have had a significant positive effect on the earnings of lone mothers whose youngest child was 3 - 9 years old, to have significantly reduced their poverty rate, but not to have had much effect on their participation rate in education. For lone mothers of a youngest child aged less than 3, the reform was not found to have had any effect on earnings, but to have strongly reduced their poverty rate and increased their rate of participation in education. The effects of the reform were found to strongly vary with lone mothers' characteristics as well. The positive effect of the reform on lone mothers' earnings was found to apply only to those with low levels of education. The positive effect on participation in education relates only to younger lone mothers. The reduction in poverty rates caused by the reform is also somewhat greater for lone mothers with low levels of education.

In Great Britain, the Working Families' Tax Credit (WFTC) was introduced in 1999, which replaced previous programs supplementing low earnings for working parents (Dilnot and McCrae 2000; Rake 2001). An important element of this reform was a strong cut-back in

the benefit reduction rate, leading to greater work incentives for low income parents. Relatively high levels of financial support for childcare costs were also introduced. Other low-level benefits have however remained available for non-working lone parents. Activity requirements to receive these have remained comparatively mild, and time limits were not introduced. Findings have been of quite strong positive effects of the reform on lone mothers' employment rates (Francesconi and van der Klaauw 2007). These employment effects have been attributed especially to the childcare credit element of the reform. Reductions in child poverty rates have also been related to the introduction of WFTC (Brewer et al. 2005). Francesconi and van der Klaauw (2007) also report differences in effects by the age and number of lone mothers' children. Employment effects were especially strong for lone mothers of one pre-school-aged child, while no effects were found for lone mothers with several older children.

In the United States, a reform of lone parent benefits was introduced as well in 1996. The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefit was replaced by Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). Like in Norway, this reform encompassed time limits for the receipt of the benefit. Activity requirements also became stricter. Benefit reduction rates were also lowered in many states, which implies an earnings incentive. At the same time, childcare funds were increased. Initial findings showed positive effects on lone mothers' employment and earnings, as well as of a reduction in poverty rates (Moffitt 2008). It has sometimes been questioned though whether the reform would have had these same impacts under less favorable economic conditions. Some studies have also found that the reform had a negative effect on incomes at the bottom of the income distribution.

Increases in lone mothers' employment and earnings occurred in Canada to almost the same extent as in the United States across the 1980s and 1990s (Myles et al. 2007). In Canada, like in the United States, reforms aiming at increasing lone mothers' employment rates were introduced in many provinces in the 1990s. These however varied strongly across provinces and were often not as extensive as in the United States. In some provinces benefits became more restrictive, and in others childcare support was improved. The benefit reduction rate of a federal benefit was also reduced, thus enhancing employment incentives. However, Myles et al. (2007) find that, in contrast to the United States, increases in lone mothers' employment and earnings in Canada were due almost completely to compositional changes within the group of lone mothers. The authors name the aging of the baby-boom cohorts as the most important demographic trend leading to higher average employment rates and earnings among Canadian lone mothers. Members of these cohorts are on average better

educated, have fewer children, and were older when their children were born than previous generations of lone mothers. These characteristics were found to be associated with higher earnings, which on average rose again when the baby-boom cohorts entered their 40s in the 1990s. For the United States by contrast, compositional changes were not found to explain all of the increase in lone mothers' employment rates and earnings. Increases in employment occurred mainly for lone mothers under 30 years of age in the United States, while increases were greatest for lone mothers aged over 40 in Canada and appear to be related strongly to changes in the educational composition of lone mothers in this age group. For younger lone mothers in Canada, small reform effects may have occurred as well, but this was found to explain very little of the total average increases in employment and earnings among Canadian lone mothers.

4. Research Questions

A first research question refers to the extent to which lone mothers' rates of entry into active labor market programs are lower than for other population groups due to actual or perceived difficulties organizing childcare. Compared to women who are childless singles, lone mothers' rates of participation may be substantially lower. This is likely to be the case if case managers at employment offices respect actual difficulties that lone mothers are confronted with in organizing childcare. Case managers may however also perceive lone mothers to be generally unavailable for employment and to some extent indiscriminately exclude them from program participation. Differences in rates of participation between lone mothers and mothers with partners are more difficult to predict. On the one hand, mothers in a partnership may share responsibility for organizing childcare with their partner and for that reason be better able to participate in active labor market programs. On the other hand, case managers may often assume a traditional division of labor to exist in two-parent families and seldom seek to enroll unemployed mothers with a partner in active labor market programs. This could lead to lower rates of program participation among mothers with partners than among lone mothers, who may more often be assumed to be responsible for providing for their household's income by means of their own employment. Lone fathers may also be an interesting group for comparison. Lone fathers are in principle in the same situation as lone mothers and should be confronted with the same difficulties in organizing childcare. None-the-less, perceptions of gender roles held by lone mothers and fathers themselves as well as by case managers at

employment offices may let lone fathers appear to be more employable than lone mothers. Therefore active labor market program participation rates may be higher for lone fathers than for lone mothers.

Further research questions address comparisons of participation rates in different types of active labor market programs. Here, the question is whether lone mothers' participation rates are higher relative to other population groups in some types of active labor market programs than in others.

It is possible that lone mothers will participate relatively more frequently in short-term classroom training programs than in other programs, since these should be the least in conflict with childcare constraints. Previous research has, however, shown that in-firm training programs are related to higher subsequent employment probabilities than classroom training programs (Wolff and Jozwiak 2007). Thus, the question is to what extent lone mothers' participation patterns in active labor market programs can be interpreted as being guided more strongly by childcare constraints than by efforts to reduce employment obstacles.

One-Euro-Jobs have been found to be more effective for women than for men in terms of raising subsequent employment rates, especially for western German women who have not been employed for a longer period of time (Hohmeyer and Wolff 2007). To the extent that this applies to the subgroup of lone mothers as well, studying rates of entry into One-Euro-Jobs for lone mothers compared to other population groups may be of particular interest.

Job subsidies have been found to be related to significantly higher subsequent employment rates (Bernhard et al. 2008). However, since they are often directly connected to longer-term subsequent employment prospects, participation may be especially difficult for lone mothers who do not have access to adequate childcare provision.

Separate analyses for eastern and western Germany will be conducted. The expectation is that lone mothers' program participation rates relative to other population groups should be higher in eastern than in western Germany. This is because the better childcare infrastructure in eastern Germany should make program participation easier than in western Germany. In addition, lone mothers as well as case manager in employment offices may hold less traditional views on maternal employment in eastern than in western Germany.

In the empirical analyses, models will include control variables for the age of the youngest child, the number of children, benefit recipients' own age, as well as employment and benefit history and level of education. The expectation is that the age of the youngest child will have a positive effect on program participation rates, that the number of children will have a negative effect, and that those who have not held a regular job for a long duration

of time as well as those with a longer history of benefit recipiency will have higher labor market program participation rates.

5. Data and Method

Analyses are conducted using administrative data from the German Federal Employment Agency. The data used was prepared and anonymized for scientific use by the department for IT Services and Information Management of the Institute for Employment Research. The data on unemployment, job search, program participation, and benefit receipt originates from employment offices, while data on contributory employment originates from notifications sent by employers to health and pension insurance funds. The data sets used for the following analyses are the Integrated Employment Biography data set and the Unemployment Benefit II History data set. In addition to individual-level information on times of benefit receipt, regular employment, and labor market program participation, this data also gives information on individuals' age, place of residence, sex, disability, nationality, and to some extent level of education. Furthermore, since unemployment benefit II is a household-level benefit, corresponding data for other household members is available for the group of unemployment benefit II recipients.

The time period covered by the analyses runs from 1 October 2005 to 31 December 2007. For these preliminary analyses, a random sample was used of 1/17 of all those who received unemployment benefit II for at least one day, were of employable age, and were not incapable of employment due to a disability or similar reasons. The very large number of benefit recipients would have made it impractical to use the complete sample for preliminary analyses. For the final analyses, however, the complete sample will be used.

The method of analysis used is event-history analysis. The dependent variable is the risk of entering a given labor market program. People are considered to be at risk of entering a labor market program when they at the same time receive unemployment benefit II, are not regularly employed, and not already participating in any type of labor market program. For these analyses, only the first risk period starting after the beginning of the observation window, that is, after the 1st of October 2005, is used for each individual.

Entries into four selected types of programs are studied here. These are One-Euro-Jobs, employment subsidies, in-firm training, and class-room training. Separate hazard models are estimated for entries into each of these programs. Episodes are censored at the end

of the observation window, that is at the 31st December 2007, as well as when individuals are no longer at risk of program participation. Individuals leave the risk group when they take up regular employment, no longer receive unemployment benefit II, or enter a different program.

The main independent variable of interest in these analyses is the population group variable. This variable allows comparisons between lone parents' transition rates into labor market programs and those of other population groups. The population group variable includes the categories *lone mothers, lone fathers, single women, single men, women with a partner and children, men with a partner and children, women with a partner and no children, men with a partner and no children, girls aged 15-17, boys aged 15-17, single childless women age 18-24 living with their parents, single childless men aged 18-24 living with their parents, women in other types of households with children, men in other types of households with children, women in other types of households without children, and men in other types of households without children*. These population group specifications are partially pre-defined in the data as a result of eligibility rules for the receipt of different levels of unemployment benefit II.

Further control variables used in the analyses are the age of the youngest child, the number of children, individuals' own age, time period, previous cumulative duration of unemployment benefit II receipt without regular employment or program participation, as well as the duration since the last unsubsidized contributory job. It is possible that the number and age of children is systematically different for lone parents compared to parents with a partner, such that it is important to standardize for these variables when comparing risks of program participation across population groups. Many programs, such as One-Euro-Jobs, are especially intended to help reintegrate persons who have not been employed for a long period of time into employment. Assignments to programs may also depend on individuals' history of benefit receipt. It is possible that individuals' employment and benefit history vary systematically with their population group, for which reason these variables are controlled for as well.

The variable for level of education is somewhat problematic. It is available only for those who have ever been registered as searching for a job. In some population groups, however, a relatively high percentage of individuals have never registered as searching for a job. Apart from children and young adults living with their parents as well as those in the 'other' groups, this is especially the case for women with a partner, both without and with children. In these last two groups, 9% - 10% never registered as searching for a job and for that reason have missing values for education. These missings cannot be assumed to be

random; it is likely that job search status is correlated with individuals' level of education. To never-the-less gain an impression of the impact of education on transitions into programs, additional analyses were conducted restricting the sample only to those who had ever searched for a job.

6. Results

6.1 Entries into One-Euro-Jobs

The estimation results in Table 1 for model 1 show that lone mothers have lower transition rates into One-Euro-Jobs than single women. This corresponds to the expectation that participating in One-Euro-Jobs may often be difficult for lone mothers due to problems organizing childcare. In eastern Germany, lone mothers' transition rates into One-Euro-Jobs are 77% as high as those of single women. In western Germany, they are 61% as high. Lower levels of program participation relative to single women in western than in eastern Germany were expected on account of the comparatively low levels of public childcare provision in western Germany.

Difficulties organizing childcare may also be the explanation for differences in transition rates into One-Euro-Jobs between women in partnerships with and without children. The results for model 1 show that in eastern Germany, transition rates for mothers in partnerships are 68% as high as those of women in partnerships without children (0.64/0.94=0.68). In western Germany, transition rates for mothers in partnerships are 45% as high as those of women in partnerships without children.

In western Germany, lone fathers have lower transition rates into One-Euro-Jobs than single men, as was correspondingly found to be the case for lone mothers. Thus it seems that lone fathers to some extent face similar childcare obstacles to One-Euro-Job participation as do lone mothers in western Germany. For lone fathers in eastern Germany, by contrast, transition rates into One-Euro-Jobs are on a similar level as those of single men.

Partnership status also seems to play an important role for participation in One-Euro-Jobs. Both among childless men and women in western Germany, having a partner is related to lower transition rates into One-Euro-Jobs. In eastern Germany, this is only the case to a significant degree for men, but not for women. Parents with a partner also seem to have lower transition rates into One-Euro-Jobs than lone parents, both in eastern and western Germany.

This is particularly the case for western Germany mothers, where transition rates into One-Euro-Jobs for mothers with a partner are only 46% as high as for lone mothers. A hypothesis had been that traditional views on the division of labor in the household, held both by caseworkers as well as benefit recipients themselves, would lead to lower One-Euro-Job participation by women in partnerships than for women without a partner. A similar relationship had not, however, been expected for men. The empirical results seem to indicate that the household context is indeed taken into account when individuals are assigned to One-Euro-Jobs, but not necessarily in a gender-specific way. An exception may be mothers in western Germany where the effect is particularly strong, perhaps indicating an interaction between partnership and motherhood status.

In model 2, variables for the age of the youngest child and the number of children are added. The results for model 2 show that comparisons between childless groups and those with children depend strongly on which age of the youngest child and number of children is chosen for comparison. The reference group in models 2 for the age of the youngest child is age 3-5, and the reference group for number of children is 1 child. The results for model 2 show that for lone mothers in eastern Germany with this number and age of children, transition rates into One-Euro-Jobs are no lower than those of single women without children. The lower transition rates found for lone mothers in model 1 appear to relate only to those with very young children aged 0-2. In western Germany, however, transition rates into One-Euro-Jobs are still lower for lone mothers with a youngest child aged 3-5 than for single women without children.

For childless men and women in western Germany, the results for models 2 and 3 still indicate that having a partner is related to lower transition rates into One-Euro-Jobs. By contrast, the control variables added in models 2 and 3 explain the partnership effect found in model 1 for fathers in western Germany. The largest partnership effects continue to exist for mothers in western Germany. In eastern Germany, there is still no partnership effect for childless women, and a very small effect remains for childless men. For fathers and mothers in eastern Germany, small partnership effects remain in models 2 and 3.

Across all family statuses, women are found to have lower transition rates into One-Euro-Jobs than men. The one exception is women and men in childless couples in eastern Germany, whose transition rates into One-Euro-Jobs are the same.

Altogether, in eastern Germany, lone mothers with a youngest child aged 3-5 have quite high transition rates into One-Euro-Jobs compared to other groups of women. Their transition rates are the same as for childless women with and without a partner, and are

slightly higher than those of mothers with a partner. In western Germany, transition rates into One-Euro-Jobs for lone mothers with a youngest child aged 3-5 are at an intermediate level. They are lower than for childless single women, but much higher than those of mothers with a partner, and at about the same level as those of childless women with a partner. Both in eastern and in western Germany, the age of the youngest child has a strong effect, with much lower transition rates into One-Euro-Jobs for those with a youngest child aged 0-2.

6.2 Entries into Job Subsidies

Table 2 shows estimation results for determinants of entries into job subsidies. Job subsidies are generally less frequent than 1-Euro-Jobs, as indicated by the estimates for the baseline hazard. Altogether, differences between men's and women's transition rates into job subsidies seem to be greater than was the case for One-Euro-Jobs. Possibly, job subsidies are more frequently offered for male-dominated occupations.

In western Germany, lone mothers' entry rates into job subsidies are again at an intermediate level compared to other groups of women, as was the case for One-Euro-Jobs. The results for model 3 for western Germany show that for lone mothers of a youngest child aged 3-5, transition rates into One-Euro-Jobs are higher than for women in partnerships with and without children, but lower than for single women without children. In eastern Germany, transition rates into job subsidies are likewise lower for lone mothers than for single women without children, and at the same level as for women in partnerships with and without children.

Men in partnerships have higher transition rates into job subsidies than men without a partner, both among men with and without children. For women, the finding is the opposite. Those in partnerships have lower transition rates into job subsidies than those without a partner, with the exception of mothers in eastern Germany where transition rates do not vary by partnership status. These findings of a gender-specific partnership effect seem to support the hypothesis that program participation is influenced by traditional views on gendered divisions of labor in the household, which may be held by case workers at employment offices and/ or benefit recipients themselves. The findings for One-Euro-Jobs described in the previous section, on the other hand, did not support this hypothesis.

A further hypothesis was that differences between lone mothers' and single women's entry rates into job subsidies would be greater than in the case of One-Euro-Jobs. The

background for this expectation was that job subsidies are often connected to longer-term employment perspectives, making long-term childcare arrangements necessary. Surprisingly, this hypothesis is supported for eastern Germany, but not for western Germany, even though the childcare infrastructure is better developed in eastern Germany. It should however be noted that participation rates in job subsidies are substantially higher in absolute terms in eastern than in western Germany.

6.3 Entries into classroom and in-firm training

Class-room training is the only of the four measures studied here where entry rates are found to be higher for lone mothers than for lone fathers (Table 3). For singles, transition rates into class-room training are approximately equal for men and women. Findings differ between eastern and western Germany for people in partnerships. In eastern Germany, mothers and fathers with a partner have about equal transition rates into classroom training. Childless women in eastern Germany with a partner have higher transition rates into classroom training than childless men with a partner. In western Germany, men with a partner have higher transition rates into classroom training than women with a partner, both among those with and without children.

Lone mothers appear to have intermediate to high transition rates into classroom training compared to other groups of women. The expectation had been that lone mothers' transition rates into classroom training relative to single women would be higher than in the case of other labor market programs. Class-room training programs are usually of relatively short duration compared to other programs, such that childcare may be easier to arrange. Lone mothers' relative transition rates into class-room training compared to single women do seem to be higher than in the case of in-firm training, both in eastern and western Germany. In eastern Germany, these relative transition rates are also higher for classroom training than for job subsidies, and are at a similar level for classroom training as for One-Euro-Jobs. In western Germany, on the other hand, there is little difference in lone mothers' transition rates relative to single women across One-Euro-Jobs, job subsidies, and classroom training.

With respect to classroom training, there is only partial support for the hypothesis that partnership status impacts program assignments via traditional expectations held by case managers or benefit recipients concerning gendered divisions of labor in the household. While the finding of a negative partnership effect for mothers and a positive partnership effect for

fathers supports this hypothesis, the negative partnership effect for both men and women among those who are childless does not.

In contrast to classroom training programs, in-firm training programs are usually of longer duration. The results in Table 4 show that while transition rates into in-firm training are approximately equal for single men and women, women's transition rates into in-firm training are substantially lower than men's among lone parents, parents in partnerships, as well as childless people in partnerships, both in eastern and western Germany. The hypothesis of a negative partnership effect for women and a positive partnership for men is also largely supported.

Transition rates into in-firm training are substantially lower for lone mothers than for single women in both eastern and western Germany. The difference in transition rates between lone mothers and single women is greater than for any of the other three programs studied here. Thus, it appears that in-firm training programs are especially difficult to combine with childcare responsibilities. Transition rates into in-firm training are similarly low for mothers in partnerships in eastern Germany, and even lower for mothers in partnerships than for lone mothers in western Germany. Transition rates are somewhat higher for childless women with a partner than for lone mothers in eastern Germany, and at about the same level as for lone mothers in western Germany.

6.4 Effects of education

As described in the methods section, the education variable could only be used for the subsample of those who had ever registered as searching for a job. Table 5 shows estimates for this subsample for entries into One-Euro-Jobs. As can be seen in Table 5, benefit recipients with higher levels of education generally seem to have lower transition rates into One-Euro-Jobs. Adding education to the model does not, however, appear to substantially alter the results. Further models were also run for the other three types of labor market programs examined here. Adding education to the model did not substantially alter the results for these programs either.

7. Summary

This study has examined participation in labor market programs by recipients of the means-tested unemployment benefit II in Germany, focusing on lone mothers. Using large-scale administrative data, transitions into four different programs types, One-Euro-Jobs, job subsidies, classroom training, and in-firm training are analyzed. The empirical findings show that lone mothers' transition rates into these four labor market programs often appear to rank at an intermediate level compared to other groups of women. In western Germany, lone mothers' rates of transition into labor market programs are generally higher than those of mothers in a partnership, but lower than those of single women without children. In eastern Germany, this pattern is not as consistent. For lone mothers of a youngest child aged 3-5 in eastern Germany, transition rates into One-Euro-Jobs as well as into classroom training are even at the same level as for single women without children. On the other hand, eastern German lone mothers' transition rates into job subsidies and in-firm training are no higher than for mothers with a partner.

The finding that lone mothers' transition rates into One-Euro-Jobs and classroom training in eastern Germany as well as into all four labor market programs types in western Germany are higher than those of mothers with a partner could be indicative of an influence of traditional views on the division of labor in the household on program participation. Case workers in employment offices as well as benefit recipients themselves could expect that in partnerships, men have greater responsibility for improving their employment prospects by participating in labor market programs. This should lead to higher program participation rates for men in partnerships than for single men and to lower labor market program participation rates for women in partnerships than for single women. In some cases, a negative partnership effect for women on transition rates into programs is indeed mirrored by a positive partnership effect for men. This is the case for job subsidies and in-firm training. In other cases, however, negative partnership effects are found for men as well. This is the case among childless men for One-Euro-Jobs and classroom training. Whenever negative partnership effects appear for both men and women, this does not seem to be reflective of assumptions of a traditional division of labor in the household. Instead, it is possible that couples are to some extent seen to share the responsibility for participating in labor market programs, leading to lower individual participation rates.

While lone mothers' transition rates into labor market programs are in the majority of cases higher than for mothers with partners, lone mothers usually have lower transition rates

into programs than single woman. This is likely to be due to childcare constraints, which can be expected to be an obstacle to program participation for lone mothers. Differences in transition rates into programs between single women and lone mothers are generally larger in western than in eastern Germany, reflecting differences in the childcare infrastructure between the two parts of Germany.

Differences between single women's and lone mothers' transition rates are especially large for in-firm training, and in eastern Germany also for job subsidies. Possibly, participation in these types of programs is the least compatible with childcare responsibilities. However, in-firm training and job subsidies have in previous studies been found to lead to substantially improved employment prospects. One-Euro-Jobs and class-room training, on the other hand, have only been found to lead to small improvements of employment prospects. Thus, it appears that for lone mothers, participation in those types of programs is most difficult that could be most effective in improving their employment chances. Long-term childcare arrangements may be necessary in order for lone mothers to participate in in-firm training and job subsidies, since these programs are often directly connected to transitions into regular employment. Thus, it may be important to make childcare spaces available to lone mothers on a long-term basis, even for those who are not yet regularly employed.

While lone fathers have lower transition rates into classroom and in-firm training programs than single men, their transition rates into job subsidies are higher than those of single men. Thus, it appears that lone fathers must have found some childcare arrangements allowing them to take advantage of job subsidies. Lone mothers' lower participation rates in job subsidies than single women's may therefore not be related to difficulties organizing childcare alone. Perhaps lone fathers, to a greater degree than lone mothers, are held to be particularly responsible for providing for their children, and are thus assigned to the program type that has proved to be especially advantageous.

Altogether, lone mothers' relatively high transition rates into labor market programs compared to mothers with partners could be evaluated positively, to the extent that labor market program participation helps them to improve their employment prospects and thereby the economic situation of their families. On the other hand, it is also possible that lone mothers, who cannot rely on a partner to share childcare responsibilities with, perceive program participation as particularly stressful, especially when public childcare is not available to an adequate degree. That would make their comparatively high program participation rates appear more problematic.

Table1: Entries into 1-Euro-Jobs - Hazard ratios

	eastern Germany			western Germany		
	model 1	model 2	model 3	model 1	model 2	model 3
baseline (months)						
0 - 5	0,00077 ***	0,00050 ***	0,00015 ***	0,00093 ***	0,00061 ***	0,00026 ***
6 - 11	0,00049 ***	0,00032 ***	0,00010 ***	0,00057 ***	0,00038 ***	0,00016 ***
12 - 17	0,00067 ***	0,00043 ***	0,00013 ***	0,00067 ***	0,00044 ***	0,00019 ***
18 - 23	0,00049 ***	0,00032 ***	0,00010 ***	0,00053 ***	0,00035 ***	0,00015 ***
24 - 29	0,00058 ***	0,00037 ***	0,00011 ***	0,00058 ***	0,00038 ***	0,00016 ***
30+	0,00070 ***	0,00051 ***	0,00015 ***	0,00044 ***	0,00030 ***	0,00013 ***
population group						
lone mothers	0,77 ***	1,05	1,00	0,61 ***	0,74 ***	0,72 ***
lone fathers	1,23 *	1,33 **	1,23 *	1,16 *	1,13	1,05
single women						
single men	1,17 ***	1,20 ***	1,17 ***	1,33 ***	1,34 ***	1,24 ***
mothers with a partner	0,64 ***	0,88 *	0,87 **	0,28 ***	0,39 ***	0,40 ***
fathers with a partner	0,77 ***	1,04	1,06	0,79 ***	1,06	1,03
childless women w. partner	0,94	0,94	0,96	0,62 ***	0,63 ***	0,68 ***
childless men w. partner	0,91 **	0,97	1,01	0,91 ***	1,00	1,03
girls age 15-17	0,02 ***	0,06 ***	0,07 ***	0,07 ***	0,14 ***	0,15 ***
boys age 15-17	0,04 ***	0,12 ***	0,14 ***	0,13 ***	0,27 ***	0,29 ***
women 18-24 in parent hh	0,49 ***	0,45 ***	0,45 ***	0,63 ***	0,48 ***	0,46 ***
men 18-24 in parent hh	0,58 ***	0,53 ***	0,52 ***	0,91 *	0,70 ***	0,65 ***
women in other hh w. children	0,46 ***	0,66 **	0,69 *	0,49 ***	0,59 ***	0,61 ***
men in other hh w. children	0,59	0,74	0,80	0,68 *	0,77	0,78
women in other hh no children	0,98	1,12	1,06	0,68 **	0,73 *	0,69 **
men in other hh no children	1,02	1,29	1,20	0,37 **	0,49 *	0,49 *
# children < 18						
1						
2		1,08	1,07		0,90 ***	0,90 ***
3		1,18 **	1,16 *		0,91 *	0,91 *
4+		1,34 **	1,33 **		0,89	0,88 *
age youngest child						
0 - 2		0,33 ***	0,38 ***		0,45 ***	0,49 ***
3 - 5						
6 - 9		0,93	0,92		1,04	1,04

	10 - 14	1,06		1,05		1,10	**	1,13	***
	15 - 17	0,99		1,00		1,21	***	1,25	***
age									
	<=17	0,46	**	0,70		0,63	***	0,85	
	18 - 24	1,95	***	2,28	***	1,80	***	1,90	***
	25 - 29								
	30 - 34	1,17	***	1,10	*	1,05		0,99	
	35 - 39	1,49	***	1,30	***	1,16	***	1,05	
	40 - 44	1,54	***	1,31	***	1,32	***	1,16	***
	45 - 49	1,70	***	1,41	***	1,47	***	1,27	***
	50 - 54	1,72	***	1,40	***	1,43	***	1,24	***
	55 - 59	1,48	***	1,25	***	1,04		0,95	
	60 - 64	0,23	***	0,24	***	0,20	***	0,22	***
calendar time									
	oct-dec 05								
	jan-jun 06	1,13	**	1,16	***	1,34	***	1,34	***
	jul-dec 06	0,89	**	0,95		1,14	***	1,11	***
	jan-jun 07	0,84	***	0,91		1,13	***	1,10	**
	jul-dec 07	0,63	***	0,70	***	0,92	**	0,90	**
cumulative previous UBII without job or program									
0 months									
>0 - 3 months				2,68	***			2,37	***
>3-6 months				2,59	***			2,33	***
> 6-12 months				2,07	***			2,07	***
>12 months				2,17	***			2,43	***
duration since last unsubsidized job									
0 months									
>0 - 6 months				1,16	**			1,18	***
>6 - 12 months				1,81	***			1,71	***
>1 - 2 years				2,10	***			1,78	***
>2 - 5 years				2,13	***			1,70	***
>5 years				2,17	***			1,73	***
never employed				1,56	***			1,45	***

Table 2: entries into job subsidies – Hazard ratios

	eastern Germany						western Germany					
	model 1		model 2		model 3		model 1		model 2		model 3	
baseline (months)												
0 - 5	0,00046	***	0,00060	***	0,00071	***	0,00024	***	0,00023	***	0,00020	***
6 - 11	0,00016	***	0,00021	***	0,00025	***	0,00010	***	0,00010	***	0,00009	***
12 - 17	0,00015	***	0,00020	***	0,00024	***	0,00009	***	0,00008	***	0,00007	***
18 - 23	0,00011	***	0,00014	***	0,00016	***	0,00006	***	0,00005	***	0,00005	***
24 - 29	0,00014	***	0,00018	***	0,00022	***	0,00010	***	0,00009	***	0,00008	***
30+	0,00009	***	0,00013	***	0,00017	***	0,00006	***	0,00006	***	0,00005	***
population group												
lone mothers	0,64	***	0,62	***	0,63	***	0,79	***	0,73	***	0,79	**
lone fathers	1,48		1,37		1,30		2,02	***	1,62	**	1,50	**
single women												
single men	1,13		1,01		0,96		1,48	***	1,36	***	1,29	***
mothers with a partner	0,58	***	0,61	***	0,65	***	0,26	***	0,27	***	0,32	***
fathers with a partner	1,58	***	1,78	***	1,58	***	2,00	***	2,07	***	1,91	***
childless women w. partner	0,56	***	0,66	***	0,69	***	0,42	***	0,44	***	0,51	***
childless men w. partner	1,10		1,38	***	1,23	**	1,57	***	1,67	***	1,60	***
girls age 15-17	0,00		0,00		0,00		0,01	***	0,07	**	0,07	*
boys age 15-17	0,01	***	0,53		0,53		0,01	***	0,13	*	0,14	*
women 18-24 in parent hh	0,44	***	0,42	***	0,52	**	0,24	***	0,29	***	0,37	***
men 18-24 in parent hh	0,43	***	0,41	***	0,49	***	0,63	***	0,77		0,94	
women in other hh w. children	0,73		0,76		0,75		0,57	**	0,55	**	0,60	*
men in other hh w. children	3,00	**	3,10	**	2,51	**	1,30		1,24		1,25	
women in other hh no children	1,16		1,27		1,26		1,00		1,02		0,98	
men in other hh no children	0,00		0,00		0,00		0,87		1,35		1,33	
# children < 18												
1												
2			0,83	*	0,88				0,88	*	0,88	*
3			0,40	***	0,44	***			0,81	**	0,84	*
4+			0,69		0,82				0,58	***	0,62	***
age youngest child												
0 - 2			0,54	***	0,49	***			0,66	***	0,65	***

3 - 5							
6 - 9	1,00		0,99		0,98		1,00	
10 - 14	1,05		1,08		1,10		1,11	
15 - 17	1,13		1,14		1,42	***	1,39	***
age								
<=17	0,01	*	0,03		0,07	***	0,16	*
18 - 24	0,75	***	0,98		0,64	***	0,81	***
25 - 29								
30 - 34	1,01		1,00		1,03		1,00	
35 - 39	0,92		0,95		1,02		0,99	
40 - 44	0,77	***	0,81	**	0,95		0,93	
45 - 49	0,55	***	0,61	***	0,87	**	0,89	*
50 - 54	0,50	***	0,57	***	0,81	***	0,87	*
55 - 59	0,36	***	0,43	***	0,49	***	0,56	***
60 - 64	0,09	***	0,11	***	0,14	***	0,18	***
calendar time								
oct-dec 05								
jan-jun 06	1,24	*	1,22	*	1,42	***	1,38	***
jul-dec 06	1,00		1,00		1,32	***	1,28	***
jan-jun 07	1,08		1,04		1,48	***	1,42	***
jul-dec 07	0,99		0,97		1,18	*	1,14	
cumulative previous UBII without job or program								
0 months								
>0 - 3 months			0,87				1,21	***
>3-6 months			0,85	**			1,00	
> 6-12 months			1,00				1,21	***
>12 months			1,34	***			1,70	***
duration since last unsubsidized job								
0 months								
>0 - 6 months			1,36	***			1,41	***
>6 - 12 months			1,42	***			1,72	***
>1 - 2 years			1,18				1,50	***
>2 - 5 years			0,88				1,02	
>5 years			0,37	***			0,53	***
never employed			0,42	***			0,46	***

Table 3: entries into class-room training – Hazard ratios

		eastern Germany						western Germany					
		model 1		model 2		model 3		model 1		model 2		model 3	
baseline (months)													
0 - 5		0,00066	***	0,00072	***	0,00059	***	0,00075	***	0,00076	***	0,00074	***
6 - 11		0,00049	***	0,00054	***	0,00044	***	0,00050	***	0,00051	***	0,00049	***
12 - 17		0,00037	***	0,00041	***	0,00034	***	0,00047	***	0,00048	***	0,00046	***
18 - 23		0,00033	***	0,00037	***	0,00030	***	0,00044	***	0,00045	***	0,00044	***
24 - 29		0,00029	***	0,00032	***	0,00027	***	0,00046	***	0,00046	***	0,00045	***
30+		0,00027	***	0,00033	***	0,00027	***	0,00025	***	0,00026	***	0,00026	***
population group													
lone mothers		0,89	*	0,94		0,93		0,76	***	0,71	***	0,73	***
lone fathers		0,68		0,71		0,70		0,59	***	0,52	***	0,52	***
single women													
single men		1,00		0,96		0,95		1,05	*	0,98		0,98	
mothers with a partner		0,73	***	0,83	**	0,83	**	0,45	***	0,48	***	0,50	***
fathers with a partner		0,72	***	0,89		0,88		0,91	***	1,02		1,00	
childless women w. partner		0,61	***	0,80	***	0,81	***	0,60	***	0,66	***	0,67	***
childless men w. partner		0,46	***	0,68	***	0,68	***	0,74	***	0,88	***	0,86	***
girls age 15-17		0,03	***	0,20	*	0,20	*	0,07	***	0,22	***	0,22	***
boys age 15-17		0,05	***	0,39		0,39		0,05	***	0,16	***	0,16	***
women 18-24 in parent hh		0,79	*	0,47	***	0,47	***	0,62	***	0,45	***	0,47	***
men 18-24 in parent hh		0,86		0,51	***	0,51	***	0,75	***	0,55	***	0,57	***
women in other hh w. children		0,78		0,89		0,89		0,53	***	0,53	***	0,54	***
men in other hh w. children		0,69		0,77		0,76		0,78		0,80		0,79	
women in other hh no children		0,99		1,24		1,22		0,57	**	0,62	*	0,63	*
men in other hh no children		0,36		0,57		0,57		0,30	**	0,44		0,45	
# children < 18													
	1												
	2			1,06		1,06				1,00		1,00	
	3			1,21		1,22	*			0,90	*	0,91	
	4+			1,36	*	1,40	*			0,96		0,98	

age youngest child							
0 - 2	0,36	***	0,36	***	0,45	***	0,44	***
3 - 5								
6 - 9	1,05		1,04		1,07		1,07	
10 - 14	1,06		1,05		1,17	***	1,16	***
15 - 17	1,14		1,14		1,20	***	1,19	**
age								
<=17	0,11	***	0,13	***	0,25	***	0,28	***
18 - 24	1,51	***	1,58	***	1,03		1,07	*
25 - 29								
30 - 34	0,96		0,94		0,94		0,94	
35 - 39	0,93		0,90		0,92	**	0,93	**
40 - 44	0,84	***	0,80	***	0,84	***	0,85	***
45 - 49	0,67	***	0,64	***	0,78	***	0,80	***
50 - 54	0,54	***	0,52	***	0,62	***	0,64	***
55 - 59	0,27	***	0,27	***	0,28	***	0,29	***
60 - 64	0,16	***	0,17	***	0,03	***	0,03	***
calendar time								
oct-dec 05								
jan-jun 06	0,91		0,92		1,25	***	1,25	***
jul-dec 06	0,99		1,02		1,19	***	1,20	***
jan-jun 07	0,95		0,99		1,37	***	1,37	***
jul-dec 07	0,85	*	0,91		1,24	***	1,24	***
cumulative previous UBII without job or program								
0 months								
>0 - 3 months			1,16	**			0,95	
>3-6 months			1,34	***			1,00	
> 6-12 months			1,23	***			0,98	
>12 months			1,19	***			1,02	
duration since last unsubsidized job								
0 months								
>0 - 6 months			1,17	*			1,27	***
>6 - 12 months			1,23	**			1,16	***
>1 - 2 years			1,13				1,05	
>2 - 5 years			0,97				0,97	
>5 years			1,05				0,92	**
never employed			0,97				0,91	**

Table 4: entries into in-firm training – Hazard ratios

	eastern Germany						western Germany					
	model 1		model 2		model 3		model 1		model 2		model 3	
baseline (months)												
0 - 5	0,00067	***	0,00070	***	0,00079	***	0,00040	***	0,00049	***	0,00052	***
6 - 11	0,00046	***	0,00048	***	0,00054	***	0,00026	***	0,00032	***	0,00035	***
12 - 17	0,00039	***	0,00041	***	0,00046	***	0,00024	***	0,00030	***	0,00033	***
18 - 23	0,00040	***	0,00041	***	0,00047	***	0,00022	***	0,00027	***	0,00029	***
24 - 29	0,00030	***	0,00031	***	0,00035	***	0,00019	***	0,00023	***	0,00025	***
30+	0,00025	***	0,00028	***	0,00033	***	0,00014	***	0,00019	***	0,00021	***
population group												
lone mothers	0,62	***	0,55	***	0,57	***	0,52	***	0,46	***	0,48	***
lone fathers	0,72		0,72		0,73		0,76		0,70	*	0,65	**
single women												
single men	0,99		0,94		0,91	*	1,19	***	1,11	***	1,07	*
mothers with a partner	0,51	***	0,49	***	0,52	***	0,21	***	0,21	***	0,23	***
fathers with a partner	1,14	**	1,25	**	1,15		1,34	***	1,44	***	1,34	***
childless women w. partner	0,54	***	0,76	***	0,78	***	0,42	***	0,48	***	0,51	***
childless men w. partner	0,70	***	1,12		1,02		1,03		1,31	***	1,24	***
girls age 15-17	0,03	***	0,63		0,67		0,06	***	0,34	**	0,35	**
boys age 15-17	0,01	***	0,22		0,23		0,10	***	0,50		0,52	
women 18-24 in parent hh	0,67	***	0,40	***	0,46	***	0,78	**	0,51	***	0,59	***
men 18-24 in parent hh	0,88		0,52	***	0,59	***	0,78	**	0,51	***	0,58	***
women in other hh w. children	0,44	**	0,41	***	0,42	***	0,41	***	0,37	***	0,39	***
men in other hh w. children	1,46		1,44		1,21		0,73		0,73		0,71	
women in other hh no children	0,23	***	0,33	*	0,33	*	0,38	**	0,55		0,53	
men in other hh no children	0,77		1,44		1,47		0,19	*	0,37		0,38	
# children < 18												
1												
2			1,01		1,06				0,96		0,97	
3			1,02		1,11				0,80	***	0,82	**
4+			0,51	**	0,61	*			0,65	***	0,69	***
age youngest child												
0 - 2			0,59	***	0,53	***			0,63	***	0,61	***
3 - 5												

6 - 9	1,30	***	1,30	***	1,03		1,04	
10 - 14	1,26	**	1,28	**	1,21	**	1,21	**
15 - 17	1,32	**	1,30	**	1,55	***	1,53	***
age								
<=17	0,03	***	0,04	***	0,12	***	0,19	***
18 - 24	1,12	**	1,32	***	1,05		1,21	***
25 - 29								
30 - 34	0,75	***	0,76	***	0,85	***	0,85	***
35 - 39	0,63	***	0,67	***	0,80	***	0,80	***
40 - 44	0,50	***	0,55	***	0,67	***	0,69	***
45 - 49	0,40	***	0,45	***	0,47	***	0,50	***
50 - 54	0,38	***	0,44	***	0,35	***	0,39	***
55 - 59	0,15	***	0,18	***	0,14	***	0,17	***
60 - 64	0,04	***	0,04	***	0,04	***	0,05	***
calendar time								
oct-dec 05								
jan-jun 06	1,53	***	1,55	***	1,33	***	1,34	***
jul-dec 06	1,30	***	1,39	***	1,07		1,11	
jan-jun 07	1,39	***	1,46	***	1,17	**	1,21	***
jul-dec 07	1,36	***	1,45	***	1,01		1,07	
cumulative previous UBII without job or program								
0 months								
>0 - 3 months			1,06				1,11	**
>3-6 months			0,94				1,11	**
> 6-12 months			0,88	***			1,00	
>12 months			1,08				1,20	***
duration since last unsubsidized job								
0 months								
>0 - 6 months			1,55	***			1,29	***
>6 - 12 months			1,17	*			1,27	***
>1 - 2 years			1,00				0,96	
>2 - 5 years			0,85	**			0,77	***
>5 years			0,43	***			0,53	***
never employed			0,55	***			0,53	***

Table 5: Entries into One-Euro-Jobs – Hazard ratios. Sample limited to people who have ever registered as searching for a job

	eastern Germany				western Germany			
	model 1		model 2		model 1		model 2	
baseline (months)								
0 - 5	0,00016	***	0,00022	***	0,00028	***	0,00032	***
6 - 11	0,00010	***	0,00014	***	0,00017	***	0,00019	***
12 - 17	0,00014	***	0,00019	***	0,00020	***	0,00023	***
18 - 23	0,00010	***	0,00014	***	0,00016	***	0,00018	***
24 - 29	0,00012	***	0,00016	***	0,00017	***	0,00020	***
30+	0,00016	***	0,00021	***	0,00014	***	0,00015	***
population group								
lone mothers	0,98		0,97		0,73	***	0,72	***
lone fathers	1,23		1,16		1,05		1,03	
single women								
single men	1,16	***	1,11	***	1,24	***	1,22	***
mothers with a partner	0,87	**	0,85	**	0,43	***	0,42	***
fathers with a partner	1,07		1,02		1,05		1,02	
childless women w. partner	0,97		0,95		0,72	***	0,71	***
childless men w. partner	1,02		0,99		1,05		1,02	
girls age 15-17	0,10	***	0,11	***	0,28	***	0,31	***
boys age 15-17	0,20	***	0,22	***	0,59	**	0,63	**
women 18-24 in parent hh	0,54	***	0,54	***	0,52	***	0,52	***
men 18-24 in parent hh	0,58	***	0,55	***	0,73	***	0,72	***
women in other hh w. children	0,69	*	0,67	*	0,64	***	0,63	***
men in other hh w. children	0,82		0,79		0,80		0,79	
women in other hh no children	1,07		1,05		0,72	*	0,71	**
men in other hh no children	1,23		1,18		0,47	*	0,46	*
# children < 18								
1								
2	1,07		1,05		0,90	***	0,89	***
3	1,16	*	1,13		0,92	*	0,90	**
4+	1,33	**	1,27	**	0,89		0,87	*
age youngest child								
0 - 2	0,39	***	0,39	***	0,51	***	0,52	***
3 - 5								
6 - 9	0,92		0,93		1,04		1,03	

10 - 14	1,06		1,06		1,13	***	1,12	**
15 - 17	1,00		1,01		1,24	***	1,23	***
age								
<=17	1,11		1,00		0,97		0,95	
18 - 24	2,32	***	2,26	***	1,91	***	1,85	***
25 - 29								
30 - 34	1,11	**	1,12	**	1,00		1,01	
35 - 39	1,32	***	1,34	***	1,06	*	1,06	*
40 - 44	1,32	***	1,34	***	1,18	***	1,17	***
45 - 49	1,43	***	1,44	***	1,27	***	1,26	***
50 - 54	1,41	***	1,42	***	1,24	***	1,23	***
55 - 59	1,26	***	1,26	***	0,96		0,94	*
60 - 64	0,25	***	0,25	***	0,22	***	0,22	***
calendar time								
oct-dec 05								
jan-jun 06	1,17	***	1,18	***	1,33	***	1,34	***
jul-dec 06	0,95		0,95		1,09	**	1,11	***
jan-jun 07	0,91		0,92		1,09	**	1,11	**
jul-dec 07	0,69	***	0,70	***	0,86	***	0,88	***
cumulative previous UBII without job or program								
0 months								
>0 - 3 months	2,53	***	2,41	***	2,20	***	2,14	***
>3-6 months	2,44	***	2,31	***	2,17	***	2,10	***
> 6-12 months	1,95	***	1,84	***	1,91	***	1,84	***
>12 months	2,04	***	1,91	***	2,23	***	2,13	***
duration since last unsubsidized job								
0 months								
>0 - 6 months	1,15	*	1,14	*	1,16	***	1,15	***
>6 - 12 months	1,78	***	1,75	***	1,67	***	1,65	***
>1 - 2 years	2,09	***	2,04	***	1,77	***	1,75	***
>2 - 5 years	2,12	***	2,10	***	1,71	***	1,71	***
>5 years	2,19	***	2,13	***	1,78	***	1,78	***
never employed	1,64	***	1,62	***	1,56	***	1,58	***
level of education								
no degree								
lower secondary degree			0,89	***			0,99	
intermediate secondary degree			0,75	***			0,85	***

upper secondary degree (lower level)	0,54	***	0,76	***
upper secondary degree (higher level)	0,53	***	0,67	***
missing	0,66	***	0,66	***

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